Commentary

Volume Seventy-six, Number Four, October 1983

The Rise & Decline of Industrial Japan
Norman Gall

George Will and American Conservatism
James Nuechterlein

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Richard Breitman & Alan M. Kraut

On Nuclear Morality
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Books in Review:
Nathan Glazer/Mona Charen/David Gress/Howard Kaye/Adam B. Ulam

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A nonsmoker might have to spend 100 hours straight in a smoky bar to inhale the equivalent of a single filter cigarette.

Other recent studies on the effects of cigarette smoke in the air report similar findings. For example, a noted German scientist wrote in 1982 that the question of whether ambient smoke may be injurious to health remains open, based on presently available research.

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

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Commentary

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Consumer Orientation
No. 24 in a series
Subject: Design objective: maximum performance, not maximum production.

24 Porsche 944

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

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Letters from Readers

Appeasement

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

After reading "Appeasement By Any Other Name" [July], I only wish that Woody Allen would cast Norman Podhoretz in his next movie. Podhoretz as Dr. Strangelove! Podhoretz defoliating the greenery in Vietnam—whoops, I mean Central America! Podhoretz dropping nuclear weapons over Central America!

It is beyond credulity that a social scientist of Mr. Podhoretz's perspicacity can believe what he writes. Reverse the totalitarian drift in Central America short of occupation by American forces? Mandate democratic government on regimes that have for so long resisted such efforts? Larger defense budgets to protect us against Cuba and Nicaragua? Deter a war with the Soviet Union by being "prepared and willing if necessary to fight," as if we are not now so prepared? It's *Star Wars* and *Return of the Jedi*, except Mr. Podhoretz wants to play fatal games with those of us, and the next generation, who inhabit this planet.

ALAN D. KANDEL
Detroit, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The concluding paragraphs of "Appeasement By Any Other Name" urge that "the United States . . . do whatever may be required, up to and including the dispatch of troops, to stop and then reverse the totalitarian drift in Central America." Two ideas are working here: cold war and hot war. The cold war is waged against Communism; the hot war is waged against people. In a cold war we shoot baloney; in a hot war we shoot bullets. . . . Fallen cold warriors rise again; fallen hot warriors do not. A cold war makes careers; a hot war makes pain.

A good example of a cold-war skirmish is the job Norman Podhoretz did on Anthony Lewis; a good example of a hot-war skirmish is the job that was done on Marty Budack. . . . Marty had been dead for several hours when I found him —wan, dirty, disheveled. . . . The inscription on his grave reads: "Killed in Action . . . Korea . . . June 25th, 1953 . . . 279th Inf. Regt.". . . .

That's just one hot-war story; there have been 112,000 stories like Marty's since 1945, the beginning of the cold war. . . . All of the cold-war casualties but two—the Rosenbergs—rose again; the hot war maimed and dead remain so. And the pain endures.

If my two Marine sons are sent to Central America, . . . they'll be shooting bullets. And the dead will stay that way. . . .

ROBERT P. HELMAN
San Francisco, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Norman Podhoretz's "Appeasement By Any Other Name" is remarkable for its utter want of humanity. The soldiers of the army of El Salvador, with considerable assistance from sundry right-wing death squads, have murdered tens of thousands of their fellow citizens. These are crimes attested to and condemned by our last two ambassadors to El Salvador. To judge from his article, such atrocities fail to wring even the tiniest shudder of disgust from Mr. Podhoretz.

Does it become a great nation to indulge in such viciousness? Must this administration assuage its ideological dementia over mutilated corpses? Is our government eager to bestride an abattoir?

If Mr. Podhoretz believes that torture and mass murder are incidental to the task of checking the spread of Communism in El Salvador, he ought to summon the courage to state this forthrightly.

TIMOTHY JAY DUBOIS
Phoenix, Arizona

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . If "appeasement by any other name" is to be condemned, then we must also reject the appeasement policy of "the lesser evil" which Norman Podhoretz and Jeane Kirkpatrick advocate in combating Soviet subversion not only in Central America but all over the globe. This sterile philosophy goes against everything America stands for and has a negative influence on our image abroad.

Present American foreign policy seems to be based on some form of computerized body count which weighs the tens of millions killed by the various types of Communist regimes against the many thousands murdered by the governments Washington supports; this policy

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goes under the insidious label of "supporting the lesser evil." How absurd this policy has become is evident in relation to El Salvador where the American people have been told by their government that if we give the Salvador regime military and economic support it may be induced to bring to justice the murderers of our compatriots who innocently became targets of government-controlled forces. In this connection it is totally irrelevant whether or not the government of El Salvador was democratically elected. To anyone in his right mind the priorities should be reversed; logic would demand that the administration ask Congress to hold up additional aid to El Salvador until that government has brought the murderers to justice. This example alone shows how Mr. Podhoretz and Ambassador Kirkpatrick have lost touch with what ordinary Americans would consider simple morality. They are on a downhill track which slowly but steadily will bring us on a par with the concepts of the various Marxist regimes guided solely by the end-justifies-the-means ideology. . . .

The shallowness of the Podhoretz/Kirkpatrick policy advice is even further exposed by Mr. Podhoretz's self-congratulatory mention of "the simple fact that the United States . . . helped *in the end* to topple the Somoza regime in Nicaragua . . ." (emphasis added). These three little words—"in the end"—are most revealing. . . . After first rationalizing the lesser evil and doing our utmost to maintain the status quo, we then—"in the end"—when it is too late, switch sides, trying to recoup the ground lost by our sterile appeasement of dishonorable and oppressive regimes. It should surprise no one when such opportunism is recognized for what it is and rebuffed.

We will remain on the losing side of all these confrontations and actually further the Communist scenario unless we develop a clear *American* policy based on the great institutions bequeathed to us by the founders of this country: our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights. These documents, incorporating universally admired and envied progressive and moral principles, will prove superior to anything the Communists can offer. They should be the cornerstone of a non-appeasement policy which every American can proudly support.

WALTER A. SHELDON
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Norman Podhoretz makes an unpersuasive argument in his discussion of Central America. He quotes the coordinator of the American Friends Service Committee's Human Rights Program as saying about the Sandinista government: "In many aspects of Nicaraguan life—nutrition, education, health care, and land reform—there have been tremendous improvements." His response is a mixture of evasion and sarcasm: "Having sung this old familiar song whose strains have echoed in countless reports from Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, Ho's North Vietnam, and Castro's Cuba, this Quaker guardian of human rights acknowledges that there have been a few violations [of human rights] in Nicaragua."

Mr. Podhoretz evidently feels that the claims for improvements under Sandinista rule can be dismissed because they are an "old song." But how would he feel if someone dismissed claims that capitalist incentive improved economic efficiency in, say, Taiwan, with the remark that it is an old song whose strains have been heard in South Korea, Chile, Guatemala, etc.? I suggest he would be annoyed by the lack of logic and the evasion of the main issue: did this particular form of rule bring benefits in this particular case? And how are those benefits to be weighed against the debits of the government in power, including human-rights violations? Here, rather than examining the situation on its merits, Mr. Podhoretz is content to deduce conclusions from his own preconceptions: i.e., that revolutionary movements against right-wing dictatorships are always and everywhere and in all respects pernicious.

The impression I have from consulting as wide a variety of sources as I can find is that at least some of the Sandinista claims for progress in health care, literacy, nutrition, and land reform are true. The impression I have from careful reading of a wide variety of human-rights reports is that the violations in Nicaragua now are fewer and less severe than they were under the Somoza regime, and than they are under the present government in El Salvador. The Sandinistas' brutal treatment of the Miskitos, which stirred a very sudden concern with the rights of Latin American Indians in General Haig, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and President Reagan, is a kind of behavior so common in the Salvadoran military (not to mention that of Guatemala) that it doesn't even make the news. The continuous accounts of atrocities are noted in bulging human-rights reports and filed away. Mr. Podhoretz's article has done nothing to persuade me that my impressions are wrong.

MICHAEL A. SELLS
Stanford University
Stanford, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I found "Appeasement By Any Other Name" substantive and thought-provoking. I agree with its major thesis that there is a widespread and serious myopia concerning the dangers of totalitarian expansionism. There certainly does exist in the U.S. a pacifist current which makes the conduct of a foreign policy actively pursuing national goals difficult, if not impossible. . . .

Mr. Podhoretz may be accurate in saying that the general current results in de-facto appeasement, but he has failed to articulate an alternative policy which makes sense to the millions who support the freeze and are suspicious of U.S. intervention in Latin America. . . . I would argue that American foreign policy will be ineffectual as long as public opinion is sharply divided. . . .

At the conceptual level, I most disagree with the article's total dismissal of "isolationism." The concept of an independent, nonaligned foreign policy was the key to American foreign policy until the 20th century. The founding fathers believed that Europe was undemocratic, corrupt, and prone to nationalistic conflicts which resulted in destructive wars. Does our 20th-century experience with Communism, Nazism, and two world wars suggest they were wrong?

The isolationism of the 20's was a direct reaction to President Wilson's ill-advised internationalism (and Anglophilia) which drew the U.S. into the world war and gave the Allies such a total victory that they were able to impose conditions which led directly to the rise of Hitler and World War II. Isolationism may have led the U.S. to ignore Hitler for too long, but interventionism helped to generate the threat in the first place.

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In similar fashion, the isolationism of today (which need not result in policies of appeasement) springs largely from the aggressiveness and interventionism of Lyndon Johnson and, to a lesser extent, Richard Nixon. It is a corrective public response which has now lost its policy focus, and is drifting. Mr. Podhoretz is right to criticize the self-deceptions of the contemporary manifestations of isolationism, but he should also recognize that a dynamic, effective foreign policy can be conducted without intruding upon the sovereignty of other nations, and it is in our long-term interest to do so. Further, since the United States is clearly overextended, both geographically and economically, isolationism offers us short-term benefits as well.

Nevertheless, as Mr. Podhoretz points out, neither isolationism nor any other American political heritage has been indifferent to the fate of Latin America. The inconsistencies and rationalizations of liberal politicians in this area are alarming. But Mr. Podhoretz does little better. Downplaying or ignoring assassination and torture in El Salvador make no more sense than rationalizing Nicaragua's violations of democracy. The political polarization among U.S. opinion leaders creates, on both sides, the desire to overlook awkward or unpleasant facts. . . .

Abroad, we concern ourselves with international economic and military competition, but are far less effective in the ideological battle. We continue to support brutal ruling cliques and thereby build deep-seated, long-term resentment toward the U.S. Russia would not have a sliver of ideological credibility left were it not for the counterproductive nature of U.S. foreign policy.

If America doesn't stand *for* something, Communism will continue to seem inevitable. We must bring hope, hope for freedom and hope for economic well-being, to the populations of the nations we seek to assist. The 1982 elections in El Salvador were successful because of the promise of freedom which our presence brought.

When America truly projects the principles upon which it was founded, grass-roots support for Communist movements will dry up and blow away. Further, around these principles, the vast majority of Americans can unify. The two essential preconditions for the de-

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feat of international Communism will have been realized.

Mr. Podhoretz is right to "speak plainly" and well. He also needs to speak constructively and politically. America, principled and united, can never be defeated. How do we get that way again, Mr. Podhoretz?

DAVID L. SALLACH
Omaha, Nebraska

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

With "The Present Danger" [March 1980] and a persistent drumbeat of other warning articles, Norman Podhoretz and COMMENTARY have made a unique and indispensable contribution to creating "the new consensus" concerning the dangerous growth of Soviet power, the decline of American power, and the urgent need to restore a favorable global balance.

Now, five years after "The Present Danger," and almost three years after the election of President Reagan which confirmed the new consensus, Mr. Podhoretz, in a brilliant and most timely statement of the case, finds it necessary to warn us that the new consensus is in imminent danger of being overwhelmed from within and without by a rising tide of appeasement, most urgently in the key areas of defense and Central America. . . .

I find . . . a serious flaw in the premises of Mr. Podhoretz's well-reasoned case. . . . As he repeatedly defines it, the new consensus incorporates not only the determination to resist Soviet expansionism by more forceful policies and a vast program of rearmament, but also opposition in principle to all disarmament negotiations as a trap and a delusion which can only lead to loss of will and appeasement in its various guises.

In my view, however, opposition to negotiation was never a part of the national consensus. When the administration at the outset acted in accordance with this erroneous belief, it found to its consternation that it had allowed the opposition to paint the President as a "warmonger." The disastrous result was to give renewed impetus to the whole array of pacifists, isolationists, and other opponents of the new consensus. It was only when the President belatedly shifted gears and presented a more forthcoming attitude toward negotiations that the tide was slowed, but the consensus had suffered serious damage. If the administration were perceived as returning to a policy of "no negotiations," the new consensus would . . . go up in smoke.

I think the fallacy lies in equating negotiations *per se* with appeasement. Surely, negotiating from a position of weakness is an invitation to disaster; but negotiating from a position of strength is the only road to a stable peace. . . . This calls for a two-track strategy: on the one hand, rearm and forcefully defend our vital interests; on the other hand, be ready to use our renewed strength to conduct negotiations while never lowering our guard. I also seem to recall Paul Nitze arguing that the negotiating process serves us well during the long catch-up period that lies ahead. I do not lightly dismiss Mr. Podhoretz's fears based on the sad history of earlier negotiations, but in this Kafkaesque century, we have only the choice of nightmares. . . .

Andrei Sakharov, in his "Open Letter to Dr. Sidney Drell" (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1983), made the point that the U.S. should negotiate from strength and urged the U.S. to proceed with the MX as the reply to the Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 and, implicitly, to go forward with the Euromissiles in response to Russia's SS-20. Sakharov went even farther in rejecting as inadequate Drell's criterion that all the West needs is a "reliable deterrent." Sakharov's criterion for successful negotiations is a favorable global political and military "correlation of forces," which includes conventional as well as nuclear arms.

My letter is already long enough without commenting on the subject of European appeasement and refusal to assume global responsibilities, but this issue will soon enough require increasing attention. I regard the placement of the Euromissiles in December (absent an agreement) as the litmus test of European will and shared responsibility. If the Europeans reject the missiles, then Europe, in my view, is indefensible and we must draw the necessary conclusions: withdraw our troops *and* cancel our unilateral nuclear commitment.

I look forward to Mr. Podhoretz clarifying his views on the aspects I have discussed, while once again expressing my gratitude to COMMENTARY and its editor for invaluable contributions to the awakening of America to our present and future danger.

ELIAS M. SCHWARZBART
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Thank you for "Appeasement By Any Other Name." I wish Mr. Podhoretz success in this call to vigilance and hope it will make converts to his views.

There are two minor points I would like to make. Mr. Podhoretz's analysis of the advocates of appeasement fails to consider that they are motivated by anti-Americanism. Joseph Epstein in his "The Education of an Anti-Capitalist" [August] made this concept real through painful self-analysis.

The other point is that we continue to refer to the Russian empire as the Soviet Union. Such niceties may be proper for the State Department, but for those who deal in truth, the beast should be called by its proper name. Such usage may catch on, and certainly will strip the Russian empire of its false banner: under the Czar it was the Orthodox religion and Pan-Slavism, now the camouflage is Communism.

MENAHEM STEINBERG
Chicago, Illinois

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to add a few comments to Norman Podhoretz's excellent analysis of the current spirit of appeasement in American foreign policy.

He is of course right in designating pacifism and isolationism as the most immediate and clearly identifiable sources of the attitudes and policies he examines. I suggest that underlying these "twins" there is a combination of attitudes one would not readily associate with one another. One of them is, needless to say, alienation, or the rejection of American society; the other a sense of security, excessive, unrealistic, "surplus security" one might call it. Both have been with us for a long time, but of late—since Reagan was voted into office—they have intensified. In the early 1980's we have witnessed a resurgence of attitudes and beliefs more often linked with the 1960's. They include the further decline in levels of collective self-esteem among elite groups and segments of the population influenced by them.

Thus beneath pacifism and isolationism is the belief—articulated or not—that this society is not worth defending and certainly not worth any strenuous effort or expenditure of resources. It follows from the unwillingness to defend this society (and the values it represents) that the nature of the threat has to be

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redefined. Ever since Vietnam, and especially in the last few years, there has been in many circles a gradual though cumulatively dramatic change in what might be called the threshold of threat perception. Thus the expansion of Soviet influence—or that of its proxies and client states—no longer matters. To be sure, the expansion of such influence and power is denied or minimized as long as possible; if and when it is finally acknowledged, it is deemed trivial or irrelevant. Surely, the proponents of this view argue, we have nothing to fear from tiny Nicaragua (earlier tiny Cuba or distant Vietnam). And if the Soviet Union acquires more client states in Africa, that will just be a burden, not a gain. And if it subdues the Afghans that will be a great *moral* defeat. In any event, the Soviet Union is a status-quo power (occasionally unable to overcome temptations when opportunities are particularly attractive). . . .

The second major factor in the redefinition of the Soviet threat is a residual (if unconscious) sense of security, noted above, that leads to delusions about American power, which is often seen by critics of society as excessive, overwhelming, and malevolent. By contrast, many still see the Soviet Union as a poor, mismanaged country (which it may well be), unable to harm us. It is inconceivable to these people that a country which cannot produce a steady supply of onions or carrots or windshield wipers, and is lacking in video games and good plumbing, is capable of menacing the West.

It is also true, as Mr. Podhoretz notes, that the Soviet Union is no longer an object of admiration by estranged Westerners as had been the case decades earlier. At the same time, being an adversary of the United States still holds some appeal for the critics; after all, Soviet spokesmen are also denouncing capitalism, racism, the arms race, the multinationals, etc. The barrage of peace propaganda has its effects, too, being exactly what the Western champions of disarmament (often unilateral) wish to hear. And if the Soviet Union is no longer admired for its domestic policies and institutions, estranged Americans have succeeded in finding surrogates and substitutes not only for the USSR, but also for China, Vietnam, or Cuba; the new, no doubt temporary, subjects of veneration are the guerrillas in El Salvador and the regime in Nicaragua. These attitudes also influence foreign policy so far as Central America is concerned.

Perhaps it is not so much that the appeasement-minded look at Communism in general as the wave of the future; rather, they look at the United States (and the West) as doomed, declining, and flawed, undeserving of support and loyalty.

Thus in the final analysis pacifism and isolationism may be the products of seemingly contradictory attitudes. There is on the one hand the desire—prompted by alienation

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—to see the U.S. go to "the dustbin of history," to be replaced by some new, undefined social-political formation. On the other hand, there is also wishful thinking about external threats and the attendant illusion about the invulnerability of the U.S. (and, one might add, the irrelevance of events abroad to the personal lives of the isolationists and pacifists).

One final paradox. While the pacifists and isolationists excel in conjuring up the most elaborate apocalyptic scenarios of a global nuclear holocaust, their imagination is curiously hamstrung when it comes to envisioning the more proximate and plausible threats and the political-economic privations which the continued decline of American power abroad portends for the U.S. and for the West in general.

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Norman Podhoretz is undoubtedly correct in ascribing to liberal opinion a tendency to see in Communist insurgencies both the inevitable tide of historical change and an impassioned protest against social inequities and exploitation. Concerned as he is, however, with the consequences of these attitudes for American foreign policy, he does not address the question of the origin of such perplexing views. On this subject I would like to add some thoughts of my own.

Superficially, these liberal attitudes might be attributed either to "the lessons of Vietnam" or to liberal compassion for the victims of injustice. But neither of these explanations can on close inspection be urged with much conviction. The swing of liberal opinion against the American effort in Vietnam came before, not after, its manifest failure, and was at least one of the principal causes of that failure. Moreover, as a rule, liberals have been remarkably less compassionate about inequities produced by revolutions than they are about those which putatively cause them.

For a better understanding of the difficulties liberals find in recognizing the threat to the United States inherent in the advance of Communist movements, I would suggest a consideration of the very nature of the political vocation of the liberal Left, and the tactical imperatives and self-justifying myths which this vocation tends to confer on its practitioners.

The basis of liberal politics, and the key to its success, lie in the mobilization of social resentments. The politics of liberalism proceeds by identifying or creating feelings of disaffection with established institutions and practices, and then channelling this animus into claims for the political power allegedly needed to redress the grievances. Discord, alienation, and an entrenched suspicion about the worthiness of the prevailing order all facilitate the advance of such politics. In contrast, a nation which perceives a grave external threat is apt to draw together, the authority of its leading institutions generally becomes strengthened, and strong pressure builds to shelve outstanding differences, at least temporarily, in a common effort. In short, a climate comes into existence in which the cultivation of solidarity rather than contention is placed at a premium, putting liberalism politically at a disadvantage. Sensing this, many liberals stubbornly deny, or attempt to argue away, the reality of external threats even when, as in Central America, these are quite palpable and close at hand.

The concept of political selfhood possessed by most liberals also impedes their capacity to assess threat, at least when the peril comes from the Left. In his own eyes, and in his public claims, the liberal characteristically identifies himself as a "good" person. His quest for power finds its ultimate justification in his superior and disinterested benevolence, and in his sympathy for the victimized of the world. To make these claims credible, he must convince himself that selflessness can be, and indeed is, a widespread and sufficient spur to political activity; any other assumption would inevitably lead to doubting the viability of the welfare state he so assiduously promotes.

Revolutionaries, of course, make quite similar motivational claims for themselves, citing a sense of outrage provoked by evils similar in kind to, if different in degree from, those inflaming the liberal conscience. Thus while the liberal may fault the revolutionary on his resort to violence and contempt for civil liberties, he finds it difficult to withhold recognition for noble intentions. If sanctity can prevail in the halls of Congress, why doubt its presence in the hills of El Salvador? The inevitable result is to dull the edge of any apprehensions about the nature of revolutionary objectives that liberals might initially possess. Convinced as he is that revolutionaries are basically, like himself, decent fellows, the liberal reasons that given good will some sort of mutual accommodation can ultimately be worked out.

It is these structural features of the contemporary liberal enterprise more than any reactions to events of recent history which form the major obstacles to a clear-sighted appreciation of the dangers with which our country is now faced.

STEPHEN H. BALCH
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . I would like to add two main points to Norman Podhoretz's analysis. The first is that the appeasement movement exists not only here, but even more intensely in Europe. European anti-Americanism is a counterpart to American isolationism. The second, perhaps more important, point is that the Soviet people and the Soviet government are just as afraid of an atomic war as those in the free world. The Soviet military build-up is meant to deter such a war. . . .

While the U.S. speaks of deterrence as if it were the absolute weapon against war, the Soviets are aware that deterrence will work only if it is coupled with an adequate foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy is geared toward dividing and demobilizing not only the Atlantic Alliance but the consensus within each of the countries in the alliance. The Soviets make use of internal and international contradictions, they help to build mass movements, they infiltrate even anti-Soviet institutions and organizations, and thus make politicians in the West bend. . . .

Why hasn't the West developed a policy that would . . . force the Soviets into a defensive posture, a policy that would create a consensus within each allied nation and within the Western Alliance as a whole, a policy that would divide the East? Such a policy does in fact exist. Only a year ago *Strategic Review* published a manifesto by Franz-Josef Strauss, chairman of the German Christian Social Union [CSU]. This program was adopted by the CDU/CSU in its election platform and was accepted by a remarkable majority of the West Ger-

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man electorate in the recent German elections.

The main idea of this policy is as follows: there is a tension in the world situation today which could lead to war. If we wish to eliminate this tension, with all its consequences, we must first understand why it occurred. After World War II the Soviet Union brought Central and Eastern Europe under its control; the West perceived this area as a Soviet corridor of aggression, and responded by forming NATO. The Soviets denied that they had any aggressive intentions, declared that NATO was an aggressive alliance, and formed the Warsaw Pact. These two powerful military blocs now threaten to destroy each other. It is obvious that but for the situation in Central and Eastern Europe neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact would have been established. . . . Consequently, if the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were granted the right of self-determination—i.e., the right of free elections in which they could elect either Communist or non-Communist governments—both NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be dissolved, all atomic weapons could be destroyed, and the greatest danger mankind has to face could be eliminated.

It should be clear that neither Franz-Josef Strauss nor West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is a naive political dreamer. They know the Soviet system, what it stands for, and how it works, better than any American politician. After all, more than twenty million of their fellow Germans are deprived of all human rights under Soviet occupation. . . . Probably neither Strauss nor Kohl expected the Soviets to accept their proposals, but they might well have expected them to appeal to the U.S., where ideas of freedom and peace have such a long tradition.

This strategy for freedom and peace could in fact bring about a real political consensus in the U.S. So long as the Soviet Union refused to accept it, Americans would see the necessity . . . of deterrence. It would then also be possible to prove to the peace movement and to the Catholic bishops that it is the U.S. which stands for peace and the Soviet Union which opposes it, since this policy is connected not to a nuclear freeze or a reduction in armaments but to the destruction of all atomic weapons and massive disarmament. And since Germany has already accepted it—at least as a commitment—we could expect a consensus within the Atlantic Alliance as well. The majority of the Third World nations would also welcome such a policy, first because these nations are opposed to war, but mainly because if it were adopted, tremendous means would be freed which could then be used for badly needed aid to the Third World.

A new international political climate would thus be created, the Soviets would be put on the defensive and would be forced to admit that their real aim is not peace but the expansion of their imperial power. It would then be the Andropovs, Jaruzelskis, Husáks, Castros, Assads, *et al.* who would be forced to bend. . . .

EUGEN LOEBL

New York City

1983 STATE OF WORLD JEWRY ADDRESS: NORMAN PODHORETZ

Norman Podhoretz is the author of five books, including *Why We Were in Vietnam, The Present Danger,* and *Making It.*

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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Before we contemplate the dispatch of the U.S. forces "to stop and then to reverse the totalitarian drift in Central America," a clear statement of goals and objectives must be set forth by the government. There must be no half-hearted, piecemeal commitment of small detachments, sent to bleed a little, while Congress and public opinion sit on the fence.

During Vietnam, members of the uniformed services and their families bore the sacrifices; most other Americans sat it out as spectators. (I served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1967 to 1969.)

As Senator Alan Simpson has noted, a fundamental (because geographical) difference between Vietnam 1975 and Central America 1983 is that for the refugees from newly-established totalitarian regimes, a boat is not the only way out. It's a long walk to the U.S. from Central America, but it's still only a walk. . . .

[Major] ROBERT P. FAIRCHILD
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to thank Norman Podhoretz for a timely and powerfully written article. . . . I totally agree with his analysis and his solution to the problem of Communist hegemony. It all goes back to the age-old adage, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," to which I would add, "Better than the appeaser's solution of no cure at all." The consequences of surrender are without a doubt worse than the consequences of all-out nuclear war. And only a sensible policy of peace through strength can prevent the latter.

RUSSELL L. BLAYLOCK
High Point, North Carolina

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I read Norman Podhoretz's article and was amazed and delighted by its clarity of argument and depth of insight. . . . Unfortunately, I do not share his optimism. The history of mankind does not seem to leave us with much hope that truth will win out in this quagmire of lies and deceit. . . .

MIKE D'VIRGILIO
Los Angeles, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I applaud Norman Podhoretz's article in which he correctly points out that the nuclear-freeze movement and the pacifists play directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.

I am a great believer in looking at the past in order to learn from it. It is my contention that the Soviets today are copying the Nazis of fifty years ago. The Nazis threatened their neighbors who were militarily weak, suffered from the Depression, remembered World War I, and were not willing to go to war to protect their freedom. The result was weakness and defeat for the democracies. England and France finally stood up but the damage had been done. Czechoslovakia was lost at Munich and it took World War II to defeat the Nazis. Are we going in the same direction again? Certainly, many Democrats in Congress sound the way the British did before World War II. Appeasement did not pay off then and it should not pay off now. . . .

WALTER J. SCHLOSS
New Canaan, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to congratulate Norman Podhoretz for writing a brilliant political essay. . . . He has hit the nail on the head again and I earnestly hope the press will wake up soon.

What troubles me is that most Americans have no idea what is going on and the press continually deceives them on any kind of conflict it may write about. The United States pays a very high price for what the media do and can do by opening up every little conflict to public debate.

What is at work here in all this senseless killing in Central America is not only social repression, but the determination of Cuba to support any dedicated group of Marxists who want power for themselves. Fidel Castro in his demonic way is obsessed with the idea of destroying the United States without firing a shot. I cannot for the life of me understand how the press in the United States can continually avoid the obvious by not telling the Americans what Castro intends to do in this hemisphere. . . .

Foreign policy is too important to be left to journalists like Anthony Lewis, Tom Wicker, Strobe Talbott, and a few others who can't seem to break through the screen of deceit and report the news (facts) objectively, so the reader will understand the truth. . . .

VICTOR C. CAMPO
Montevideo, Uruguay

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Thank God for Norman Podhoretz! "Appeasement By Any Other Name" is an outstanding article. Sadly, it will have little effect on the accommodationists because they are, to borrow Mr. Podhoretz's phrase, ". . . so stupid and so ignorant of history . . ." that they make a habit of disregarding the truth. Still, the article will serve to stiffen the resolve of the pro-defense and anti-Communist groups. I hope the members of Congress who read it will come to the realization that we have scant margin for error in Central America.

As to the short memories of the pacifists: one of the bonuses of being a modern American "liberal" is that one does not have to take responsibility for one's failures or errors of judgment. I long to hear the prominent antiwar activists of the Vietnam era come forth and say, "We were wrong." I pray it won't be necessary to hope for the same statement from the El Salvador accommodationists in, say, 1988.

JOHN SHAFFER
Canton, Pennsylvania

NORMAN PODHORETZ writes:

Let me begin by pointing to what does *not* appear in any of the above letters (or, for that matter, in any of the letters addressed privately to me, or in any of the published comment on "Appeasement By Any Other Name"). No one has said that I misrepresented the ideas of the opposition to the 1980 consensus when I described them as pacifist and isolationist in inspiration. No one has even objected to my use of the term appeasement in summing up the implications for policy of the opposition's ideas. It is tempting to conclude from this apparent acquiescence that the new pacifists, isolationists, and appeasers are now willing to travel under their true colors and no longer object to being called by their proper names. Unfortunately for honest political discussion, however, several of the above letters indicate that such a conclusion would be overly optimistic.

Alan D. Kandel, Robert P. Helman, and Timothy Jay duBois, for example, all inform me that people get killed in war—and Mr. duBois adds a self-righteous lecture on the atrocities of guerrilla war (though the only atrocities that wring a "shudder of disgust" from him are the ones committed by anti-Com-

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

The Bateke people of the Republic of the Congo have a tradition where, upon the birth of a boy child, a statue is carved by a talented villager. The purpose of this statue is to protect the boy until he reaches puberty. Although the quality of these statues is very inconsistent, the best of them are worthy of a place among the great works of Art.

Ancestors appear frequently in the sculpture of the West African people. This emphasis reflects a basic fact about the nature of African existence, that is that each African is what he is and has what he has as a member of a family, i.e., the descendant of an ancestor. It is this ancestor sculpture that so amazed European cubists at the beginning of this century.

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

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munist forces). But they seem not to realize that in saying that Soviet power and Communist totalitarianism are not worth fighting against, they are calling for the appeasement, and thereby the spread, of those evils.

Walter A. Sheldon, similarly, seems not to realize that to attack the strategy of the lesser evil is to accept or to promote the victory of the greater. In invoking the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, moreover, he also seems unaware of the fact that the men who wrote those documents entered into an alliance with the France of the Bastille. And finally, he fails to see that a foreign policy based on the principles of the Declaration of Independence would be a foreign policy actively engaged in trying to *overthrow* totalitarian Communist regimes, not one bound to increase the number of such regimes.

Unlike Mr. Sheldon, Michael A. Sells is all for the strategy of the lesser evil, though to him that means supporting the Sandinistas. He believes that the Sandinistas have made improvements; I am skeptical for the simple reason that exactly the same claims for similar regimes have repeatedly been made in the past only to be proved false (which has *not* been the case with claims of economic development in Taiwan and South Korea). Moreover, the Sandinistas are still in the process of consolidating their power. What reason is there to believe that if they succeed in turning Nicaragua into a full-fledged Communist state, it will be any less repressive politically or any less miserable economically than any other Communist state in the world?

David L. Sallach's letter is far more civil than Mr. Sheldon's, and he is far more forthright than Mr. duBois. But like them he misrepresents the nature and extent of American support for "brutal ruling cliques," whether in Central America or anywhere else in the world. The truth is that the United States has consistently tried to follow a lesser-evil strategy while at the same time encouraging such democratic forces as might exist in a given situation (if they happened to exist at all).

Liberals used to know this. Thus, in *A Thousand Days,* Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. approvingly quotes President John F. Kennedy on the Dominican Republic in 1961: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third." Where the United States has violated this rule, as in Iran and Nicaragua (and, at the end, in Vietnam), the result has been not only worse from the point of view of American interests but also worse for the countries in question. If some of the critics get their way, the same thing will happen in El Salvador.

Mr. Sallach asks how we can become "principled and united" again. My answer is that in trying to contain the spread of Soviet power for the past thirty-five years, the United States *has* been acting in a "principled" way and *has* been offering hope to countries whose chance for freedom and economic well-being would be entirely wiped out if they were sucked into the system of Communist totalitarianism. If Mr. Sallach wants us to become united again, the best way is for people like him to begin recognizing—or, in some cases, remembering—that fact.

Elias M. Schwarzbart is very generous about my work, but he has me wrong on at least one point. I did not say that the 1980 consensus involved an opposition to negotiations, only that it supported a shift of emphasis from arms control to rearmament. What seems to have happened is that once public opinion felt reassured that a build-up would take place, it began swinging back toward active support for arms control. As a politician, Ronald Reagan has been forced to respond to this change. But those of us who are not politicians are free to say, and have a duty to say, what we really think on such matters. I think the record shows that the great hopes invested in arms-control negotiations with expansionist totalitarian powers are illusory and dangerous, and this is what I was trying to say in my article.

On the question raised by Mr. Schwarzbart of withdrawing from Europe, I can only repeat that doing so would in my judgment lead to the Finlandization of the West, including ultimately the United States itself. But I must also admit that the prospect seems to me increasingly likely—which, alas, is more than I can say for Eugen Loebl's vision of a mutual withdrawal from Europe by both superpowers.

Finally, I agree with Menahem Steinberg's point about anti-Americanism, and I find Paul Hollander very illuminating on the same point (as is Stephen H. Balch on the related issue of liberal disaffection). But I disagree with Mr. Steinberg when he says that Communism is merely a "camouflage" for traditional Russian imperialism. As I have argued several times in these pages, I believe that the Soviet threat cannot be fully understood or properly assessed without reference to its ideological component—which is to say, Communism.

Spies & Le Carré

To the Editor of Commentary:

Walter Laqueur begins his article on John le Carré by disputing the notion I hazarded some years ago that the spy was the representative man of our time ["Le Carré's Fantasies," June]. Mr. Laqueur points out, quite rightly, that the spy is no fashion-setter or role model. To say this is a kind of tautology, since very few people know who is a spy or where to find one.

But what my article, "Meditations on the Literature of Spying" (*American Scholar,* Spring 1965), tried to say was something else: first, that the spy of *fiction* represents us, not that we follow his lead. I specified at length, with a variety of examples, what he represents—our feelings about ourselves and our attitudes toward the world. We are—or tend to be—ambivalent and ambiguous, double-agents. We rather despise what we and our associates do, feeling that we are all agents, not men, expendable and anonymous besides: 007's or "M's."

As for the world, it is not our oyster but enemy country. Everybody, to quote one writer, "is fighting the long grim fight," eternally suspicious of all motives (read our current biographies) and ever tempted to sabotage society in a non-heroic way. Under a stoic mask we feel sorry for ourselves, and justly so: being deceived and misunderstood, as well as deceiving, we find that love and friendship are delusions and we are lonely. Social and psychiatric studies tell us little else, and poetry, novels, and the stage repeat the tale. It is the satisfaction of such feelings that makes us think the life of espionage "realistic."

These generalities may have been rough-hewn when I uttered them

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twenty years ago; they may need to be modified now; but they certainly were absent from the mind of Mr. Laqueur when he thought he was contradicting what I proposed.

JACQUES BARZUN

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Walter Laqueur's article on John le Carré's latest work, *The Little Drummer Girl*, appears to be motivated more by pique at Le Carré's success than by a sincere desire to judge the book. While *The Little Drummer Girl* has its share of faults, for the most part these lie in the execution of Le Carré's ambitious undertaking, not in the ambition itself.

Mr. Laqueur writes that the "thriller" is an "honorable, modest genre," one "not normally associated with a high degree of literacy." In his view, Le Carré, by attempting to move beyond the formulaic clichés of the field and say something about the motivations and psychology of his characters (not to mention the world they inhabit), shows "intellectual pretensions" and inflates the genre "to an absurdly high status." Where is it written that fiction must conform to rigid boundaries, that an author may not use a familiar form as a vehicle for perceptive insights? Why must anyone who mentions serious writers (e.g., Le Carré bringing in Mann, Berkeley, Brecht, *et al.*) in a heretofore illiterate environment be put in the stocks?

Instead of merely stating that "The plot of *The Little Drummer Girl*, in other words, is perfectly idiotic," Mr. Laqueur should have demonstrated clearly *why* that is true. Instead of simply attacking what he thought was a "fraudulent air of authenticity" in the book, Mr. Laqueur could have shown, whether by citing his own experiences or those of others, exactly how Le Carré's characters and situations are implausible. It is not that he does not have a case (the recruitment of Charlie is one of the book's weakest points), but rather that he fails to go beyond snide remarks to document it.

There are serious problems with *The Little Drummer Girl*, foremost among them Le Carré's famed "evenhandedness," which, in this instance, gives equal space and credence to facts and PLO propaganda. But the book should be criticized on legitimate grounds, not for the fact of the author's popular coup. . . .

GIDEON ROSE

Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As someone who has lived under both Hitlerism and Stalinism, I became an avid reader of John le Carré's cold-war novels. . . . Each of the books in the "Smiley trilogy" became increasingly better reading; I admired Le Carré's description of the human condition, set against the backdrop of a fictitious struggle between British and Soviet intelligence organizations. . . .

Walter Laqueur, however, ridicules those readers who have fallen for Le Carré's alleged "verisimilitude" or believed in "the depth of his characterizations." And in what must be considered the worst comparison in recent literary criticism, Mr. Laqueur then adds insult to injury by accusing Le Carré of creating characters that are at bottom just as implausible as those of Ian Fleming.

I will resist discussing all of Mr. Laqueur's allegations, . . . but will address myself only to his sly innuendo that Le Carré is anti-Semitic; it is true that Mr. Laqueur formally denies this charge, but only after examining the Jewish characters in Le Carré's books and finding that they have few if any redeeming features. . . .

The extent of Mr. Laqueur's misjudgments and superficiality can best be understood by examining Fiedler in *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, a character Mr. Laqueur summarily dismisses. There are four main characters in the book, a spy novel which has not been equaled since its publication in 1963: Leamas, the disillusioned anti-hero who works for London; Mundt, the ex-Nazi who runs East German security; Fiedler, the brooding intellectual East German Communist who suspects his superior of treason; and Liz Gold, the naive, idealistic British Communist party member. Her Jewishness is crucial to the story, but it is inexplicably overlooked by Mr. Laqueur.

London wants Fiedler destroyed to save Mundt, its "mole" in the East German regime. London's plan hinges on the mutual sympathy that will develop between Leamas and Fiedler: behind their cynical, jaded façades, both men in fact . . . attempt to stay true to what they perceive as their ideals. It is the book's supreme irony that in a fearfully symmetrical denouement, Leamas unwittingly helps destroy Fiedler, thus helping to restore Mundt's credibility in the eyes of the East Germans. . . .

But *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* should be read on another level: as a reflection of the Stalinist show trials of the late 40's and early 50's in Eastern Europe. Fiedler personifies the old guard, intellectual Communists—mostly Jewish—whom the Stalinist *apparat* had to destroy. Leamas's words to the tribunal: "I'll tell you something—no one else will. . . . Mundt had Fiedler beaten up, and all the time, while it was going on, Mundt baited him and jeered at him for being a Jew." This mirrors the actual truth: Hungarian, Polish, and Czech Communists of Jewish background were above all jeered at as Jews during their interrogation and torture. Nowhere was this as obvious as in Czechoslovakia; seven out of nine "deviationist" Communists tried in Prague, including Slansky, general secretary of the party, were vilified as Jews. And earlier, in a similar trial in Hungary, the accused who had changed their names were meticulously identified by their original, Jewish-sounding names.

It is surprising that Mr. Laqueur would miss these historical analogies and can accuse Le Carré of implausibility. After all, how many Western authors have written about these trials, not to mention with Le Carré's insight and sympathy for the falsely accused Jewish Communists—and as early as 1963?

And now about *The Little Drummer Girl*, set in the Middle East. In a curious twist, Mr. Laqueur now finds a "fraudulent air of authenticity hovering about all [the] implausible situations" described in the book. He singles out Kurtz, the leading Israeli anti-terrorist expert, for his analysis. First he searches for literary clues and finds that the trail leading to Conrad is a cold one. Mr. Laqueur is looking for a Jewish villain, but Kurtz defies categorization. . . . Mr. Laqueur himself supplies enough quotes to illustrate Kurtz's nonconformism, yet never spells it out.

Kurtz is a Jewish Smiley. But just as Mr. Laqueur consistently refuses to recognize Smiley's humanity and integrity amid the cunning required by his profession, so he refuses to see Kurtz's higher morality in his

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skeptic's disguise. Le Carré describes Kurtz as "too paradoxical, too complicated, made of too many souls and colors," and this does not fit into Mr. Laqueur's argument. In fact, Le Carré captures the more general fate of the Jews when he says about Kurtz: "When he spoke of death, it was clear that death had passed by him often and very close, and might any moment come his way again."

I also take exception to Mr. Laqueur's accusation that Le Carré takes a pro-Palestinian Arab line in this book. Equating sympathy for bombing victims with a pro-Palestinian stand can only be attributed to narrow-mindedness. After the unusual publicity build-up that preceded *The Little Drummer Girl*, I was frankly disappointed by the book. I found its overwrought plot slightly insulting to my intelligence, but not at all offensive to my hypersensitive Jewish feelings.

THOMAS B. WINDHOLZ
New York City

WALTER LAQUEUR writes:

I have no quarrel with what Jacques Barzun is saying.

Gideon Rose seems to believe that I am a writer of espionage fiction. This attractive idea had not occurred to me previously. But since I am not really a competitor, the allegation that my article was motivated by pique at Le Carré's success seems to me farfetched. The authors of *Jaws, Jonathan Livingston Seagull*, and other such books have sold even more copies than Le Carré. I may have felt regret that I am not in this league—what writer would not?—but there were no feelings of envy.

Thomas B. Windholz has lived under both Hitlerism and Stalinism, but Le Carré, alas, has not. Mr. Windholz says that he found *The Little Drummer Girl* not offensive to his Jewish feelings. Nor did I. Le Carré was charged with anti-Semitism by some critics following the publication of an earlier book, a fact which seems to have escaped Mr. Windholz. I tried to make it clear, unfortunately without success, that I thought this specific charge misplaced: Le Carré seems not to like people in general, why should Jews get preferential treatment? As for Fiedler, the Jewish Communist in *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, it is perfectly true that Le Carré makes him more sympathetic than Mundt, the ex-Nazi; one ought to be grateful for small mercies. Regarding Liz Gold (in the same novel), I did note that there are a number of characters in these novels who, judging by their names, may or may not be Jewish. But their Jewishness is no more meaningful in this context than the color of their hair, and the issue is therefore irrelevant.

I fail to see any analogies between this novel and the trials, in the early 1950's, of Czech, Polish, and Hungarian Communists. As far as Hungary and Poland are concerned, the main victims were, in any case, not Jewish. I referred to Le Carré's sympathies for Arafat, not for the suffering of the Palestinian victims in the camps. I regret that Mr. Windholz does not like my comparison between Le Carré and Ian Fleming, but I still think it is very much to the point. It is a case of Left versus Right, in the general framework of Eton. They may have detested each other, but they still have a good deal in common. As for the question of verisimilitude, I did not say that this is the only decisive yardstick of spy stories. I was commenting on false pretenses of verisimilitude. And Mr. Windholz, in the last paragraph of his letter, seems to agree with me—albeit somewhat reluctantly.

"The Confidence Gap"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his otherwise thoughtful review of our book, *The Confidence Gap* [Books in Review, July], Melville J. Ulmer contends that "a further shift toward the 'democratic socialism' of Western Europe" is our prescribed solution for the restoration of public confidence in American business and other institutions. Where did he get such an idea?

We do say, as he quotes: "The future of American business depends in some part on whether American society for the next generation continues to resemble its past or moves toward more European types of political, economic, and social arrangements." The point of that passage is to argue that the future of American business, as far as public esteem is concerned, would be *worse* if our system were to come to resemble European social democracies. We point out in the same section that "both anti-business sentiment and policies are less severe in the United States than in most industrial democracies (Japan being the principal exception)." And, a few pages later, "Capitalism has never achieved the legitimacy in once-aristocratic Europe that it has in the United States.... Hence, American business people have a tradition of public leadership, high status, and social recognition that the business class rarely acquired elsewhere."

In fact, we argue that "the spearhead of the attack on business has come from the New Politics liberal Left, the intelligentsia, and affluent college-educated professionals who are basically critical of the materialistic emphasis in society" and that the New Right shares this moralistic view of politics and distrust of business values. As far as the mass public is concerned, we find "a heightened demand for social responsibility on the part of powerful institutions" and for "some degree of commitment to the public interest." Is this what Mr. Ulmer regards as advocating European socialism?

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
Stanford, California

WILLIAM SCHNEIDER
Washington, D.C.

MELVILLE J. ULMER writes:

For reasons given in my review, I am happy to learn now that Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider do not advocate "European socialism," but I do wish that they had said so, since so much in *The Confidence Gap* gives the opposite impression. For example, at one point they imply that real improvement in public sentiment "would probably require that the Democratic party and the American labor movement become much more committed to socialism and social-democratic policies and manifest *more opposition to business than* they have ever done." Elsewhere they observe: "Only if *major* social changes generate a renewal of public confidence can business and other institutions expect to rise significantly in the esteem of most Americans" (emphasis added). Finally, the book closes with: "Should the 1980's be characterized by a major crisis, the outcome could very well be substantial support for movements to change the system in a fundamental way."

Such rumblings of future radical change are the only recommendations or forecasts that I can find in their otherwise interesting book. At any rate, one must accept, as I surely do, the assurance that the

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authors did not really mean what it seemed to me was clearly indicated in *The Confidence Gap.*

The Pope & the USSR

To the Editor of Commentary:

Michael Ledeen, in his article documenting the Bulgarian/Soviet involvement in the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II ["The Bulgarian Connection and the Media," June], presents an extremely well-argued thesis. . . .

The Soviet state must be understood in terms of a paranoid system in which symbolic enemies are far more frightening than real ones. . . . The most fearful symbolic object for the Soviets was Trotsky, who served as devil incarnate from 1927 until 1940 when he was murdered in Coyoacán, Mexico, by an agent of Stalin. At no time during those agonizing years did Trotsky present an actual threat to the security of Soviet power. He was a furtive, shabby figure whose main claim to notice occurred when a commission was convened in 1937 in Coyoacán, headed by John Dewey, to hear Trotsky's side of the Moscow trials. As a real challenge to Stalin, Trotsky was pathetic. Nevertheless, because he was a potent symbolic threat, his death was required.

At present, what more potent symbol could this paranoid system have than a Polish Pope? Poland is the most important link in the Soviet/East European empire. . . . We now know that the KGB concluded in 1979 after John Paul II took office that Zbigniew Brzezinski had "engineered" his election to take advantage of Polish discontent and "destabilize" Poland in order to separate it from the Soviet system. Recently, we saw that the Soviets continue to regard the Pope as a potent symbol, if only because they allowed their Polish satraps to treat him as such during his historic visit to Poland in June.

Though most of the Western press fell silent, allegedly in the interest of world peace, the Soviets have made it clear that to keep the empire intact they would shrink from nothing, including, as one Italian official put it, a "true act of war in a time of peace."

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

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cow, from the Romanovs to Andropov, knew that Poland was the key to Russian domination in Eastern Europe. To keep Poland pacified, it is very much within the realm of possibility that the Soviets could kill a Pope, especially a Pope viewed as a creature of the CIA bent upon the destruction of Soviet power. . . .

Mr. Ledeen's last sentence talks of the "systematic distortion of reality" by the Western press. I suggest that he is correct and that this is a conditioned reflex to the Soviet distortion of the same facts.

HAROLD TICKTIN
Cleveland, Ohio

The Sephardi Heritage

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Chaim Raphael's conclusion in "Jewish History and the Sephardim" [May] that "some transformation is called for in which the pride of the Sephardi heritage is given the weight it deserves in Jewish self-consciousness" must be acted upon, in order to heal the damage caused by Israel's Western chauvinism. This proclamation of Western superiority has been, and is, a dual curse for Israel: in addition to alienating more than half of Israel's Jews, it also estranges and is an irritant to Israel's Arabs (approximately 600,000) and its Arab neighbors.

It is high time for Ashkenazim to ponder George Steiner's remarks in *Language and Silence*: "We know now that a man can read Goethe or Rilke in the evening, that he can play Bach and Schubert, and go to his day's work at Auschwitz. . . . The mass murder of the Jews and . . . the destruction under Nazism and Stalinism . . . rose from . . . the core of European civilization."

As for stimulating pride in the Sephardi heritage, there are much more basic ingredients of the Jewish heritage than the centuries of the "Jewish-Muslim symbiosis" and Yemenite folklore and dance, though these are important. But infinitely more important is the fact that the basic Jewish texts were created in the "Orient." I am referring to those texts which *all* Jews venerate and in which Jewish faith is articulated. There is, first of all, the Hebrew Bible, whose imagery, flora and fauna, seasons and calendar are those of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East. The prayers for weekdays, holidays, and the Sabbath which are not biblical texts were written by Babylonian and Egyptian Jews a thousand and more years ago. The additions of the Ashkenazi prayer rite are incidental and lack halakhic validity. The Mishnah; the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds; the midrashim and the vast geonic literature; the many kabbalistic texts, notably the *Zohar*; the *Shulhan Arukh*, the authoritative code of law—all these basic and truly great Jewish works are the creations of the ancestors of those who, today, are Israel's *edot hamizrach*, "Oriental"/Sephardi Jews. . . .

TRUDE WEISS-ROSMARIN
Editor, *Jewish Spectator*
Santa Monica, California

CHAIM RAPHAEL writes:

I entirely agree with the point made by Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, namely, that "the basic Jewish texts were created in the 'Orient.'" I thought, indeed, that I had covered this by saying that "the Jewish faith, expressed in ritual and learning, took its shape for all centuries to come from the Jewish authorities in 'Babylonia' (modern Iraq)." However, it is helpful to see this spelled out in more detail. Indeed, one could go farther. The connection with "Babylon" is very mysterious in its power in Jewish life. The Jewish people came to life in the land of the Two Rivers as part of the movement of peoples in the Middle East, and though deeply involved with these cultures, still managed to create a wholly individual outlook. Babylon saved the Jewish people and the Bible in the First Exile, kept Jewish life going there after the Return, and was ready to pick up the ball once again in the Second Exile, creating a coherent view of faith that was to be a living source for Jews everywhere. As an ardent Litvak, I have one slight reservation in all this. There can be no question that Babylon is the source; yet the miracle of Ashkenazi resurgence in Eastern Europe from the 18th century is also magical, both in the unimaginably rich talent it ultimately released, and in the Ashkenazi role in creating modern Israel.

Academy Awards

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

A moviegoer since the 1920's, I applaud Richard Grenier for his critical acumen and felicitous style. His article, "The Politicized Oscar" [June], prompts me to ask the following questions, which I have puzzled over for some time. . . .

1. Are clearly anti-American movies, like *Missing*, backed by U.S. money? If not, then who finances them? If they are American-financed, however, do the moneymen know what they are financing, or is it that they don't care so long as the product seems a good bet to make a "bundle"? Or do they expect that the movie will do well overseas even if it doesn't do well domestically?

2. If a movie is expected to "make a mint" in Europe, say, does that imply a ready-made market for anti-American movies there? Do propagandistic melodramas, like the works of Costa-Gavras, reflect European views of the U.S.? . . .

3. Why do presumably intelligent, decent citizens who are competent and celebrated actors sign up for roles in clearly anti-American movies? . . . Is it that the part is so good that an Oscar nomination seems inevitable, or is it the money? Or is is that the actor . . . uncritically accepts the hostile script as true or has accepted the statement that it is based on a true story? . . .

BERNARD ADELMAN
Winthrop, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

After reading "The Politicized Oscar," I would like to ask a question that the article addressed but did not resolve: should Academy Award decisions be made on the basis of politics?

On the one hand, Richard Grenier feels that politics should be left out. He approves the usual depoliticized nature of the ceremonies, and is uneasy with the idea that movies like *If You Love This Planet* and *Alsino and the Condor* might have been nominated on the basis of political considerations. But on the other hand, he argues that political considerations should determine whether a film is nominated or not. He does not approve of the fact that a Soviet film, *Private Life*, was nominated, arguing that the Academy should not support efforts that approve the rehabilitation of Stalin. If I try to synthesize a principle from Mr. Grenier's reactions, it is that left-wing politics should be left out of awards decisions, but conservative politics should be taken into account. I hope I have misinterpreted Mr. Grenier's remarks, and that

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there is an explanation for this confusion.

GARY A. KLEIN
Yellow Springs, Ohio

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have been a reader of exchanges in letters-to-the-editor columns for enough years to know that outraged readers can expect little satisfaction from them. Nevertheless, I venture this letter to express my profound dismay that Richard Grenier would feel free to falsify completely the contents of a book like *Sophie's Choice,* either through ignorance or for his own political purposes.

May I be the latest in a long line of people to uphold the right of a reviewer to form whatever opinion he wishes about art or literature, no matter how stupid or self-serving. However, I think a reviewer has an obligation to report truthfully and accurately the contents of a book whether he likes it or not. Mr. Grenier tries to suggest that *Sophie's Choice* equates the suffering of the Poles with that of the Jews during the Holocaust, while the book itself is one of the more eloquent descriptions of Jews as the primary targets of the Holocaust that has ever been written—and all the more powerful because it is written by a non-Jew.

Mr. Grenier writes that *Sophie's Choice* is "based on a gross falsification of history." The alleged falsification is that William Styron equates the suffering of Gentile Poles and other nationalities considered "inferior" with that of the Jews and that, therefore, the book diminishes the impact or significance of the Holocaust. To reach this absurd conclusion, Mr. Grenier obviously had to ignore the book, which is completely to the contrary. For example, how does the following explicit description of Auschwitz, found on page 234 of the book (Random House hard-cover edition), square with Mr. Grenier's sweeping statement?

> It may help clarify what went on between Sophie and Rudolf Hoess if we try for a moment to examine the nature and function of Auschwitz in general, but especially during the six months after her arrival in early April of that year 1943. I emphasize this time because it is important. Much can be explained in terms of the metamorphosis which the camp underwent as the result of an order (unquestionably originating with the Fuehrer) which went down to Hoess from Himmler sometime during the first week of April. The order was one of the most monumental and sweeping to be promulgated since the "final solution" itself was hatched in the fecund brains of the Nazi thaumaturges: that is, the recently built gas chambers and crematoriums of Birkenau would be employed *solely* for the extermination of Jews. This edict superseded previous rules of procedure which allowed for the gassing of non-Jews (mostly Poles, Russians, and other Slavs) on the same "selective" basis of health and age as the Jews. There was a technological and a logistical necessity embedded in the new directive, the impetus of which derived not from any sudden preservative concern on the part of the Germans for the Slavs and other "Aryan" non-Jewish deportees, but from an overriding obsession—springing from Hitler and amounting now to mania in the minds of Himmler, Eichmann, and

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

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their cousin overlords in the SS chain of command—to finally get on with the Jewish slaughter until every Jew in Europe had perished. The new order was in effect a clearing of the decks for action: the Birkenau facilities, gargantuan as they were, had certain ultimate limitations both spatial and thermal; with their absolute and uncontested priority in the lists of *der Massenmord* now, the Jews were tendered a sudden unaccustomed exclusivity. With few exceptions (Gypsies for one), Birkenau was theirs alone.

Even at the critical moment of Sophie's arrival with her children at Auschwitz, Styron writes that among those on the train, "All the Jews have gone to the gas," but Sophie and the other non-Jews still hoped for better treatment. Does this fit in with Mr. Grenier's tidy diatribe?

If Mr. Grenier needs or wants further evidence that Mr. Styron has not slighted the agony of the Jewish people, which the Holocaust represents, let him look also at pages 143, 144, 145, 150, 152, 153, 217, 219, 221, 375, 379, 389, 478, 480, and 483. In fact, why doesn't he just read the book? These references, by the way, are not complete, but those hurriedly found in a fifteen-minute, late-night perusal, piqued by Mr. Grenier's wholesale misrepresentation.

If Richard Grenier doesn't think *Sophie's Choice* is well written, that's his business. If he feels that William Styron should be punished or chastised for his views about Central America, that's also his business. But when he chooses to ignore or viciously distort the core of one of the most significant novels ever written about the Holocaust, then it becomes everybody's business.

I don't expect any redress of my grievances from Mr. Grenier, but I do hope, and in fact I am sure, that your readers will want to read the book and see the movie for themselves, and then make their own judgments based on their perceptions and *not* on these gross and inexcusable distortions made by Mr. Grenier for his own purposes.

JOEL H. STERNS
Trenton, New Jersey

RICHARD GRENIER writes:

I thank Bernard Adelman for his complimentary letter. All his questions are absolutely legitimate, but to answer them in full would require an entire article, so I will be as brief as possible.

Yes, *Missing* and a number of what I would consider anti-American movies are financed by American money, and their producers are perfectly aware that even if the films fail in the U.S. they have an excellent chance of being successful abroad. I am afraid these producers fall into that now notorious category of American businessmen who "love commerce more than they loathe Communism." Yes, the success of anti-American propaganda movies like those of Costa-Gavras does, to a substantial extent, reflect European attitudes toward the U.S. —at least among what is called the "successor generation," people who do not remember the world before 1945. There is quite a bit of doublethink in this, however, and in France, for example, where the plummeting prestige of the Socialist regime has affected the intellectual world as well as the rest of the country, we might see some changes, but I do not know whether this has been reflected in movie attendance. Last, Hollywood, as I have written before, is to a large degree in the hands of star actors. That is, if Robert Redford turns the screenplay down, the movie is likely not to be made. So that the studios, which in the old days ran Hollywood and were in the main ultraconservative, no longer impose movies on the stars, the stars impose the movies on the studios. The question of why movie stars, "presumably intelligent, decent citizens," choose to make what I would consider anti-American movies is far too complex to be dealt with here. I can only remind Mr. Adelman that movie stars are actors, and actors are "artists"—a class the majority of which has historically had difficulty identifying with our kind of society. If he wants an even more spectacular example of the alienation of artists, let him examine the doings and statements of another kind of artist—writers—in that great literary forum, the PEN Club.

Gary A. Klein has most definitely misinterpreted my remarks, and his letter contains more misrepresentations and non sequiturs than I would have thought possible in such a small space. First, in my article, I did not address the question of whether Academy Award decisions *should* be made "on the basis

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of politics." I simply pointed out that the Awards ceremony—barring a few individual outbursts—has historically been apolitical, and has made quite a point of this. Then, suddenly, the last ceremony took a violent political swing, the text of the presentation reading as if it were written by Cora Weiss or the Reverend William Sloane Coffin. My principal "uneasiness" about *If You Love This Planet* and *Alsino and the Condor* was not that they were nominated on the basis of political considerations, but that these nominations were made by a *secret steering committee,* and that the votes cast represented only a tiny fraction of the full Academy. So much for my article. I freely confess to Mr. Klein, however, that if the full Academy had knowingly voted a top award to a Soviet film rehabilitating Joseph Stalin I would have been distinctly disturbed, whereas Mr. Klein, I gather, would have welcomed such an eventuality as a joyous expression of "left-wing" politics. Beyond this point I shall tutor Mr. Klein no farther, as I suspect that his questions are disingenuous, and that he understands me full well, as I do him.

Joel H. Sterns's overheated letter charges that I "viciously distort" and deliberately report untruthfully on William Styron's *Sophie's Choice* for my "own purposes." I do not engage in debate on this level and hence shall not answer his letter. He might be interested to learn, however, that no less a historian of the Holocaust than Lucy S. Dawidowicz, author of *The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945,* considers *Sophie's Choice* an attempt to "usurp the Holocaust, to take it away from the Jews." She says mordantly that Styron thinks "all that suffering is too good for the Jews and he has given it to the Gentiles."

Mailer

To the Editor of Commentary:

Joseph Epstein's "Mailer Hits Bottom" [July] is one of the funniest pieces I have ever read. I laughed so hard I cried. "He is, that is to say, a serious writer except when he is thinking," says Mr. Epstein. "In *Ancient Evenings,* unfortunately, Mailer is thinking nearly full time."

Very funny indeed.

Janice Wijnen

Rego Park, New York

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Why get so excited about Norman Mailer? His new work, *Ancient Evenings,* is a New York-type book, emphasizing ambition, sex, and telepathy. Clearly it is about New York City not ancient Egypt, and, very logically, it was written amid the pyramids of the 20th century. . . .

It should be recognized that Mailer is interesting because he is so bad, because of his charming, boyish naiveté in the face of disaster, and because his miscalculations are truly American in their enormity. It's not every day you see someone struggling so mightily against his own limitations—and losing ever so tragically while hope yet remains.

Poor Norman Mailer. He will surely be remembered as the American writer who was skinned by the critics more often than any other.

Risto Marttinen

Falls Church, Virginia

Salvador

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mark Falcoff's review of Joan Didion's *Salvador* [Books in Review, May] is perceptive and challenging. While most critics have been content to savor Miss Didion's standard *Angst* in a new setting, he asks important questions about her facts and her perspective. I would like to explain why this type of reportage is harmful to our perceptions of Central America.

Miss Didion really has no background as a historian, a political expert, or a sociologist and her journalistic specialties have been things like tabloid murder trials, water, headaches, etc. Her last novel was condescending in its attitude toward all of Latin American culture. To think therefore that she could go to El Salvador for a two-week stint and capture the soul of the country is ludicrous.

What Miss Didion has done in this book is transfer her bleak feelings about life to this war-torn country. The "heart of darkness" she found in El Salvador is in fact no different from the one she previously discovered in Beverly Hills or Marin County, though the special effects here (bombings, mangled bodies, etc.) are much more spectacular and cinematic. . . .

It isn't only activist liberals Miss Didion is poking fun at, but anybody who thinks that people's actions can make a difference. Her basic indifference to the country al-

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

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lows her to use clichés like "barbarism," "dark frontier," "cultural zero," which make it easy to write off El Salvador as a lost cause. Instead of bringing us closer to the scene, her book ends up leaving us numb and confused. Somehow, I think we should expect more from our writers.

DAN O'NEILL
Los Angeles, California

Poles and Jews

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to respond to Maurice Friedberg's review of Yisrael Gutman's book, *The Jews of Warsaw, 1939-1943* [Books in Review, May], which leaves the impression that the Poles may have been as evil as the Germans who occupied their country. Either the impartiality of the author gets shrouded somewhat by the partiality of the reviewer here, or not quite all the sources available were used in the writing of this account. In the review we read: "When the uprising flared up on April 19, 1943, there was not a single Pole inside the ghetto. . . ." According to Jurgen Stroop (the commander of the German forces that put down the uprising), the Polish "bandits" who aided the Jews were soldiers of the Home Army (London-controlled), numbering nineteen, and led by Major Henryk Iwanski (nicknamed "Bystry"); they had entered the ghetto even before the outbreak of the fighting in order to help their Jewish co-fighters organize armed resistance in the event of a German attack. Ten of them died in the fighting, among them Wladyslaw Iwanski, a brother of the commander, and Roman Iwanski, a son. All the others were wounded, among them Major Iwanski.

Poles of other political orientation also came to the aid of Jewish fighters. According to the archives of the Jewish Institute in Warsaw, units of the Ludwik Warynski Special Group (People's Army) led by Franciszek Bartoszek ("Jacek") attacked with grenades and pistols the SS-men who were machine-gunning the ghetto from Nowiniarska Street. The guard soldiers liquidated the German outpost and destroyed its position, without suffering any losses. On the same day (April 20, 1943), three platoons led by Jozef Lapinski ("Chmura"), Zbigniew Mlynarski ("Kret"), and Mieczyslaw Zborowicz ("Gajowy") of the Home Army, commanded by Captain Jozef Pszenny ("Chwacki"), attacked the German police at 7 P.M., trying to break up the ghetto wall at Bronifraterska and Sapiezynska Streets. In the ensuing struggle, two were killed . . . and several were wounded. The Jewish fighters supported this attack by firing from the windows.

Other skirmishes from the "outside" have been documented. In Stroop's report, dated April 22, 1943, one reads: "It must be reported that as of yesterday, detachments taking part in the action are constantly being shot at from outside the ghetto, from the Aryan side. In one case, storm troops, who counterattacked immediately, succeeded in seizing thirty-five Communist bandits who were immediately liquidated."

There are more such accounts of Poles giving aid to Jews during the ghetto uprising. According to Marek Arczynski, one of the founders of ZEGOTA (Council for Aid to Jews), organized by Poles, only a small part of the Polish population was under the influence of the extreme Right or fascist elements which approved a passive attitude toward the fate of the Jewish people. . . . Arczynski, for his work, was decorated with a Medal of the Righteous. Carl Weyman, . . . also a recipient of a Medal of the Righteous, stated . . . that thousands of Poles participated in acts of bravery trying to rescue Jews. It must be emphasized . . . that in no other country did the Nazis resort to such far-reaching measures or such terrible terror to punish anyone aiding Jews as they did in Poland. The Dutch, Danes, or French could permit themselves a public demonstration against policies aimed at the Jews without running the risk of incurring serious repression. In Poland, Poles faced death sentences, which were often executed summarily. Emanuel Ringelblum also makes this fact known in his memoirs. . . .

If Gutman's account is as thorough as Mr. Friedberg says it is, then one can only wonder what sources the author used, where the omissions or deletions occurred, what he chose to emphasize, etc., etc.

Yes, the Polish-Jewish "problem" is indeed complex, tangled, a tightly interwoven fabric of two peoples closely related, whose histories (at least modern) share so many common facets, so rich in their commingling over the centuries. It would be well to have this problem examined in full. . . .

EDWIN P. KULAWIEC
George Washington University
Washington, D.C.

MAURICE FRIEDBERG writes:

To Edwin P. Kulawiec I shall reiterate my standard admonition to undergraduates: only those who read the book in question are in a position to judge its merits, or—even more obviously—the fairness of the book's reviews.

Interested readers are referred to the unequivocal statement on page 403 of Gutman's exhaustively researched volume:

> The Polish underground knew perfectly well who the fighters in the ghetto were. In fact, the *Delegatura* reported to London on the "war of the Jews against the Germans. . . ." This report makes no mention whatsoever of Poles participating in the fighting or of any military operation designed to aid the fighting ghetto. The truth of the matter is that there was not so much as a single Pole inside the ghetto, either in the ranks or in the command of the fighting organizations.

Correction

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

A minor emendation to Edward Jay Epstein's review of my book, *Red Carpet* [Books in Review, August]. Mr. Epstein has inadvertently promoted me from mere former graduate student in the Harvard Russian Research Center to "fellow." Many thanks, but for now I prefer just to write.

JOSEPH FINDER
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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The Rise & Decline of Industrial Japan

Norman Gall

INDUSTRIAL supremacy does not usually last very long. "All industrial curves seem to take off vertically and to decline equally dramatically," the French historian Fernand Braudel writes in his great work, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. "There was a distinct relationship then between industrial expansion and decline in places often very far apart. The last player to arrive is always the favorite."

Braudel was commenting on the shift of the center of textile production from Italy to northern Europe some four hundred years ago, but he could have been talking about Japan today. For most of this century, Japan has been leading one of the most momentous shifts in the geographical distribution of industrial production that the world has seen.

Japan's share of all industrial output has leaped from 1 percent in 1913 to 11 percent today, more than doubling over the past decade alone. Over the past two decades, its manufactured exports multiplied from $4 billion to $150 billion, accelerating a rise in per-capita income since 1952 from $188 to more than $10,000, now roughly equal to the other major industrial countries.

While Japan is most famous for its cars and consumer electronics, more than two-fifths of its exports are now production machinery and other capital goods, including whole factories, contributing to the extension, cheapening, and upgrading of industrial processes in many other countries. Japan is not merely inflicting heavy damage on U.S. industry with exports of steel and automobiles; it is also building steel mills in Brazil, Korea, China, Qatar, Nigeria, and Venezuela, and setting up electronics factories throughout Southeast Asia and in such remote places as Manaus, on the Amazon river, and Tierra del Fuego, at the edge of the Antarctic in South America.

Along with all this, Japan has gradually been taking up the slack left by the declining importance of the United States as what might be called a matrix economy: the source of new products and new designs, components for assembly and spare parts, and the creator of new industries in other countries. As high domestic costs have made certain items too expensive to produce, or when direct export has been blocked for political reasons (as with color-TV shipments to the U.S.), production often has been farmed out by Japan's matrix economy to factories elsewhere, first to Korea and Taiwan (former colonies), then throughout the world, often in ways akin to the subcontracting of production between large and small Japanese firms.

Japan's recent conquest of new markets has provoked fear and rage among Western businessmen, union leaders, and politicians concerned with maintaining employment and productive capacity, and threatens to disrupt the postwar system of international trade. Yet according to the latest World Bank figures, Japan exports a smaller share (15 percent) of its national product than most industrial countries, coming closer to the low export profile of the U.S. economy (10 percent) than those of most European nations, which exceed 30 percent. Moreover, Japan's manufactured exports are less than its share of population among the industrial countries, and less in absolute terms than the manufactured exports of the U.S. and Germany. Indeed, with half the population of Japan, Germany exports considerably more manufactured goods.

No doubt Japan still is and will remain one of the world's leading industrial economies. Yet unperceived by most Westerners, Japan's economy is entering a phase of "maturity" akin to that of the older industrial nations. Thus since the 1973 oil crisis, despite Japan's extraordinary achievements in energy conservation and in maintaining the competitiveness of its manufactured exports, real economic growth has declined to 3 percent yearly —according to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the minimum needed "just to insure the stability of Japanese society"— and to about one-third to one-fourth the levels of the previous "boom decades." Annual gains in labor productivity have declined in the same proportion. While these rates are higher than those of the Western economies, that is because Japan still is younger industrially. On the other hand, Japan

NORMAN GALL, whose articles on Latin America have appeared in COMMENTARY over the years, is a contributing editor of *Forbes*, residing in Brazil.

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soon will have the oldest workforce of all industrial countries because (thanks to a bulge in its birth rate during the early postwar period) its population is aging faster than any other nation on earth.

At the same time, we are witnessing the erosion of the economic viability of some of Japan's key "strategic" industries—shipbuilding, aluminum, oil refining, petrochemicals, nonferrous metals—that were favored with priorities and subsidies over the past half-century in Japan's drive toward heavy and chemical industrialization. In these and other industries, the domestic Japanese market is increasingly being penetrated by imports. "Despite a widely-held view that the Japanese economy is 'closed,' " says a new Hudson Institute report, "the cases of declining industries on record to date show that at some point Japanese companies, like those in other countries, are unable to sustain price/cost differentials with the rest of the world." In the official view of MITI: "Just as Japan is being admired for the strength of its economic power, major changes are taking place within its industrial structure. The very foundation of that industrial activity which must support Japan's future economic performance is in danger." Thus, while Japan was the world's leading steel producer two years ago, a sudden rise in cheap imports in 1982-83 has taken away one-fourth of the home market from Japanese companies which are now pressing the government for protection.

In addition to all this, Japan since 1973 has been running the largest government deficits of any major industrial country, eating steadily into the huge pool of personal savings—highest in the world—that once could finance both government deficits and industrial investment. Thus savings has been following investment on a downward path, while Japan's international competitiveness is being undermined gradually by rising consumption at home, the closing of overseas markets, and the challenge in its home market of imports from abroad.

II

According to Braudel, "industrial functions are called into existence by commercial activity, which creates the demand for them; they therefore presuppose a certain level of economic maturity." Yes, trade breeds manufacturing, and Japan was forced to trade again with the West after the visit in 1853 of Commodore Perry's "black ships," ending more than two centuries of seclusion imposed by the Tokugawa shoguns. But how was Japan able to overwhelm its Western trading partners with a flood of cheap manufactured goods, of ever-increasing sophistication and quality, so soon after the reopening of trade?

Scholars of many different stripes have been chewing on that question for a long time. In his new book, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Chalmers Johnson of the University of California tells how the elite bureaucracy of MITI rode piggyback on the militarization of Japanese politics and society in the 1930's to carry out a transition from low-class industry (silk, cotton textiles, toys) to high-class industry (steel, chemicals, motor vehicles, airplanes). Building on this foundation, Japan in the postwar decades became a "plan-rational state." Johnson explains:

> The United States government has many regulations concerning the antitrust implications of the size of firms, but it does not concern itself with what industries ought to exist and what industries are no longer needed. In the plan-rational state [Japan], the government will give the greatest precedence to industrial policy. . . . The real equivalent of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Development in the United States is not the Department of Commerce but the Department of Defense, which by its very nature and functions shares MITI's strategic, goal-oriented outlook.

Other scholars—including Takafusa Nakamura of the University of Tokyo—have taken Johnson to task for exaggerating the importance of MITI, for underrating the role of the private sector, and for stating that Japan's first priority since 1925 has been economic development. Nakamura has just published two major works in English on the prewar and postwar Japanese economy that provide a much more far-reaching view. Nevertheless, he shares Johnson's fascination with the embarrassing and often unpalatable linkages between warfare and economic development, and he elsewhere actually reinforces Johnson's analogy between MITI and the Pentagon. In his *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, Nakamura argues that present systems of lifetime employment, industrial investment, forced mergers, industrial subcontracting, and sweeping bureaucratic powers over industry all developed in the wartime emergency that began with the 1937 invasion of China and ended with the surrender to the United States in 1945. "To a great extent, the system which was created during the war was inherited as the postwar economic system," he writes. "The industries which were expanded during the war became the major postwar industries; wartime technology was reborn in the postwar export industries; and the postwar national lifestyle, too, originated in changes that began during the period of conflict."

The trouble with interpretations like these is that they concentrate too much on recent events and not enough on the underlying strengths that bred the great flowering of Japanese economic development in the half-century before 1929. Perhaps Japan's success, both in the prewar and postwar decades, would have been

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easier for Westerners to understand if Japan were not so far, culturally and geographically, from the "white men's club" of nations along the two great industrial belts that, until 1929, produced four-fifths of the world's industrial goods. The first was the European belt that spread over the centuries along an irregular series of iron and coal deposits that stretch from the British Midlands to the Ruhr, Silesia, and Russia's Don basin. The second was the North American belt that followed both shores of the Great Lakes from western New York, Pennsylvania, and Ontario into the huge but now depleted Mesabi iron range of Minnesota. While these two industrial belts developed as men learned better use of their coal and iron, Japan groped along the path of a resource-poor seafaring nation, Holland, in nurturing trade and industry.

Indeed, the Dutch were the Japanese of the 17th century. Like the Japanese three centuries later, the Dutch built upon an early trade in bulk commodities to introduce new methods of making ships and textiles—the advanced products of the time—in the service of a trading network that spanned the world. "The Dutch had a genius, if not an obsession, for reducing costs," writes the Italian historian Carlo Cipolla:

> The Dutch succeeded in selling anything to anybody anywhere in the world because they sold at very low prices, and their prices were competitively low because their costs of production were more compressed than elsewhere. The Dutch decidedly moved toward mass production. In an increasing number of activities they endeavored to maximize their profit by maximizing the volume of sales. Even Dutch painters produced their masterpieces at low prices and in prolific quantities.

Like the Japanese centuries later, Dutch entrepreneurs thrived on low domestic interest rates—3 percent in Amsterdam against 6 percent in London—which made it easier to invest in trade and industry. And like the Dutch before them, the Japanese thrived as interlopers on other peoples' trade. Just as the Dutch aggressively cut themselves into the established business of the city-states of Italy and the North German Hanseatic League, the Japanese became suppliers of cotton fabrics to Europe's Asian and African colonies during World War I, while the colonial powers were otherwise distracted. The momentum thus gathered enabled Japan to overtake the British as the world's leading textile exporter by 1933.

By then, too, Japan was further irritating and embarrassing the industrial powers by selling beer to Germany, silk to silk-making Italy, and American flags to the American Legion. Meanwhile, as the Dutch did centuries before, the Japanese were creating new markets by selling a bewildering variety of manufactured products so cheaply that they were within the reach of people who never could afford them before. In Chile, for example, they were marketing handsome English-style bicycles in 1934 for $8 each, half the price of the competing German model. American microscopes wholesaled at $7.50, while Japanese copies wholesaled for 61 cents in Japan in 1935 and were landed in Boston, duty-paid, for $1.95. By the 1930's U.S.-Japanese "trade frictions" were beginning to take the shape of the disputes of the 1970's.

In 1935 the U.S. got Japan to agree to "voluntary" restraints on textile imports and then imposed "here and there" controls on imports of wool-knit gloves, zippers, rubber shoes, electric bulbs, toys, matches, brushes, carpets, pottery and porcelain, imitation pearls, canned fish, and pencils.

TODAY, the mix has changed. However, even as Japan in 1980 became the world's leading producer of steel and automobiles, overtaking depressed U.S. industries and throwing overpaid U.S. workers out of work, the Japanese economy was beginning to yield to the same forces that governed the rise and decline of earlier powers.

Thus the Dutch encountered protectionist legislation in Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Norway, and Spain in the early 18th century; the Japanese today are facing the same kind of closing of their export markets. So, too, high wages and taxes began to undermine the competitiveness of Dutch products just as foreigners were beginning to make the same things and close their home markets, after many Dutch industries had expanded to meet export demand; the same thing is happening to Japan today. Again, just as cheap Dutch textiles previously invaded the home markets of Genoa, Venice, and Milan, wiping out their industries, cheaper English cloth later invaded the Dutch market—wiping out the workshops of Leyden and Utrecht in the 18th century almost as fast as they had mushroomed a century earlier; today, in the same way, the Japanese home market is being invaded by cheap Korean steel, textiles, machine tools, and electrical appliances.

The point is illustrated in Ronald P. Dore's jewel-like book, *Shinohata: A Portrait of a Japanese Village*. "I'm afraid the [printed gift] towels are more expensive this year," apologizes an old cloth merchant quoted by Dore. "Luckily the dyers still had the plates from last year or the expense would have been terrible. They can't get people to do this kind of thing nowadays. They've even started sending work to Korea to be done. It's terrible the cost of labor these days."

The complaint of the cloth merchant in Shinohata bears witness to a sweeping change in the traditional economic system upon which Japan built in order to burst onto the world economy with so much force. Only recently have we come to appreciate the strength and character of that traditional system and the degree to which Japan's precapitalist development singularly paralleled that of Western Europe. In his newest book, *The Wheels of Commerce*, Braudel summarizes the re-

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cent work of many scholars by observing that Japan grew institutionally

> in a kind of anarchy not unlike that of the European Middle Ages. Everything developed simultaneously in the diversified arena of Japan as the country gradually formed itself over the centuries: a central government, feudal lords, towns, peasantry, an artisan class, the merchants. Japanese society bristled with "liberties" like the liberties of medieval Europe, which were privileges behind which one could barricade oneself for protection and survival.

THE strength and adaptability of the traditional system are richly described in Nakamura's new book, *Economic Growth in Prewar Japan*. One-fourth of all farmers managed second businesses by the end of the Tokugawa shogunate (1803-64). They ran small bars and eating houses, made bean curds and candies, sold tobacco, vegetable oils, and lumber, and hired themselves out as craftsmen and laborers, while their wives and daughters raised silkworms and wove cloth and straw matting when not working in the fields. Landlords were pawnbrokers and moneylenders, fertilizer and dry-goods merchants, and owned small *sake* and soy-sauce factories, whose number doubled between 1892 and 1899 alone.

According to Nakamura, Japanese industry adapted imported Western machines to make them cheaper and simpler to copy and to make factory operations more labor-intensive. For silk-reeling machines from France and Italy, capital costs were reduced by making parts from wood instead of copper, iron, and brass; wire replaced glass and earth replaced brick. Big cotton-spinning factories could not become profitable until they added night shifts, increasing the ratio of cheap labor to expensive capital. Power-weaving made little progress until a big hydroelectric construction effort began after 1910, enabling capital per worker to double during the 1920's in the textile industry.

Preindustrial Japan was not a poor country. Fisheries in its surrounding waters were so abundant that they provided not only a ready protein supply for the islanders, but also a supply (in the form of dried fish) of fertilizer, contributing to the large increases in farm productivity during the Tokugawa era. Japan's mineral wealth was such that it was a leading supplier of silver and copper to Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. These exports continued through the Dutch trading station on an island in Nagasaki harbor even after trade with other Western countries was banned in 1637. By the 18th century Japan was one of the most urbanized societies outside Europe. In an earlier book, *Education in Tokugawa Japan* (1965), Dore estimated that 54 percent of males and 19 percent of females had been through primary school in 1875 (as compared with England at the height of the Industrial Revolution, when only one child in four or five was ever getting to school).

So much, then, for the traditional view of Japan making a sudden transition from feudalism to capitalism as it burst upon the world scene after the visit of Commodore Perry's "black ships." This interpretation, the product of the writings of Japanese Marxists, has until recently dominated the literature on their country's economic history. The newer view is crystallized in a pathbreaking study, *Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868* by Professors Susan B. Hanley and Kozo Yamamura of the University of Washington, who marshal much new data to argue that Japan's sudden success upon reentering the world economy a century ago was due to

> . . . the already high level of agricultural productivity attained by the end of the Tokugawa period, the existence of pools of potential capital and easily trainable industrial labor that could be tapped by emerging industries, the already developed economic institutions, and the importance of traditional manufacturing and commercial activities throughout the early phases of industrialization. . . . Tokugawa economic and demographic changes explain why Japan alone in Asia succeeded in industrializing so rapidly, making increasingly efficient use of its resources. . . . Since both the total output and per-capita income were rising during the second half of the Tokugawa period, the economy was able to generate both the capital required for industrialization and sufficient demand for new products during the first crucial decades of industrialization. A mid-19th century economy in which the per-acre yield of rice was as high as in most Southeast Asian nations in the 1950's cannot be considered a "backward" economy.

This portrait of Japan in the century or so before the arrival of Commodore Perry is more consistent than the Marxist view with the rapid economic development that followed. With trading and financial skills already well-developed before the arrival of the "black ships," it should be no surprise that Japanese entrepreneurs soon became alert to opportunities beyond the horizon. Japan's premodern economic system exploited those opportunities.

To consider how much longer Japan's modern system can continue exploiting those opportunities, we must return to the complaint of the old cloth merchant in *Shinohata*.

III

"SOON IT will be all big enterprise," the cloth merchant says:

> The banks and the big manufacturers; they're getting bigger all the time. That's the tendency. . . . And now the next thing is capital liberalization. There are going to be foreign firms investing in Japan. Since we are now about to face

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foreign competition, we must develop a firm solid basis to fight it off, they say. All this economic growth, that's it. The growth of the economy has gone so far that the balance of—what do you call it?—the balance of payments has got a big balance in the black—billions of dollars—and that means the pressure's on Japan internationally speaking. Trade protection won't do any more. We've got to be internationally minded. It's going to be a tough time for us Japanese from now on.

One of the West's old masters of Japan studies, Dore first visited Shinohata in 1955 while preparing an earlier book, *Land Reform in Japan*. When he returned two decades later, he found the villagers' "sense of modern prosperity underpinned by a certain sense of guilt. It's just not quite *right*." The villagers were being massaged lovingly and continually with government services and public works. Their benefactors were politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which has governed Japan continuously since 1955 and has become more and more dependent on votes from overrepresented rural districts to stay in power.

"You can say what you like about these politicians, but they certainly know how to run the country; they must be smart," a farmer tells Dore:

> I don't know how it's done, but at any rate here I am, doing much the same as I was doing 20 years ago; I don't get much bigger yields from the rice fields. I do about the same amount of work on construction sites, but our whole style of life is different; everything's mechanized, we don't have to work nearly as hard and we can afford things we'd never dreamt of a few years ago.

The LDP has been ruling with the support of what one might call a business-peasant alliance formed gradually in the postwar years in response to General Douglas MacArthur's 1945 call for "revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies" in Japanese villages. The most spectacular benefit to businessmen and peasants from this alliance has been a series of luxurious public works.

Some of these works in Shinohata are in the great tradition of land-reclamation projects going back at least four centuries: the area of rice paddies in Japan was doubled between 1550 and 1650 by construction of dikes and diversion of rivers. But today there is a difference. In *Shinohata* Dore remarks, "Nowhere else are rice fields banked with such expensive concrete blocks." Fields that were "entirely recreated after a typhoon washed them away 15 years ago—at a cost to public funds of $2,400 an acre—[are now] left to grow weeds throughout the year." He adds:

> Older people remember the days when what one earned from a day's casual labor would buy less than a couple of kilograms of rice, not the 20 kilograms that the 4,000-yen daily wage would buy today—not to count the fact that rice was then far cheaper relative to other goods. To many of them the sudden prosperity seems too good to last. It can't be true. It has a hollow ring. It is built on sand.

I harbored similar thoughts during my visit last October to the village of Ushiroyama, cradled among the hills of the snow country of central Japan. The village's 51 houses, with curved, pagoda-style roofs, are threaded by a narrow paved road that winds downward past flower gardens and the soft greens and browns of terraced rice fields into a quiet ravine where the government has built a small dam to control soil erosion. Because the cold and snow of Ushiroyama make these hills marginal for rice production, the villagers used to specialize in growing silk—Japan's main export until 1929, with 97 percent going to the U.S., until prices collapsed under competition from synthetics during the Great Depression.

Today Ushiroyama produces little but votes for the LDP. In return, nine-tenths of all farm families now earn most of their money off the farm, much of it on construction projects that increasingly defy the imagination: hot-water sprinkler systems embedded in local highways to melt falling snow; or the tunnel now being dug so the villagers of Ushiroyama, at a cost of $300,000 per family, can leave their valley more easily when it snows; or the new Tokyo-Niigata bullet train built at the staggering cost of $60 million per mile. It all comprises an enormously expensive welfare system for rural Japan.

In September 1936 *Fortune* magazine published a special issue on Japan, one of the unremembered (and anonymous) masterpieces of American journalism, ascribing "the great competitive superiority of the Japanese" to

> a homogeneous, highly integrated, and beautifully adapted social organization permitting a unification of national effort not possible in any other country. . . . *The Japanese can still get along without more things than any other industrial people* [emphasis in original]. . . . The Japanese family system—which, whatever it was in the old days, is now merely another name for self-help among the Japanese workers—absorbs its unemployed not by absorbing them but by dividing with them. Every tiniest crumb of possible activity will be kneaded into employment of a sort. A man will make a living out of carrying a kettle of steam along the country roads from farm to farm to scald out the brass tobacco pipes of the farmers. Another will exist by showing paper drawings to children and explaining their story. Each fraction of economic life is subdivided to further fractions.

In Ushiroyama a farmer named Kazuju Yamamoto was telling me how things have changed:

> My children go to the village school that the government maintains, even though there are only 12 pupils. Next year my daughter will be

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going to the junior high school in town and sleeping in the dormitory they provide for village children. In the winter I earn money driving a snowplow along village roads for the government. When the weather's good I work on construction jobs.

That farmers living on handkerchief-sized pieces of land—the national average is one hectare (2.5 acres)—can live better than many U.S. farmers, the world's most productive, shows how much Japan has changed. But that is only part of the story. That these farmers can vacation in Hawaii, drive two cars, and load their houses with all the electronic conveniences one would wish (TV, telephone, washer, dryer, etc.) shows how far rural Japan has advanced into the age of superfluity, from which it may be hard to recede.

IV

MUCH OF the farmer's new prosperity is due to the fact that land prices and government spending rose in tandem by 19 percent yearly in the two decades before the 1973 oil shock, while the Japanese "miracle" was unfolding at a long-term rate of 10 percent annual economic growth.

Those "miracle" decades began in 1950 with the "special-procurements boom" of the Korean war, when the U.S. military gave contracts worth $2.4 billion (about $10 billion in today's money) to Japanese companies, including orders for 7,079 trucks that, Johnson says, were "the key to the revival of the Japanese automotive industry." These contracts, plus spending in Japan by U.S. military personnel, proved a foreign-exchange windfall for Japan in a dollar-scarce world economy, providing the means to import machinery that led to the 1953 investment boom.

Between 1954 and 1960 private investment quadrupled, while exports doubled, accelerating the parade of booms. In 1956-57 came the "Jimmu boom," so named by Japanese journalists because no such prosperity was remembered since the Emperor Jimmu ascended the throne in 660. Next came the 1959-61 "Iwato boom," bringing good times not seen since the even more remote period when the Sun Goddess Amatarasu Omikami was lured from her sullen seclusion in the Iwato cave.

By then, the historic Income-Doubling Plan had been launched by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1960-64), one of Japan's legendary super-bureaucrats. In his book, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, Nakamura tells how the Income-Doubling Plan—which outpaced all expectations, doubling personal income in seven instead of the planned ten years—was fueled by a "strikingly large budget expansion," with public-spending increases averaging 25 percent yearly in the early 1960's and plant and equipment investment averaging 40 percent. The "accompanying rising prosperity" led into the "Izanami boom" (1967-69), when the economy grew by 13 percent yearly, harking back to the still more misty past when the goddess Izanami coupled with her brother and gave birth to the islands of Japan.

Through all these booms, the main source of economic growth was not exports but investment. From 1952 to 1970 annual private investment increased more than tenfold, financed by an enormous growth in household savings, which peaked at 24 percent of disposable income in 1974 (as compared with only 6 percent in the U.S. today).

But this huge pile of savings—estimated at $550 billion in 1980—soon began to be squandered. In his drive for the LDP leadership, former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka (1972-74) hastily converted an internal MITI report into a bestselling book, *Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago*, calling for what amounted to a second Income-Doubling Plan. Predicting that Japan's national product would rise to $1 trillion by 1985, Tanaka announced that the enormous new transport demand thus generated would require 5,600 miles of new bullet-train track crisscrossing the country, plus 6,000 miles of superhighways, and 4,000 miles of oil pipelines (which, incidentally, would benefit the real-estate and construction interests that backed his extraordinary political career). In the event, Japan's GNP reached $1 trillion as early as 1979, but only 1,120 miles of bullet-train lines have been built and, because they were so expensive, no more are planned.

Nevertheless, from the tracks already completed, one can see the need to remodel the archipelago: unending waves of densely-packed houses lapping against the mountainsides, masses of miniature dwellings fronting on miniature streets, sprawling and monotonous suburban cityscapes extending almost continuously between Tokyo and Osaka on the horizon dominated by Mount Fuji and by the big cages of golf driving ranges bulging up amidst the houses in the same imposing way that white church towers dominate the skyline of all New England towns.

We do not know why golf practice cages have come to dominate the visible profile of these suburban communities. We do know that the Japanese businessman is devoted to the company of other men, generally his clients and colleagues, with whom he spends long evenings of camaraderie in bars and restaurants on the company expense account. We know too that on weekends he gets up at 5 A.M. to drive two or three hours to play golf on a course he has to reserve a month in advance, at a cost of $500 for the day, including drinks and lunch, which the company routinely will pay.

His abandoned wife, meanwhile, will channel all her energies into driving their son to study, study, study so he can progress along life's endless and highly regulated competitions into a company job like his father's. "Will your two-year-old make it

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to a first-rate firm?" ask the ads on the Tokyo suburban trains. "Better start his education now, before he's too old!" Once hired, he can then endlessly complain, like his parents, that "we are economic animals living in rabbit hutches."

While the government spends lavishly on public works for peasants, large swaths of the Tokyo and Osaka areas are without piped sewage. Housing is expensive and of poor quality, which nobody can explain, given Japan's technological breakthroughs in other areas. Some of the blame is laid to the rising price of land, which in turn has helped drive up rents. Over the past decade, construction costs rose 2.5 times while housing-land prices rose sevenfold in suburban Tokyo and by more in other cities. Because interest rates have been held artificially low by the government, Japanese companies invest surplus cash in land, an asset that appreciates faster than financial paper. Land also is an important political stake. Tanaka, who is still Japan's most powerful politician, despite his prosecution for allegedly taking a $2.5 million bribe from Lockheed while Prime Minister, once said that if the LDP ever tried seriously to control private land rights, the party would go to pieces.

LIKE THE farmers, businessmen have become increasingly dependent on government spending. Between 1973 and 1981, Japan's government deficits averaged 8.1 percent of GNP (while U.S. deficits averaged 2.5 percent). Since 1973, as economic growth rates fell to one-fourth of the pace of the boom decades, government borrowing has multiplied Japan's public debt fifteenfold, from one-fifteenth to nearly two-fifths of GNP (while the U.S. federal debt remained stable at one-third of GNP through most of the postwar period). By 1979, these government deficits had become the central issue in Japanese politics as public borrowing reached 40 percent of government spending. However, so dependent had Japanese business become on public-works contracts that a new organization was born, with the backing of 1,076 cement, steel, engineering, and construction companies, under the slogan: "Higher above ground, deeper underground, and farther offshore."

Over the past five years the debts of Japanese National Railways (JNR) roughly doubled to $72 billion, rivaling the size of the foreign debts of Brazil and Mexico, primarily because of the railroads' role as a politically-guided welfare system. And indeed, Japan has caught up with the West in welfare commitments even faster than it previously caught up in production technology. Because Japan's population is aging faster than that of other industrial nations, its welfare bills will also multiply faster as its industries mature and its wage structure becomes top-heavy thanks to its seniority system.

In 1982 Japanese exports fell for the first time since 1955. According to the *Industrial Review of Japan/1983*, published by Tokyo's leading business newspaper (*Nihon Kezai Shinbun*):

> Foreign demand for Japan's mainstay export products has almost been filled and overseas inventories of these products have been piled up. It was no longer possible for the Japanese economy to fuel its growth via exports. Decreasing exports invited a decline in production which, in turn, resulted in a reduction in imports. This was compounded by increasing pressure from Western countries for Japan to open up its market or, failing that, to at least strengthen its voluntary export restrictions. As a result, exports have fallen and the domestic economy has been trapped in a vicious circle.

This "vicious circle" still has sustained a large trade surplus and the highest economic growth and lowest unemployment among major industrial countries. If we were living in the 1930's, we might expect a peremptory Western response to cut off the Japanese exports that have been exploiting the weaknesses of Western industries. There indeed have been trade restrictions, but the restrictions have been themselves restricted by a delicate balancing of interests that reflects Japan's incorporation into an international system that has changed much over the past half-century.

Now as then, Japan is the largest overseas customer for U.S. exports, but the U.S. economy is much more dependent on exports today than it was a half-century ago. At the same time, Japan's two main markets and competitors in industrial exports, Germany and the United States, fearful of reviving the nightmare of the 1930's, are determined to maintain both free trade and their own home markets open to the degree permitted by domestic political constraints. Meanwhile, Japan itself has become a major exporter of capital as well as goods, with the Tokyo money market becoming the world's second-largest after Wall Street. Many foreign companies and governments raise funds there. Japan thus is following the historical path of the Dutch in the 18th century, Britain in the 19th, and the U.S. in the 20th, all of whom became capital exporters at the peak of their industrial ascendancy.

In this new role, Japan is cooperating intimately with banks and governments in other creditor-nations in attempts to manage today's international currency and debt difficulties. In addition, a fast-growing number of small and medium-sized Japanese companies have joined giants like Nissan and Matsushita (Panasonic-National) in investing in factories overseas. In some months of last year, investment income from abroad accounted for most of Japan's current international earnings. In this way the structure of Japan's balance of payments is changing from that of a developing country to something akin to Britain a century ago or the United States today.

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Because of this change in Japan's balance-of-payments structure, many are beginning to see that Japan need not export as much as it does to sustain present living standards and, indeed, to retain a significant surplus for investment overseas. In 1981, the last year for which we have detailed statistics, three-fourths of Japan's imports ($109 billion) went to meet basic needs for food, fuel, and raw materials, about the same proportion as other industrial countries outside the lucky circle formed by resource-rich nations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. In that year Japan exported $152 billion worth of goods, earning 40 percent more than its basic import needs.

One of the singular features of Japan's economic ascent over the past 130 years has been its intimate linkage with the United States. In the century that ended with the 1973 oil shock, Japan sent roughly one-third of its exports to the U.S., usually earning large trade surpluses. During the 1970's, however, Japan came to rely even more heavily on its growing trade surpluses with the U.S. to pay its way in the world economy, especially since the 1973 oil shock. While Japan's bilateral surpluses with the U.S. averaged only $1 billion yearly in 1970-76, they suddenly ballooned to $16.3 billion by 1981. Without this huge surplus with its biggest trading partner, Japan's international payments (including services) would be deeply in deficit.

Today, however, there is a growing awareness among Japanese (sharpened by the recent decline in oil prices) that large trade surpluses are not only becoming unnecessary for Japan but are also intolerable for its trading partners, and that Japan cannot continue to rely on expansion of the big U.S and European market to sustain its export and industries, in particular those large flagship companies that provide a minority of Japanese workers with guarantees of lifetime employment.

IN THE process of becoming more like us, the Japanese are finding themselves faced with the challenge of managing the same kinds of problems that also plague us. How they meet this challenge will be a fascinating and fateful story in the years immediately ahead. For the incorporation of Japan over the past century into what might be called the world system of capitalism and democracy has been the latest example of the recurrent mutual stimulation between distant cultural and industrial centers that is one of the most positive and painfully-sculpted features of human development.

We do not know whether it is still true, as *Fortune* observed a half-century ago, that "The Japanese can still get along without more things than any other industrial people." On the one hand, there is the huge increase in consumption of recent decades and the cost and welfare burdens imposed by tiny farms, tiny shops, and other inefficient economic units that have become net takers from the system. On the other hand, Japan over the centuries has shown a remarkable capacity to cut back consumption in different ways, from the practice of infanticide and abortion to maintain living standards in the 17th and 18th centuries, to its radical simplification of imported industrial machinery and processes early in this century, to its pathbreaking achievements in oil conservation in the 1970's. In its new role at the center of a much larger system, Japan now may either be trapped by its excesses or generate new ideas and patterns that could be very useful in insuring the continued vitality of capitalism and democracy not only in Japan itself but in the United States and the other Western countries as well.

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George Will and American Conservatism

James Nuechterlein

ONCE upon a time American conservatism was something of an intellectual embarrassment. When Clinton Rossiter in the mid-1950's dubbed it the "thankless persuasion," he expressed what was the common judgment of most scholarly observers even at the mid-point of Dwight Eisenhower's Presidency. Eisenhower was not the first conservative Americans placed in the White House in modern times, and he would not be the last, but the nation's political thought remained unwaveringly liberal even when its political practice veered, as it occasionally did, to the Right. In a society where liberalism was less a creed than an assumption, conservative thought could only appear a curious anomaly, an eccentricity tolerantly to be endured because it made so little difference. Ordinary citizens might frequently act as conservatives and even on occasion think of themselves that way. But intellectuals paid conservatism little attention, and then mainly to affirm that its thankfulness derived from its mindlessness.

It was a curious situation. Post-New Deal America, widely considered the most conservative in its politics of all industrial states, had no conservative thought to speak of. (It had not much radicalism either, such was the hegemony of liberalism over its political culture.) There were conservatives, of course, but for the most part they dwelt in sectarian isolation. Treated by those who counted as if they were not there, conservatives spoke to each other in a febrile coterie language that further confirmed their exclusion from the common cultural conversation. Not infrequently they talked and acted like the extremists everyone imagined them to be. The great disgrace of postwar American conservatism—its participation in the depredations of Senator Joseph McCarthy—can be understood in part (though excused not at all) as a reckless act of vengeance against an intellectual establishment that would not recognize conservatism's existence.

Yet over the past fifteen years, the pattern of better than half a century has begun to erode. The New Left movement of the 1960's, itself a challenge to the dominance of liberalism in American culture, produced a neoconservative reaction that offered for the first time in memory a critique from their Right that liberals felt obliged to take seriously. And things did not stop there. The Watergate scandal notwithstanding, the decade of the 70's amounted to an ongoing rebuke to liberal thought and practice. Signs of weakness and faltering of will abroad, combined with the impact of inflation, economic stagnation, and cultural degeneration at home, provoked a questioning of liberal public-policy assumptions unprecedented since the 1930's. Policy reversals led in turn to questions concerning the assumptions behind the policies, and when liberals found themselves unable to account coherently for what had gone wrong or to promise plausibly that they knew how to make things right, they lost almost overnight the assurance of natural rule that had been theirs since the Great Depression. Ronald Reagan's convincing victory in 1980 over Jimmy Carter, whose administration seemed to symbolize the decay of the liberal idea, brought the promise, though not yet the certainty, of an extended post-liberal era in American history.

Conservative political victories had occurred before without bringing into question the continued supremacy of liberal assumptions. What made Reagan's election appear more than just another turn in the normal political cycle had to do with contemporary developments in the world of ideas. To put the matter simply: while liberals were losing faith in their beliefs, conservatives were developing unaccustomed confidence in theirs. Though liberalism still dominates within the intellectual community, as anyone who spends any time there knows full well, at no time since the 1920's has conservatism been as much a force to be reckoned with as it is now. Not all conservatives have caught on to this. Some of them, accustomed to derision and intellectual ostracism, still speak with the defensiveness, rancor, and resentment of habitual outsiders. They do not understand how far in from the intellectual cold they have come. Conservatism is not yet the state church of the American intellectual world, but it is no longer a despised sect either.

ONE OF those who *does* understand, and who acts accordingly, is George F. Will. No political columnist has succeeded to the

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exalted position in public commentary once held by Walter Lippmann, but Will is among the handful of those who today occupy the rank just below that. His newspaper column is widely syndicated, he writes an influential biweekly column for *Newsweek* magazine, and he appears to have captured the role of obligatory conservative on television political talk shows. The Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary that he received in 1977 affirmed his high reputation and his establishment credentials. (Nor, it seems clear, will the silly recent flap over his part in the Carter briefing-book non-scandal affect his position; if it does, it will mean that the level of ethical discernment in American public life has fallen lower than any of us had feared.)

Will personifies conservatism's rehabilitated condition. When he speaks, people listen (even non-conservatives), and he exhibits the natural ease and authority of those who assume as a matter of course that their opinions will be attended to. He reflects conservatism's new respectability even as he has helped establish it. Reading Will's confident prose, one gets the impression of a man who sees conservatism as the natural state of things and who finds it difficult fully to understand anyone who does not. A conservatism expressed in tones of quiet assurance rather than insistent assertion is a conservatism that has found a secure place for itself.

Will's conservatism commands respect because it is more than a political reflex or a set of policy prescriptions. He began his career as a professor of political philosophy (having done graduate work at Oxford and Princeton) and the coherence and quality of his political judgments reflect his background: even those who deplore Will's politics express admiration for the subtlety and sophistication of his arguments as well as the elegance of his prose. His columns attempt to ground particular political cases in larger philosophic and moral contexts, and he has a knack for finding what he calls "the kernel of principle and other significance that exists, recognized or not, inside events, actions, policies, and manners." This explains the unusual success of the two volumes of his collected columns that have already been published.* They have been far more widely noticed and respectfully reviewed than is usual for such collections, and deservedly so: Will's columns age well because they regularly address, without awkward strain, matters that go beyond the immediate issues at hand.

For all these reasons, the publication of Will's new book, *Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does*,† has been eagerly anticipated. Given Will's reputation, there was every reason to expect a highly favorable response. Yet the book has received a mixed, generally unenthusiastic reception. The fullest expression of Will's philosophy yet—there is nothing new here for regular readers of his columns—it has encountered far more intellectual resistance than Will's ideas had earlier run into.

The reasons for this indifferent reception bear careful examination. It is worth analyzing in particular why conservative reviewers have been, if anything, more critical than have those on the Left. More than that, Will's book offers a convenient occasion for a discussion of conservatism's larger situation and prospects.

II

WILL's program in *Statecraft as Soulcraft* is nothing if not ambitious. Arguing the need to "change somewhat the agenda and even the vocabulary of contemporary politics," he insists in particular that "the cluster of ideas that is commonly thought to constitute conservatism should be pried apart and reconstituted." And what is wrong with American conservatism, Will suggests, traces back to flawed philosophic assumptions on the part of the nation's founders. This is, then, something of an unusual project for a conservative to undertake in that it proposes a radical rethinking of the national political tradition.

Will argues that America, like all liberal democratic societies, is "ill-founded." By that he means that the political philosophy of modernity represents a falling away from the great classical tradition of political thought. The classical tradition, based in Aristotle and kept alive at least as late as Edmund Burke, understood that the first question of government is, How should we live? or (the same question in different words), What kind of people do we want our citizens to be? But, Will goes on, the Moderns (exemplified by Machiavelli and Hobbes) have forsaken the Ancients' preoccupation with virtue and are no longer concerned "to cultivate the best persons and the best in persons." Rather they focus simply on questions of political management and political skill, on "keeping order and keeping power."

This lowering of sights, according to Will, proceeds from a decline in belief in natural law, in universal norms of truth and virtue accessible to reason and in accordance with "the better angels of our nature." Modernity, says Will, seeing reason as slave to passion and man as a purely self-interested creature, can only think of the public good in terms of the aggregation of narrow private interests. The Ancients concerned themselves with the ends men ought to seek; the Moderns satisfy themselves with the most dexterous management of those elemental desires and passions that they take as the given materials of politics. For Moderns, in Will's analysis, achievement of the good society does not require serious contemplation or consci-

* *The Pursuit of Happiness, and Other Sobering Thoughts*, Harper & Row, 333 pp., $10.95; *The Pursuit of Virtue and Other Tory Notions*, Simon & Schuster, 397 pp., $16.50.

† Simon & Schuster, 186 pp., $13.95.

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ous willing of the social good. Much as in the economic world of Adam Smith, it emerges willy-nilly out of individuals' unreflecting pursuit of their own interests: private vice, public virtue. The classical tradition wanted to know how man ought to live; modernity finds it necessary only to understand how he behaves.

Such a view of the social process, Will argues, denigrates government and politics. In the classical tradition, the state, led by the natural aristocracy of the wise and virtuous, served the noble purpose of nurturing virtue and gently guiding its citizens by precept and law in the direction of social affection, moral community, and dedication to the common good. Thus statecraft as soulcraft. To the extent that the Moderns concern themselves with such ends at all, Will says, they assume that they will be provided for not by the state but by the larger—and largely automatic—workings of society. In the modernist view, as Will has it, the state becomes dissociated from society and looked to simply as an instrument of coercion, justified only in its negative, if necessary, function of intervening in those situations where automatic social processes cannot be depended on or where the clash of individual self-interests threatens to disturb the public order. Given modernity's mechanistic and individualistic assumptions, Will says, the state becomes an object of suspicion, even scorn—it acts, when it acts, to limit individual freedom—and the political vocation is robbed of the honor and grandeur that should attach to it. From statecraft as soulcraft, it might be said, we have descended to statecraft as public nuisance (or, at best, necessary evil).

All this brings Will to America, "modernity's destination." It was James Madison, the father of the American Constitution, who turned the management of private interests from an art into a science and who provided the most elaborate rationale yet constructed for elevating self-interest into the central assumption of politics. In *The Federalist Papers,* as read by Will, Madison praised large republics (such as the proposed United States of America) for what had earlier been seen as their greatest defect: their absence of unifying homogeneity and their proliferation of competing interests ("factions"). Madison argued that the greatest of democratic dangers—the potential tyranny of the majority—could be avoided, first, by constructing a constitutional system incorporating federalism, separation of powers, and multiple checks and balances and, second, by so multiplying interests and passions in society that no one group or no combination of groups could come together as a stable and dominating force.

Note, Will emphasizes, that "Madison's attention is exclusively on controlling passions with countervailing passions; he is not concerned with the amelioration or reform of passions. The political problem is seen entirely in terms of controlling the passions that nature gives, not nurturing the kind of character that the polity might need." As Will interprets Madison, disinterested virtue is no more to be expected from the rulers than the ruled: "public-spiritedness will not be assumed, or even necessary, even in public officials." At the heart of Madison's scheme, Will says, lies the assumption that man cannot be improved; he can only be controlled.

According to Will, the "defective philosophic premises" of the nation's founding have continued to manifest themselves over the years. America to him is still a nation marked by excessive individualism and inadequate sense of community, its politics too frequently "a mere partnership in low concerns and vagrant desires." He finds the quintessential political drama of American history in the debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas over the extension of slavery into the territories. Douglas, operating in the true Madisonian tradition, reduced even slavery to a clash of material and economic interests, and he proposed to settle the issue by a political weighing and balancing of those interests without regard to moral principle. Lincoln, in Will's reading, argued to the contrary that there are limits to popular sovereignty, that even in an open society there can be—indeed there must be—closed questions. To accept the possibility of the extension of slavery was to deny the self-evident moral truth of human equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence. (Most historians conclude that Northerners fought the Civil War in order to preserve the Union. Will argues that more was involved, that they fought to preserve a union "dedicated" to a "proposition.")

In Will's view, Americans have more often followed Douglas than Lincoln. Their political theory and practice have focused on the satisfaction of individual wants, without consideration of the possibility that some wants might be less deserving of satisfaction than others. Their individualism—an individualism most often expressed, in Will's view, in terms of the pursuit of economic self-interest—has gotten in the way of the self-restraint and public-spiritedness necessary for true social cohesion. They have failed, Will thinks, to cultivate that form of community "which proceeds from shared adherence to a public philosophy and shared emulation of exemplary behavior and values." They have neglected statecraft as soulcraft: the careful nurture of the character of the citizenry through moral exhortation, wise laws, and good government.

Will's central complaint about American political culture, with its "disproportionate individualism and . . . inadequate sense of human beings as social creatures," often finds poignant expression:

> An American dream is to be unconfined by geography or history. Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American archetype, considered himself "an endless seeker with no Past at my back." And his

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idea of satisfactory education was the self-education of the Thoreau boys who had "gone up the Merrimack to live by their wits." The oldest American romance is with the idea of a pathless wilderness in which absolute individualism—what is today called "self-realization"—is uninhibited by social bonds. But must we always speak of society in connection with the nasty word "bonds"? The word suggests ropes biting into wrists. We have had quite enough Leatherstocking Tales, thank you. We need a literature of cheerful sociability, novels of social "thickness" that make society seem a complex but friendly place where social relationships facilitate rather than frustrate individualism and "self-realization." And we need a public philosophy that can rectify the current imbalance between the political order's meticulous concern for material well-being and its fastidious withdrawal from concern for the inner lives and moral character of citizens.

This is not the usual stuff of American conservatism, not, at least, of its dominant strain.

Will wants to reshape American political culture and reconstitute the conservative tradition through the establishment of what he calls "strong-government conservatism." The American Right, he argues, should stop acting as if its only settled principle were hostility to government and should instead adopt a more positive attitude toward politics and the state. Conservatives, in Will's view, need to develop a self-conscious program of political economy, one that goes beyond unqualified support for free-market economics and unyielding antipathy to government. To him all economic programs are expedients and should be subordinated to higher political/moral considerations. What is needed in particular is an "affirmative doctrine of the welfare state" based on a "limited but clear ethic of common provision." Will argues that conservatives have for too long defined themselves simply in opposition to the New Deal. The American people, he says, have emphatically affirmed the New Deal principle that the state bears a considerable responsibility for the material well-being of its citizens, and conservatives will never enjoy the long-run confidence of the public until they fully acknowledge that principle themselves. Conservatism, if it is to prosper, must be a "conservatism with a kindly face."

Will's conservative welfare state follows along lines laid out earlier by Irving Kristol. Like Kristol, Will argues that government is better at providing the poor with cash than with goods and services, and he is convinced that the poor will be better off receiving money to purchase their necessities from the private sector than being tended to by an inefficient and intrusive social-welfare bureaucracy. He also follows Kristol in urging that, wherever possible, government weave its net of social protection for citizens by providing private-sector incentives, as in allowing tax deductions for medical-insurance premiums.

Will sees a vigorous national government as a supplement and support to society's network of private institutions and voluntary organizations—not, as conservatives so often have, as its enemy. As a Burkean, he wants to strengthen the "little platoons" that nurture our social lives and shelter us from the pressures and terrors of mass society, and he argues that a limited welfare state can sustain rather than weaken the family, the school, the church, and the local community. A wise government, he suggests, will always delegate many of its functions to intermediary institutions.

Will's recommendation of the welfare state to conservatives is not based solely, or even primarily, on grounds of political expediency. Its fundamental justification, he says, is justice, the sense of giving all those united with us in the common endeavors of society their due. Beyond that, while Will notes the welfare state's potential for divisiveness, he argues that it can be, on balance, a unifying force. It should, he thinks, help shape a social consensus of the common good based on assumptions of "shared values and a shared fate." Then too, Will suggests, only when conservatives have displayed their commitment to the common purpose through support of the welfare state will they be able plausibly to advocate use of the state to shape social values with respect to such issues as abortion, sexual relations, and pornography. Conservatism, he seems to argue, must be all of a piece. If it wishes to make government's weight felt in social policy (and in a strong defense and foreign policy), it cannot very well justify a principled refusal of government intervention in other areas of public concern. The proper distinction between liberalism and conservatism, Will appears to be saying, lies not in whether or not government should be strong, but in the uses to which strong government should be put.

III

WILL's conservatism is obviously a conservatism with a difference. Enough of a difference, in fact, that some question Will's conservative credentials. His very respectability makes him suspect. If liberals are so enamored of him, the reasoning goes, he must be less than a genuine conservative. Part of this criticism perhaps stems from simple jealousy: Will has made it in a way that other journalists on the Right naturally envy. In part too conservative suspicion of Will can be attributed to what Freud called the narcissism of small differences. To the degree that conservatives are still susceptible to the sectarian temptation, they are likely to spend more time and mental energy searching out apostasy on the Right than invincible ignorance on the Left.

But to some extent it is Will's own doing that so many conservatives have turned on him. He appears to take a perverse delight in highlighting his differences with fellow conservatives. He never

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hides from the conservative label, but he does seem insistent at times on defining conservatism in terms so exclusive that he alone could comfortably meet the requirements for membership in its ranks. It takes a certain arrogance to proclaim, as Will does, that there exist in America today "almost no conservatives, properly understood." It is one thing to argue the legitimacy of one's own perhaps recondite understanding of conservatism, quite another to insist that it is the only understanding possible.

Yet for all that, there can be no mistaking Will's conservatism. Readers of *Statecraft as Soulcraft* might not always be certain, but regular observers of Will's columns will have no doubt. When he dwells on generalities, he does on occasion sound like a closet liberal, but when he gets down to specifics, he is soundly and unmistakably conservative. On social issues—gay rights, abortion, busing and quotas, pornography, feminism, sexual morality, crime and punishment—he is consistently on the Right. He may be worlds removed from the Moral Majority in style, but on the issues he is far more often with them than not. On foreign and defense policy, his characteristic criticism of the Reagan administration is that it is insufficiently Reaganite. He is a persuaded and profound anti-Communist and an unapologetic cold warrior. It is true that on economic issues and on government interventionism he does stray from conservative orthodoxy, but even there his heresies are only marginal. He may speak in generalized praise of the welfare state and of activist government, but his specific recommendations in those areas, both in his columns and even in *Statecraft as Soulcraft*, would be acceptable to all but the most Manchesterian of American conservatives.

Will qualifies as a conservative both by temperament and by political affinity. He is a nationalist, a fatalist, a traditionalist, and an almost curmudgeonly anti-modernist. His reverence for the past is palpable: how many writers today yearn, as Will does, for a pre-modern era "when cities were supposed to be something other than mere arenas for acquisition, when civil society was supposed to serve ends other than the pursuit of self-interest, when civil law was supposed to be patterned after a higher law"? And for all his talk of the need and possibility of making the most of "our finest potentialities," he has not abandoned the classic conservative view that the fundamental source of social ills resides in human nature. "Nothing dies harder," he has written, "than the myth that society is the source of all human imperfections and anxieties."

The same pattern prevails at the level of political choice and association. Will has identified with and supported the Reagan administration, even as he has maneuvered (no self-respecting journalist could do otherwise) to keep some critical distance from it. While it is true that Will awarded Reagan a grade of only B— for his performance in his first year as President, the apparent severity of that mark has to be weighed against the grades Will assigned to Presidents Carter (D—), Ford (C—), and Nixon (F). Had Professor Will graded on the curve, Reagan would have emerged with a solid A. The President may get annoyed at Will's regular complaints that the nation's deficits are too high and its taxes too low, but he surely understands that on essential matters he has at least one dependable friend at *Newsweek* and the Washington *Post*.

Yet if it is the case that Will's conservative credentials cannot reasonably be challenged, it is also true that his conservatism may not be entirely suited to American conditions.

IV

It is odd that an author should be more impressive in brief essays than in a fully developed argument, but that is the situation with Will. His columns, taken together, offer a richer and more satisfactory (if less systematic) public philosophy than does his book. Part of the reason for this has already been alluded to. Will's columns normally begin with discussion of a specific issue and move on from there to more general analysis. *Statecraft as Soulcraft* too often lacks the anchor of particularity. For long stretches, the argument proceeds at such a high level of abstraction that the reader finds himself unable sensibly either to agree or disagree. Without a specific political context, one can only say of much of Will's philosophic pleading, "it all depends."

One of the distinctive strengths of conservative political thought is its preoccupation with particular cases and conditions and its distrust of large abstractions. That inclination is not, as is frequently suspected, a sign of anti-intellectualism; it is rather the healthy appreciation that in the world of political analysis, where we characteristically choose not between good and evil but among competing goods, context is everything. Will is too sophisticated (and too genuinely conservative) not to understand that, but that understanding is not always reflected in *Statecraft as Soulcraft*.

The discipline of particularity tests and qualifies overambitious generalizations. A number of conservative reviewers of Will's book have complained, with some point, that it provides aid and comfort to the Left in that it spends most of its time attacking the failures of the Right. Much of that has to do with the nature of Will's project: as a conservative who wants to reconstitute conservatism, he naturally focuses his attention on the inadequacies of conservatism as presently understood. But part of the problem relates to Will's too elevated level of discourse, as a comparison of his book with his columns demonstrates. In the immediate and quotidian world of

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Will the columnist, his sympathies for strong government are regularly checked and restrained by his knowledge of government's habitual failures. But in *Statecraft as Soulcraft*, Will can hymn the glories of government not as it exists but as Edmund Burke imagined it in its ideal state. Toward the end of the book, when Will descends from general precepts to specific prescriptions, his cautious conservatism reasserts itself, but by that time most readers, liberal or conservative, will have gained an impression of the book's argument contrary to what the author precisely intended.

Matters of form and proportion are not what most trouble this book, however. The central problem lies in its unabashed Toryism, which gives it an angle of vision useful as a corrective to American conservatives but doubtful as a base on which native conservative thought might build.

Will's difficulty begins with his title. The notion that the state or the political order in general should be concerned with the care of souls might be congenial to those in a certain tradition of state-church thought, but most orthodox believers will regard it with deep suspicion and alarm (as, for that matter, will most secularists). Talk of the soul belongs to the province of religion rather than social ethics; it suggests matters of ultimate concern beyond the realm of the penultimate in which politics resides. True religion transcends and judges all political philosophies and systems. It does not exist as a prop to the social order, even if, in practice, it might often function that way. Soulcraft belongs to priests, not politicians.

Will may very well not intend to associate "soulcraft" with theological implications. Disinterested public virtue, which is his primary concern, has normally been thought of, after all, in secular and not religious terms. But even if he only means "statecraft as soulcraft" as a shorthand phrase to suggest concern on the part of the state for ethical nurture, he is in dangerous waters. The reader is forewarned of trouble when Will argues that Felix Frankfurter was "radically wrong" to suggest that "law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of man." The danger becomes fully clear when Will applies his argument to the civil-rights laws of 1964 and 1965:

> The great civil-rights legislation of the 1960's was, of course, designed primarily to improve the condition of the descendants of slaves. But it had another purpose. It was intended to do what it in fact did. *It was supposed to alter the operation of the minds of many white Americans. [The civil-rights laws] were explicit and successful attempts to change (among other things) individuals' moral beliefs by compelling them to change their behavior. The theory was that if government compelled people to eat and work and study and play together, government would improve the inner lives of those people.* [Emphasis added.]

This argument is mistaken in fact and dangerous in its implications. When Congress passed the civil-rights acts, it surely did not see itself as arbiter of the "moral beliefs" and "inner lives" of Americans. If it had, it would have been trespassing on grounds from which it should be rigorously excluded. The government has every right to force me to behave in ways that do not violate the legal rights of my neighbors. It has no right at all to presume to improve my inner life through the use of its coercive powers. If such a right is once granted, it is difficult to see that there are *any* proper limits a society can set on the powers of government.

Will himself appears to sense the danger here, for he no sooner makes his connection between the power of law and men's inner lives than he begins to back away from it. He reminds us (and himself?) that a government which has become conscious of itself in the realm of morality can easily rationalize tyranny. What is really at issue between the state and the citizen, he says, "is not coercion; it is not compelling persons to act against their settled convictions; it is not a collision of wills. . . . Rather it is a slow, steady, gentle, educative, and persuasive enterprise." Government at its best, Will goes on, exercises not raw power but a "gentling function." The reader is left to reconcile these passages with those on the civil-rights acts as best he can. The civil-rights laws were not, of course, tyrannical, but if Will's interpretation of their secondary purpose were allowed to stand, they could serve as a dangerous precedent.

There is a problem too with the distinction Will draws between the classical teaching that politics has to do with the pursuit of virtue and the modern doctrine that political thought must assume the centrality of individual self-interest. That may be a defensible proposition in general, but Will's application of it to the founding of America is not. Though Madison and the other founders were certainly concerned with balancing interests, they were in fact also deeply concerned with the cultivation of republican virtue. Moreover, throughout the nation's history, Americans have operated on the common-sense assumption that they could maintain a reasonable balance between the pursuit of their own interests and concern for the common good. Part of our self-interest, after all, is to think well of ourselves, and most of us could not do so if our concerns never extended beyond our own needs. We all have care for our own interests, but we almost all also have a desire to advance along with rather than at the expense of those around us. And for most Americans, the naggings of conscience have been reinforced by the teachings of their churches and other moral authorities. The Judeo-Christian moral tradition has been one of the great determining influences on American culture. It has

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consistently preached that concern for self is not enough, and its power to counterbalance the instinct of self-interest has been and remains greater than Will acknowledges.

Disputed understandings over American history and culture aside, Will's preoccupation with public virtue raises troubling questions. The problem is not his concern with the subject as such: he may well be right to argue that the best measure of a society is the quality of the people it produces. But Will grounds his concern and draws implications from it in ways that many people, including many conservatives, will find unpersuasive or overdrawn.

Will anchors his belief in the pursuit of virtue in the concept of natural law. We can only speak coherently of public virtue, he seems to suggest, if we accept the existence of "norms apprehensible by common judgment." But even those who share Will's belief in the indispensability of some notion of natural law (as I do) have to concede that it remains a notably elusive concept. Even within the Christian tradition, for example, there has been considerable disagreement over both the precise definition of natural law and the extent to which fallible men and women can be expected to live according to its precepts. Considering the heterogeneous nature of modern American society, it is difficult to imagine that we can find common ground based on any theory of natural law. Even if we shift vocabulary and speak simply of "shared values," we will be hard put to find agreement, except at the most general level, on standards of right thought and action. Will has failed to reconcile his concern for American moral community with the reality of American pluralism.

Indeed, it is difficult to understand how an America of 230 million people can create a sense of community at the level of intensity Will would seem to require. When he speaks of "organic collectivity," one wonders what that can mean in a society which, as he concedes, has very little by way of a common culture. John Winthrop's Massachusetts Bay Colony had true community, but that community is lost to us because its binding faith is lost to us. Today we have so little in the way of common moral beliefs and standards that even on such a fundamental issue as abortion-on-demand (in opposition to which I stand entirely with Will) we as a nation are hopelessly divided. Will wants to make of us a tighter moral community than we can sustain.

It is true, of course, that we are social creatures and that we do require a sense of community. But Americans, for all their unabashed patriotism, have traditionally found close ties and shared values at levels of association less grand than the community of the whole nation. Ties of family, friendship, church, ethnicity, neighborhood, and voluntary-group membership provide the intimacy, warmth, and sense of shared moral sentiments for which we naturally yearn. Our love of country, by contrast, functions at a high level of generality. Will wants to go beyond this. He wants to use government both to strengthen our private groups and associations (though he offers little by way of specific recommendation) and to provide for the society as a whole a denser weave of consensus and community than now exists.

It is this latter purpose that Will intends his conservative welfare state to fulfill. He defends the welfare state less in reference to the needs of those who benefit from its services than by reason of the unifying function its "ethic of common provision" performs. The welfare state, he says, gives citizens a sense of shared fate, and its altruistic intentions help mend and maintain the "chain of community" that the individualistic tendencies of modern politics put under constant strain. We need to provide a welfare state, Will argues, because it is the right thing to do and because it provides a moral basis for community.

But one wonders if that is the way the welfare state actually functions. Here as elsewhere Will tends to see government not as it is but as he would have it be. Even as he talks of government strengthening society's "little platoons" when all about us the evidence mounts that the state's expansion coincides with their contraction, so he praises the unifying powers of a welfare state that in practice tears us apart by politicizing and thus intensifying intergroup rivalry for social benefits. In both cases, Will recognizes the potential dangers but, having done so, turns his back on them without further consideration. More than that is required for the construction of a workable doctrine of conservative political economy.

Will is right, given the conditions of modern industrial society, to argue the necessity of the welfare state and to suggest that conservatives must learn to adjust themselves to it with better grace than they have sometimes displayed. But that is not to argue that conservatives are wrong to regard the welfare state with considerable uneasiness. For someone so concerned with the virtue of citizens, Will curiously overlooks the moral effects of welfare on its recipients. The evidence is strong that for a critical minority welfare erodes those qualities of self-respect and self-reliance that are essential to a decent social existence. If we are to judge a society by the kind of people it produces, we cannot ignore the clear signs of social pathology associated with welfare. Will should be careful of the peculiar temptations of *noblesse oblige*: welfare may be morally uplifting for those who bestow it but morally destructive of those who come to rely on it as their due. It is almost impossible to raise these questions without engendering suspicions of callousness and moral arrogance (even in one's own mind), but such matters must be factored into the moral calculus by which we measure the effects of the welfare state.

In any case, the existence of the welfare state is

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not really at issue. Outside of a handful of libertarians whom everyone ignores, no one seriously contemplates the dismantling of the welfare state. The question is not whether we shall retain it but how, if at all, we are to go about setting limits on it. As Marc Plattner put it some years back, the issue is "the welfare state vs. the redistributive state" (*Public Interest*, Spring 1979). Contemporary advocates of the state want to use it not simply to put a floor of security under those at the bottom of society but to turn it into the central agent for the allocation of social resources and rewards. Will has a point in arguing that conservatives need to come up with a coherent attitude toward the welfare state, but while they must find ways to affirm it, they must not in so doing philosophically underwrite its unlimited expansion. Will is better at suggesting means of affirmation than mechanisms of restriction.

What is at stake here is Will's whole program of "strong-government conservatism." He affirms strong government against what he sees as the dominant modernist politics of individual self-interest. But modern politics—the politics of the 20th century—is not rooted in individualistic and competitive values; it is rather collectivist and egalitarian. Will notes this in passing and then ignores it to return to his talk of modernism as individualism. What he also ignores is that his preferred language of strong government and community has been captured by the Left, which identifies social progress as movement toward greater equality of condition under government aegis.

One can sympathize with Will's irritation concerning the "careless anti-government rhetoric" of American conservatism. Ronald Reagan's speeches do sometimes arouse the suspicion that he wishes the government could find a way of going out of business. Yet the American tradition of insistence on limited government is neither ignoble nor frivolous, and it does carry with it an inherent suspicion of an activist state. Will defends his preference for strong government with appeals to Burke, but those appeals are less persuasive than he supposes. Burke lived and wrote, after all, in an aristocratic society where the functions of government were few and the political nation was carefully circumscribed; a "celebration of the state" in such a context cannot easily be translated into modern circumstances. Conservatism, in any case, has to do not simply with tradition but with *particular* traditions, and Will himself states that political thought necessarily gets expressed in parochial categories—"native flowers sprung from native soils." Since he concedes that his is a species of "European" conservatism, it is odd that he should be so categorical in denouncing as illegitimate varieties of American conservatism at odds with his own.

In one sense, of course, Will is entirely correct about "strong-government conservatism." Given modern conditions, government will be large; the only alternative to big government in a complex industrial society is anarchistic chaos. But it is precisely the inevitability of big government that makes American conservatism's instinctive suspicion of it—and resolute defense of individual freedom against it—necessary and salutary. Without a strong presumption that government should be carefully limited, it will grow hopelessly out of control. We need not, in America, fear the schemes of tyranny, but we have been granted no exemption from the imperatives of bureaucracy. Government grown unwieldy, inept, and intrusive is part of the bargain of modernity, but it requires eternal vigilance to keep the costs of the bargain from becoming prohibitive. That, in America, is a task for conservatives.

All this is not to suggest that Will's "European" conservatism holds no message or utility for Americans. The language of virtue, discipline, and restraint, of concern for values, pursuit of excellence, and cultivation of community, has a universal validity. Indeed, there has always been a strain of such cultural conservatism in the American tradition. It serves as a valuable check on the temptations to reckless hedonism and mindless populism that our society must perpetually guard against. But if it is a necessary program, it is not sufficient. Will's position is ironic. He seeks to deepen and broaden the American consensus, but his philosophic principles keep him at a distance from the most available source of revivified consensus: a celebration of democratic capitalism.

In the tradition of cultural conservatism, Will is uneasy about the social consequences of capitalism. The heart of capitalism, he says, lies in its "restless energy," while true conservatism seeks "a still point of virtuous equilibrium." The dynamism that makes capitalism work—and Will respects capitalism's vitality—unleashes passions and desires that loosen restraint, license excessive individualism and materialism, and dissolve the bonds of community. Unless certain disciplines are imposed by the political/moral order, Will suggests, capitalism has the ironic potential of eroding the very qualities of prudence, industry, and deferral of gratification necessary to its long-run survival. One hears echoes in Will of Daniel Bell's suspicion that capitalism may finally be undone by the cultural decadence engendered by its own successes. Will would not go so far as to say that capitalism and conservatism contradict each other, but it is obvious that for him they coexist only in considerable tension.

Will's concerns cannot lightly be dismissed, nor the tensions he describes easily be resolved. The problems they address may well in theory be insoluble. But history often confounds theory, and democratic capitalism has proved in practice a remarkably durable and resilient system of political economy. American history continues to be,

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on balance, a success story, and for all the difficulties the society has experienced over the past two decades, there is no good reason to despair of its ability to endure. Will is not in the end bearish on America, but he does offer a more troubled view of our condition than may be found in the works of such recent defenders of the American system as Michael Novak* and (in a neoliberal vein) Robert Benne.†

Will's picture of the workings of the economic order occasionally borders on caricature. He notes but does not sufficiently emphasize the system's benefits (prosperity, opportunity, a self-reliant citizenry) and he exaggerates its presumed heartlessness and inattention to virtue. The competitive world of capitalism *would* be unacceptably harsh were it not softened by the concern citizens display for their neighbors both through private sharing and through the institutionalized charity of the welfare state. Americans under capitalism do not appear a more self-preoccupied and grasping people than those who live in more socialized societies, and the American system does not seem to bear more harshly on the great mass of its citizens than is the case elsewhere. Moreover, given their unrivaled opportunities for hedonistic self-indulgence, Americans are if anything less decadent, materialistic, or rootless than could be predicted.

In other words, our pluralistic and uncoordinated moral order works better than might at first appear and better, perhaps, than we have reason to expect it to. It is certainly not clear that it would work more satisfactorily under the self-conscious tutelage of the state that Will proposes. American society operates with but a low-level public conception of the common good, but its moral/cultural private sector offers more support for moral decency and purpose than its pluralism and diversity would seem to indicate. Americans are less in need of soulcraft than moralists suppose, even moralists as sympathetic and discerning as George Will.

Democratic capitalism deserves support from conservatives on its merits. Its ability to provide economic abundance, political freedom, and cultural vitality should not be cheaply discounted or taken as given. It is a system worth defending. It is also, for conservatives, a political opportunity. American leftists have over the years drifted, almost without knowing it, into an adversarial stance toward the system that undergirds their society. Few on the liberal Left will attack capitalism directly, but even fewer can utter its name without awkward apologies or qualifications. The Left's problem is fundamental and overwhelming: it proposes to lead a society about whose constituting arrangements it has a bad conscience. Conservatives—at least those conservatives unbeguiled by cultural critiques of capitalism—are not so inhibited or constrained, and their opportunities for positive leadership should improve accordingly, as in fact in recent years they have.

When George Will addresses particular issues or situations he participates, often brilliantly, in the conservative revival. It is only when he succumbs to the lures of philosophy that he risks losing his bearings. There is a lesson there for all conservatives.

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* *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, Simon & Schuster, 434 pp., $16.95.

† *The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment*, Fortress, 267 pp., $10.95.

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Who Was the "Mysterious Messenger"?

Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut

On July 28, 1942, a prominent and well-connected German industrialist met with a Swiss citizen in Zurich. The industrialist revealed that Hitler's headquarters was considering a plan to concentrate all Jews from Germany and German-occupied territories in the East in the fall of that year, and to exterminate them through the use of prussic acid. Altogether, the Nazis would kill some three-and-one-half to four million Jews in this operation.

Certain details of the information were inaccurate or obsolete. The plan was not under consideration; it had already begun. The undertaking was so vast that it could only occur over many months. Nonetheless, the industrialist had uncovered one of the greatest secrets in Nazi Germany. Adolf Hitler's "Final Solution" of the Jewish question was to kill all the Jews of Europe by means of gas chambers.

The alarmed Swiss referred the industrialist to Benjamin Sagalowitz, the press officer of the Jewish religious communities of Zurich. The industrialist then urged Sagalowitz to inform Churchill and Roosevelt immediately. In his conversations with Sagalowitz, and later with Gerhart Riegner, the Swiss representative of the World Jewish Congress, the industrialist asked that his name be kept a secret when they passed his intelligence to Western governments. Since the industrialist was heading back to Germany, extreme caution was required to keep his identity from the Gestapo and the Abwehr (German military intelligence).

As Arthur Morse (*While Six Million Died*) and Walter Laqueur (*The Terrible Secret*) have already disclosed, Sagalowitz and Riegner were forced to reveal the industrialist's name only once; in October 1942, the American minister to Switzerland, Leland Harrison, demanded to know his identity. Because Harrison's cooperation was essential in forcing a reaction from Washington to the Final Solution, Riegner put the name in a sealed envelope and gave it to Harrison, who shared the name only with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern. He did not leave the envelope either in the records of the legation or among his personal papers.

Despite the best efforts of several scholars, particularly Walter Laqueur ("The Mysterious Messenger and the Final Solution," COMMENTARY, March 1980), this wartime secret has been preserved since 1942. The industrialist himself has died, as has Sagalowitz. In recent years the only person who knew the industrialist's name was Riegner, and—as he told us when we began our investigation of this matter—he still felt bound by his promise of confidentiality. In Riegner's words, "It was the only thing that he ever asked from us."

After many months of searching through the labyrinth of documents at the National Archives, we were confident that we had unearthed the industrialist's identity and with it, one of the great untold espionage episodes of World War II. (Since then, another scholar, Monty N. Penkower of Touro College, working independently from other sources, has also identified the German industrialist, but without mention of the broader intelligence activities in which he was engaged.)

EDUARD REINHOLD KARL SCHULTE was born on January 4, 1891, in Düsseldorf. He obtained a doctorate of law and went into the booming field of banking and industry in the years before World War I. He had lost a leg in an accident (and was fitted with an artificial one), which kept him out of the conflict, but he served his country by working in the War Office for Raw Materials as a specialist in oils and fats. Later, he worked in various high executive positions in the soap industry. In 1925 he became managing director of Georg von Giesche's Erben, the largest zinc producer in Germany and a major producer of lead, coal, and sulfur as well. He soon accumulated positions on the boards of other large corpora-

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tions. He married Clara Luise Minna Ebert, eight years his senior, and fathered two sons. A tall, distinguished-looking man, he was described by an American official in 1945 as being honest, intelligent, and very energetic.

Schulte is not known to have participated actively in the tumultuous politics of the Weimar Republic, but his general outlook corresponded to the position of the German Democratic party, whose fortunes faded as the Nazis gained strength. A believer in the market system, he was at the same time a convinced democrat, a combination that was uncommon in Weimar Germany. When Hitler took power in January 1933, Schulte must have realized that very bad times lay ahead. His company acquired a Swiss subsidiary, which gave him a reason to travel to Switzerland frequently.

Schulte's desire to bring peace and democracy to Germany drove this anti-Nazi industrialist to work with the Allies during the war. The crimes of the Gestapo and the SS Schulte attributed ultimately to Hitler. Unlike many anti-Nazis, however, he placed little faith in the ability and will of the German army to overthrow the Nazi regime. In July 1942, he warned that nothing of sense should be expected from the officers, and a year later he still saw no sign of any break in their support for the regime. Moreover, Schulte wanted to do more than destroy Nazism. The only means to a lasting peace, he argued, was a decisive Allied military victory and the complete destruction of the military caste that had long plagued Germany. With no illusions about the capacity of the German army to overthrow the Third Reich or to sustain democracy, Schulte cast his lot with the only forces capable of achieving those goals.

Thus, after the German conquest of Poland, Schulte—having at some point established high-level Polish and French contacts as well as good relations with someone in the German Foreign Office and with a number of high-ranking army officers—began passing intelligence information to representatives of the Polish Special Intelligence Service and the French Service of Information in Bern. The Poles sent the material on to the staff of the Polish commander in chief, by then in London. Schulte's information on German foreign policy and military strategy was of top quality. In May 1941, for example, Schulte reported that German preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union would be completed by the end of the month. The invasion followed on June 22. In January 1942, he transmitted the operational plans of the German armies in Russia, predicting their thrust toward the Caucasus. Schulte also described in detail internal frictions that were pitting Hitler and the Nazi party against the German general staff. The Poles naturally gave such material to the British, who passed some of it on to the United States. Schulte's name, of course, was never used in the documents and telegrams to the United States; in one document the source was said to be a director of an important German industrial concern.

The report about the Final Solution, which Schulte had received from someone in Hitler's headquarters, obviously could not be left to ordinary channels. Schulte had been astute enough to recognize that Jewish officials in Switzerland would take whatever steps necessary to bring the Final Solution to the attention of Allied leaders. His message went from Sagalowitz to Gerhart Riegner in Geneva. Sagalowitz knew that Riegner could reach Rabbi Stephen Wise, the head of the American Jewish Congress, in New York. It would then be up to Wise to go to Franklin Roosevelt, a pilgrimage he had made several times before.

RIEGNER was a young German Jew who had recognized the dangers of Nazism even before 1933 and left Germany shortly after Hitler took power. He went to Geneva, where he studied law under a trio of distinguished scholars at the Graduate Institute of International Studies: Hans Kelsen, William Rappard, and Paul Guggenheim. When Stephen Wise and Nahum Goldmann organized the World Jewish Congress in 1936 and were looking for a Swiss representative with a background in international law, the scholars recommended Riegner. Working alongside his senior colleague Richard Lichtheim, Riegner threw himself zealously into the dual task of defending Jewry and combating Nazism.

Riegner was the right man to receive the report of the Final Solution, since his personal experience with fanatical Nazi anti-Semitism made the intelligence credible, as it would prove not to be to many others. But he still needed to know more about Schulte before he could have confidence in the accuracy of the information, which was bound to be questioned. Riegner found out that the industrialist had twice before provided key intelligence information to the Allies and that he was also a power in the business world, a "captain of industry" whose firm employed some 30,000 persons. He also obtained a copy of the industrialist's general comments about conditions in Germany. On the basis of all this, Riegner concluded that the report of mass extermination was accurate. It complemented information he had received from other sources about the brutality of the deportations. He then consulted his teacher, Paul Guggenheim, of Geneva's Graduate Institute. Guggenheim was skeptical, and persuaded Riegner to tell Wise that the information was unverified. But he also assisted Riegner by giving him a letter of introduction to the American consul in Geneva, Paul C. Squire. As it turned out, Squire was away on vacation, so the agitated Riegner turned the information over to Vice Consul Howard Elting on August 8, 1942.

Elting told Riegner that the information seemed fantastic, but Riegner pointed out that reports from Paris, Holland, Berlin, Vienna, and Prague

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had all confirmed the fact that large numbers of Jews were being brutally deported. Riegner then requested that the Allied governments be informed, that they make every effort to obtain confirmation or denial, and that the message also be sent to Rabbi Wise in New York. On the same day Riegner asked the British consulate to transmit the message to Sidney Silverman, a Labor member of the House of Commons who was the British representative of the World Jewish Congress. Riegner feared that Washington might not send the telegram to Wise, but believed that the British Foreign Office would not dare to suppress a telegram to a member of Parliament.

Although he too was skeptical of the revelation, Elting dutifully wrote up a memo of his conversation with Riegner. In it he described Riegner as a serious and balanced individual who would not have come forward with the information if he had not believed it. Elting recommended that the legation send Riegner's message to Washington, and legation officials complied. But in an accompanying dispatch, Ambassador Harrison apparently questioned the accuracy of the information. The State Department summarized the report and passed a copy to the OSS. The summary described the Riegner message as a "wild rumor inspired by Jewish fears."

In mid-September Schulte supplied Sagalowitz or Riegner with two coded letters written by a Swiss Jew living in Warsaw. On the surface, they appeared to be a set of innocent family messages that no German censor could object to. The first letter read in part:

> I spoke to Mr. Jäger. He told me that he will invite all the relatives of the family Achenu, with the exception of Miss Eisenzweig, from Warsaw to the countryside dwelling Kewer. I am alone here. I feel lonely. As to the citrus fruit I hope that I shall receive them in time. . . . Uncle Gerusch works also in Warsaw; he is a very capable worker. His friend Miso works with him. Please pray for me.

The key nouns, as Riegner explained to Squire, and Squire related to Harrison, actually were: Jäger=Germans, Achenu=our brethren, Eisenzweig=iron workers, Kewer=tomb, Gerusch=deportation, and Miso=death. The Jews of Warsaw, except for the iron workers, were being deported to their death. This was Schulte's best effort to provide confirmation of the Final Solution. Riegner, of course, gave the information to the American consulate in Geneva.

Adolf Hitler, as Arthur Morse has noted, helped to resolve American doubts about the Final Solution through a passage in his speech of September 30, given in the Berlin Sport Stadium, which was broadcast on radio and reported in the press.

> In my speech of September 1, 1939 I . . . [warned that] if Jewry should plot another world war in order to exterminate the Aryan peoples of Europe, it would not be the Aryan peoples which would be exterminated, but Jewry. . . . I shall be right also in that prophecy.

On October 22 Harrison met with Riegner and Richard Lichtheim, the other World Jewish Congress representative in Switzerland. Riegner gave the American minister a summary of the reports on Nazi killings of the Jews and pointed out that these actions were in accord with Hitler's threats. Aware that the State Department was still only partially convinced, Harrison wanted more proof. The only thing Riegner had not disclosed was his source on the Final Solution report: Schulte. It was at that point that Riegner handed Harrison the sealed envelope containing Schulte's name and position. It was Riegner's desperate attempt to persuade Washington of the reality of the Final Solution. So abiding was Riegner's faith in Roosevelt that when he ran into Paul Squire on October 25, Riegner asked if the American Consulate could supply him with a portrait of the President to hang in the offices of the World Jewish Congress. Squire gladly complied, and the portrait went up immediately in order to show, as Riegner wrote, "[Our] great admiration [for] one of the most comprehensive friends of our people."

With German forces stretching from the Atlantic to the Volga, from the northern tip of Norway to the desert wastes around El Alamein in North Africa, no power on earth could stop the Nazi death mills in Poland at that point. But the best chance for countermeasures of some kind lay in Washington. Yet Washington engaged in a token response, at best, to the report which Eduard Schulte had transmitted via Jewish sources in Switzerland. The information that millions of Jews had been or were about to be exterminated by poison gas in specially constructed death chambers horrified some American officials; others ignored it. The military defeat of Hitler's armies, not the rescue of his victims, had to remain top priority, and most government officials regarded the rescue of Jewish refugees as a humanitarian effort that the country could not afford in the midst of a war for the survival of Western civilization. American policy-makers remained consistent in their refusal to treat the Jews' plight as unique. Eduard Schulte's hope of ending the Holocaust before the conclusion of the war remained unfulfilled.

Having transmitted his intelligence on the Final Solution to the West via a Jewish listening post in Switzerland, Schulte returned to his chief occupation of assisting the Allies to defeat Hitler. During his May 1943 visit to Bern, Schulte—from a private Swiss office—dictated a letter to Allen Dulles, chief of the OSS mission in Bern. The secretary failed to destroy the carbon paper, and it was stolen by a typist in the office whose lover was an SS man stationed in Zurich. By the time the pair realized the significance of the information and contacted Gestapo authorities, Schulte had re-

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turned to Upper Silesia. But someone in Zurich had got wind of the leak and warned Schulte just in time. With his valid Swiss visa he fled to Basel, where the Swiss granted him sanctuary on December 5, 1943. Four weeks later Schulte's wife also managed to escape to Switzerland, and the two lived in Zurich for the remainder of the war. Both of Schulte's sons survived the war as well. The Russians had taken one son prisoner at Stalingrad; the other, a lieutenant in a German tank division, was wounded five times but remained on the Eastern front to protect himself from the Gestapo. In March 1945, he deserted to Switzerland. Safe, albeit in exile, Eduard Schulte occupied himself working on a memorandum on postwar economic plans for Germany, which was later given to Allen Dulles.

At the end of the war, Schulte received certificates of service and appreciation from representatives of Great Britain, France, the non-Communist Polish government, and the U.S. The British award, signed by Field Marshal Montgomery, simply described Schulte as "a volunteer in the service of the United Nations for the great cause of freedom." The American document, a letter from Allen Dulles, stated that Schulte had "rendered most valuable services to the cause of the United Nations motivated solely by his hatred of the Nazi system and his desire to see it overthrown as thoroughly and speedily as possible." Schulte, the letter continued, had "uniformly stood for the ideals and principles of liberty and democracy."

Gerhart Riegner and Benjamin Sagalowitz paid homage to Schulte by making known the story of how this courageous industrialist had informed them of the Final Solution even as they kept their pledge to him that they would preserve his anonymity. We have worked to reveal his identity with the same purpose in mind. Eventually, Schulte will be honored on Yad Vashem's Avenue of the Righteous, the long boulevard of evergreen carob trees which the state of Israel has planted to honor the memory of those "righteous Gentiles" who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust. At that time his heirs will receive a medal with the talmudic inscription, "Whoever saves a single soul, it is as if he had saved the whole world." Schulte tried to save millions of Jews by alerting the world to their peril. That the message largely fell on deaf ears in Washington in no way detracts from the honor due the messenger.

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On Nuclear Morality

Charles Krauthammer

THE contemporary anti-nuclear case takes two forms. There is, first, the prudential argument that the nuclear balance is inherently unstable and unsustainable over time, doomed to breakdown and to taking us with it. The animating sentiment here is fear, a fear that the anti-nuclear campaign of the 1980's has fanned with great skill. One of its major innovations has been its insistence on a technique of graphic depiction, a kind of nuclear neorealism, as a way of mobilizing mass support for its aims. Thus the Hiroshima slide show and the concentrically circular maps showing where and precisely when one will die in every home town. But there are limitations to this approach. The law of diminishing returns applies even to repeated presentations of the apocalypse. Ground Zero Day can be celebrated, as it were, once or perhaps twice, but it soon begins to lose its effectiveness. The numbing effect of detail, as well as the simple inability of any movement to sustain indefinitely a sense of crisis and imminent calamity, has led to the current decline in popularity of the pragmatic anti-nuclear case.

Consequently there has been a subtle shift in emphasis to a second line of attack, from a concern about what nuclear weapons might do to our bodies to a concern about what they are doing to our souls. Medical lectures on "the last epidemic" have been replaced by a sharper, and more elevated, debate about the ethics of possessing, building, and threatening to use nuclear weapons. (The most recent and highly publicized document on the subject is the pastoral letter of the U.S. bishops on war and peace.)

The moral anti-nuclear argument is based on the view that deterrence, the central strategic doctrine of the nuclear age, is ethically impermissible. Yet two auxiliary issues, one a requirement of deterrence, the other an extension of it, have received the most public attention and become the focus for much of the fervor of the anti-nuclear crusade. The requirement is nuclear modernization, which is opposed under the banner of "the freeze"; the extension is the American nuclear umbrella (the threat of nuclear retaliation against an attack, conventional or nuclear, on America's NATO allies), which is opposed under the slogan of "no-first-use." In examining the different strands of the anti-nuclear argument, it is useful to start with the more fundamental challenge to deterrence itself.

THE doctrine of deterrence holds that a nuclear aggressor will not act if faced with a threat of retaliation in kind. It rests, therefore, on the willingness to use these weapons in response to attack. The moral critique of deterrence holds that the actual use of nuclear weapons, even in retaliation, is never justified. As the bishops put it, simply, one is morally obliged to "say no to nuclear war."

But things are not so simple. There are different kinds of retaliation, and different arguments (often advanced by different proponents) for the inadmissibility of each.

The popularly accepted notion of deterrence (often mistakenly assumed to be the only kind) is "countervalue" retaliation, an attack on industrial and population centers aimed at destroying the society of the aggressor. The threat to launch such retaliation is the basis of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, also known as MAD, massive retaliation, or the balance of terror. It is a balance constructed of paradox: weapons built never to be used; purely defensive weapons, like the ABM, more threatening to peace than offensive weapons; weapons aimed at people lessening the risk of war, weapons aimed at weapons increasing it. In Churchill's summary, "Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

The bishops—and others, including non-pacifists like Albert Wohlstetter,* who advocate deterrence based on a "counterforce" strategy of striking military targets—are neither assured nor amused by such paradoxes; they are appalled by them. For them MAD is unequivocally bad. Deliberate attacks on "soft targets" grossly violate the just-war doctrine of discrimination. They are inadmissible under any circumstance, because they make no dis-

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* "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," COMMENTARY, June 1983.

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tinction between combatants and noncombatants. Indeed, they are primarily aimed at innocent bystanders.

The bishops, however, reject not just a countervalue strategy, but also a counterforce strategy. Since military targets are often interspersed with civilian population centers, such an attack would kill millions of innocents, and thus violate the principle of proportionality, by which the suffering inflicted in a war must not outweigh the possible gains of conducting such a war. "It would be a perverted political policy or moral casuistry," write the bishops, "which tried to justify using a weapon which 'indirectly' or 'unintentionally' killed a million innocent people because they happened to live near a 'militarily significant target.' " The bishops also reject, in a second sense, the idea that a counterforce war would be limited. They share the widespread conviction that limited nuclear war is a fiction, that counterforce attacks must inevitably degenerate into countervalue warfare, and thus bring us full circle back to the moral objections to MAD and all-out nuclear war.

That does not leave very much. If a countervalue strategy is rejected for violating the principle of discrimination, and a counterforce strategy is rejected for violating the principle of proportionality (and also for leading back to total war), one runs out of ways of targeting nuclear weapons. That suits the bishops: they make a point of insisting that their doctrine is "no-use-ever." The logic, and quite transparent objective, of such a position is to reject deterrence in toto. However, the bishops suffer from one constraint. Vatican policy seems to contradict this position. Pope John Paul II has declared that "in current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." What to do? The bishops settle for the unhappy compromise of not opposing deterrence itself, but simply what it takes to make deterrence work. Accordingly, they do not in principle oppose the possession of nuclear weapons when its sole intention is to deter an adversary from using his; they only oppose any plan, intent, or strategy to use these weapons in the act of retaliation. You may keep the weapons, but you may not use them. In sum, the only moral nuclear policy is nuclear bluff.

It is a sorry compromise, neither coherent nor convincing. It is not coherent, because it requires the bishops to support a policy—deterrence—which their entire argument is designed to undermine. And it is not convincing because the kind of deterrence they approve is no deterrence at all. Deterrence is not inherent in the weapons. It results from a combination of possession and the will to use them. If one side renounces, for moral or other reasons, the intent of ever actually using nuclear weapons, deterrence ceases to exist.

Pacifists unencumbered by papal pronouncements are able more openly to oppose deterrence. To take only the most celebrated recent example, in *The Fate of the Earth* Jonathan Schell makes the case the bishops would like to make, and stripped of any theological trappings. In its secular version it goes like this: biological existence is the ultimate value; all other values are conditional upon it; there can be neither liberty nor democracy nor any other value in defense of which Western nuclear weapons are deployed, if mankind itself is destroyed; and after nuclear war the earth will be "a republic of insects and grass." Therefore nothing can justify using nuclear weapons. Deterrence is more than a hoax, it is a crime.

Schell's argument enjoys a coherence that the bishops' case lacks, but it is still unsatisfying. Judged on its own terms—of finding a policy that best serves the ultimate and overriding value of biological survival—it fails.

For one thing, it willfully ignores history. Deterrence has a track record. For the entire postwar period it has maintained the peace between the two superpowers, preventing not only nuclear war, but conventional war as well. Under the logic of deterrence, proxy and brushfire wars are permitted, but not wars between the major powers. As a result, Europe, the central confrontation line between the two superpowers, has enjoyed its longest period of uninterrupted peace in a century. And the United States and the Soviet Union, the two most powerful nations in history, locked in an ideological antagonism and a global struggle as profound as any in history, have not exchanged so much as small-arms fire for a generation.

This is not to say that deterrence cannot in principle break down. It is to say that when a system that has kept the peace for a generation is to be rejected, one is morally obliged to come up with a better alternative. It makes no sense to reject deterrence simply because it may not be infallible; it only makes sense to reject it if it proves more dangerous than the alternatives. And a more plausible alternative has yet to be offered. Schell's recommended substitute is a call for a new world order in which all violence, nuclear and conventional, is renounced. Yet his 231-page brief against deterrence neglects to go into the details of exactly how this proposal is to be implemented. Of the job of remaking politics and man, he says, "I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks."

There is one logical alternative to deterrence, and it does not require remaking man or politics, though neither Schell nor the bishops are quite willing to embrace it: unilateral disarmament. (The bishops' position that one may possess but never use nuclear weapons, however, is unilateralist in all but name.) It has a track record, too. The only nuclear war ever fought was as one-

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sided as it was short. It ended when the non-nuclear power suffered the destruction of two cities (and then surrendered unconditionally). Unilateralism has similar consequences in other contexts, like bacteriological warfare. In Southeast Asia today yellow rain falls on helpless tribesmen. The same Vietnamese forces in the same place a decade before never used these weapons against a far more formidable American enemy. The reason is obvious. The primitive Hmong, technologically disarmed, cannot retaliate; the Americans could. Similarly for our experience with chemical weapons in World War II, which were not used by either side even after the breakdown of peace, because both sides were capable of retaliation.

Far from being a guarantor of survival, unilateralism is a threat to it. Thus, whether one's ethical system calls its overriding value the sanctity of life or mere biological survival, unilateralism fails within its own terms, and with it the moral critique of deterrence. The breakdown of deterrence would lead to a catastrophic increase in the probability of precisely the inadmissible outcome its critics seek to avoid. The bishops unwittingly concede that point in a subsidiary argument against counterforce when they speak of such a strategy "making deterrence unstable in a crisis and war more likely."

The critics argue that no ends can justify such disproportionate and nondiscriminatory means as the use of nuclear weapons. That would be true if the ends of such a war were territory, or domination, or victory. But they are not. The sole end is to prevent a war from coming into existence in the first place. That the threat of retaliation is the best available this-world guarantee against such a war is a paradox the bishops and other pacifists are unwilling to face. As Michael Novak writes: "The appropriate moral principle is not the relation of means to ends but the choice of a moral act which prevents greater evil. Clearly, it is a more moral choice and occasions lesser evil to hold a deterrent intention than it is to allow nuclear attack."* Or recklessly to increase the danger of such an attack.

Nevertheless, debate does not end with the acceptance of the necessity, and thus the morality, of deterrence. Not everything is then permitted. There is a major argument between proponents of countervalue and counterforce deterrence. The former claim that counterforce threats lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear war more likely because it becomes "more thinkable." The latter argue that to retaliate against defenseless populations is not only disproportionate and nondiscriminatory, but dangerous as well, since the threat is not credible and thus actually lowers the nuclear threshold. (Note that the countervalue vs. counterforce debate is over the relative merits of different kinds of retaliation, and not, as is sometimes pretended, between a "party of deterrence" and a "war-fighting party." The latter distinction is empty: all deterrence rests on the threat of nuclear retaliation, i.e., "war-fighting"; and all retaliatory [i.e., non-lunatic] war-fighting strategies from McNamara to today are designed to prevent attack in the first place, i.e., for deterrence. The distinction between these two "parties" has to do with candor, not strategy: the "war-fighters" are willing to spell out the retaliatory steps that the "deterrers" rely on to prevent war, but which they prefer not to discuss in public.)

Nevertheless, whichever side of the intramural debate among deterrence advocates one takes, it seems to me that deterrence wins the debate with its opponents simply because it is a better means of achieving the ultimate moral aim of both sides —survival.

There is another argument in favor of deterrence, though in my view it carries less weight. It appeals not to survival but to other values. It holds that (1) there are values more important than survival, and (2) nuclear weapons are necessary to protect them. The second proposition is, of course, true. The West is the guarantor of such fragile historical achievements as democracy and political liberty; a whole constellation of ideals and values ultimately rests on its ability to deter those who reject these values and have a history of destroying them wherever they dominate. Unilaterally to reject deterrence is to surrender these values in the name of survival.

The rub comes with the first proposition. Are there values more important than survival? Sidney Hook was surely right when he once said that when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization self-sacrifice makes no sense since there are no survivors to give meaning to the sacrificial act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal. If this highly abstract choice were indeed the only one, it would be hard to meet Schell's point that since all values hinge on biological survival, to forfeit that is to forfeit everything. It is thus simply not enough to say (rightly) that nuclear weapons, given the world as it is today, keep us free; one must couple that statement with another, equally true: they keep us safe. A nuclear policy—like unilateralism—that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both) is a moral calamity. A nuclear policy—like deterrence—that protects us from both perils is the only morally compelling alternative.

ALTHOUGH the attack on deterrence itself is the most fundamental assault on American nuclear doctrine, the case is difficult and complicated. It has, therefore, not seized the public

* "Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age," *National Review*, April 1, 1983.

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imagination the way two auxiliary issues have. These other issues deal not with the basic assumptions of deterrence but with the weapons and some of the tactics that underpin it. These two campaigns have been conducted under the slogan of the "freeze" and "no-first-use."

The moral attack on the weapons themselves takes two curiously contradictory approaches. The first, a mainstay of freeze proponents, is that beyond existing levels new weapons are simply redundant, that we are wasting billions of dollars on useless weapons that will do no more than make the rubble bounce, to borrow another memorable Churchillian formulation. The moral crime, it is alleged, is that these monies are being taken away from human needs, like housing and health care and aid to poorer countries. This theme runs through much of the moral literature on armaments. It is featured, for example, in the Brandt North-South report which calculates that for every bomber one could instead build so many pharmacies in the Third World. The bishops also protest "the economic distortion of priorities—billions readily spent for destructive instruments while pitched battles are waged daily in our legislatures over much smaller amounts for the homeless, the hungry, and the helpless here and abroad."

It is extraordinary that an argument so weak can enjoy such widespread currency. Compared to other types of weapons, strategic nuclear weapons are remarkably cheap. In the U.S. they account for less than 10 percent of the military budget, and about one-half of 1 percent of the gross national product. The reasons are clear. Strategic nuclear weapons are not labor-intensive. Once in place, they need a minimal amount of maintenance, and fulfill their function simply by existing. Indeed, the argument turns against the anti-nuclearists. A shift away from strategic to conventional weapons would be extremely expensive. That is precisely why the West decided in the 1950's and 1960's to rely so heavily on nuclear weapons and to permit the current conventional imbalance in Europe. Rather than match the Soviet bloc tank for tank, plane for plane, the West decided to go nuclear, because this offered, in John Foster Dulles's immortal phrase, "more bang for the buck." The decision to buy cheap nuclear defense permitted the West vastly to expand social spending. A decision to move away from nuclear to conventional defense would require a willingness to divert enormous resources away from social to defense spending. Thus, if social priorities are to enter the moral calculus, as the nuclear critics demand, it is the anti-nuclear case that is undercut.

On the other hand, freeze advocates often argue that these weapons are not useless but dangerous, destabilizing, and likely to precipitate a nuclear war. The more weapons we build, the closer we come to nuclear war. The assumption is that high weapons levels *in themselves* increase the likelihood of war. That reverses cause and effect. Weapons are a result of tensions between nations, not their primary cause. It is true that distrust can be a dangerous by-product of an uncontrolled arms race. And yet arms-control agreements like SALT can reduce the risk of war by building mutual confidence and trust, while at the same time permitting *higher* weapons levels. Historically, nuclear tension simply does not correlate well with weapons levels. The worst nuclear crisis took place in October 1962, when the level of nuclear arms was much lower than it is today. And nuclear tensions were probably at their lowest during the heyday of détente in the mid-70's; at that time U.S.-Soviet relations were at their peak, while each side had by then vastly increased its capacity for multiple overkill.

There is an understandable built-in prejudice against new weapons. Even those willing grudgingly to grant the need for minimal deterrence recoil from building and deploying new weapons of mass destruction. "Enough is enough," they say. What is ignored in this critique is that deterrence has requirements, and one is survivability (the ability of one's weapons to sustain a first strike and still deliver a second strike). And survivability, in an era of technological innovation, requires modernization, often to counteract non-nuclear advances like those in anti-submarine or anti-aircraft warfare (advances, incidentally, which a freeze would do nothing to curb). Thus, the proposed new American bomber, whether it be the B-1 or the Stealth, will be better able to elude destruction on the ground and Soviet defenses in the air. It will not be any more destructive—or immoral—than the B-52. Similarly for the Trident subs, which are quieter and (because they have longer-range missiles) can hide in larger areas of the ocean than Poseidons. In short, mainstream non-unilateralist freeze proponents are caught in the position of accepting the fundamental morality of deterrence but rejecting the addition of any new weapon for preserving it.

THE penchant for providing ends without means also characterizes the final flank attack on deterrence: the rejection of the doctrine of "extended deterrence," the threat to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in response to an attack (even a conventional attack) by the Soviet Union on NATO. That policy, which derives ultimately from Western unwillingness to match Soviet conventional strength in Europe, has long troubled many Americans. But since the alternatives are massive conventional rearmament or abandonment of our European allies, it has had to serve through half-a-dozen administrations as the guarantor of the Western alliance.

The campaign waged against this policy has been spearheaded by four former high administration officials, all with interesting histories. Rob-

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ert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy are the authors of "flexible response" (a euphemism for limited nuclear war); George Kennan, of "containment"; and Gerard Smith, of SALT I. In an influential 1982 article in *Foreign Affairs*, they joined forces to call for adoption of a "no-first-use" policy on nuclear weapons.

This position has found an echo in many quarters, including, not surprisingly, the bishops' pastoral letter. It, too, doubts the possibility of a limited nuclear war remaining limited, and resolutely opposes ever crossing the line separating conventional from nuclear war. Therefore any nuclear retaliation against any conventional attack is rejected in principle.

Leave aside the consideration that the impossibility of limited nuclear war is both historically unproven and by no means logically necessary. Assume that limited nuclear war is indeed a fiction. We are still faced with the central problem of the no-first-use approach: its intent is to prevent any war from becoming nuclear, but its unintended consequence is to make that eventuality more likely. For thirty years war between the superpowers has been deterred at its origin. The prospect that even the slightest conventional conflict might escalate into a nuclear war has been so daunting that neither has been permitted to happen. Current policy sets the "firebreak" at the line dividing war from peace; a no-first-use policy moves it to the line dividing conventional war from nuclear war. No-first-use advocates are prepared to risk an increased chance of conventional war (now less dangerous and more "thinkable") in return for a decreased chance of any such war going nuclear. But a no-first-use pledge is unenforceable. Who will guarantee that the loser in any war will stick to such a pledge? A conventional European war would create the greatest risk ever of nuclear war. Any policy, however pious its intent, that makes conventional war more thinkable makes nuclear war more likely.

And that is the fundamental flaw in both this argument and the general attack on deterrence. It examines current policy in the light of some ideal, and finds it wanting. It ignores the fact that rejecting these policies forces the adoption of more dangerous alternatives, and makes more likely the calamities we are trying to avoid. In the end these arguments defeat themselves.

NUCLEAR weapons are useful only to the extent that they are never used. But they are more likely to fulfill their purpose, and never be used, if one's adversary believes that one indeed has the will to use them in retaliation for attack. That will to use them is what the moralists find unacceptable. But it is precisely on that will that the structure of deterrence rests. And it is on the structure of deterrence that rest not only the "secondary" values of Western civilization but also the primary value of survival in the nuclear age.

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The War of the Liberal Economists

Melville J. Ulmer

JUST as Ronald Reagan was taking office in 1981, raucous cheers and standing ovations were greeting the award of the Nobel Prize in economics to Yale's James Tobin, hailed by his colleagues as "carrier of the torch for Keynesian ideas now under ruthless attack." And indeed, Tobin, in collaboration with MIT's Robert Solow, shot off an article to the New York *Times* asserting unshakable faith in their own doctrines of yore and offering tantalizing promises of wonderful new ones to come. This piece proved to be the first in an avalanche of books, articles, and public lectures aimed at discrediting "Reaganomics" and simultaneously offering a rigorous and politically alluring liberal alternative.

"Liberal" has become a loose word that conveys a multitude of views. Its use today among economists covers strict Keynesians like Tobin, Solow, and Walter Heller; "post-Keynesians" like Paul Davidson and Sidney Weintraub; a potent fringe of iconoclasts or radicals like Lester Brown, Samuel Bowles, Robert Lekachman, and Bennett Harrison; and a number of others with mixed colorations of the foregoing like Lester Thurow. (Conversely, their conservative opponents also make up a mixed bag, as occasional conflicts among the Reagan administration's supporters testify. Today the term conservative as applied to economists embraces centrists like Martin Feldstein, Paul McCracken, and Hebert Stein; classical supply-siders like Arthur Laffer and George Gilder; and monetarists and libertarians like Beryl Sprinkle, Milton Friedman, Alan Greenspan, and Friedrich Hayek.)

Even so, the recent writings of liberal economists reveal a common pattern. In fact, the more acceptable to the public did the Reagan program appear in action during the past two years, the more resolutely did the entire spectrum of liberals move to the Left, in pursuit of Tobin's anticipated innovations. Incongruously, each upward notch in the present business expansion elicited new and more flamboyant assaults on Reaganomics, and new and bolder stratagems for the future, in popular vehicles such as the New York *Times* and the Washington *Post* as well as in books and learned journals.

The campaign of the liberal economists has been waged on four separate though related fronts, and on each of them it has mounted an assault on the nation's fund of middle-class convictions and social morals.

On the first of these fronts, the acknowledged leader of the liberal economists is Tobin. Though the middle-class fear of inflation and high taxes reached a pitch, for a time at least, that made professional politicians quake and quaver, it left no perceptible impress on the fervor with which Tobin advocated both. "We must learn to live with inflation," he wrote, as an essential price for maintaining "full" employment. Now as in the past, he rests his faith on easy money and generous public spending to keep the economy buzzing and people at work—and never mind the price level. Reminded of the 13-percent annual inflation rate, coupled with 8-percent unemployment, which Keynesian policies bequeathed as the 1970's ended, he replied: "I wish people would say . . . straightforwardly that they believe policy should not have been aimed at recovery." The mistake in the late 1970's, he remarked to me at a recent reception in his honor, was that money had not been made easy *enough*.

Thus, Tobin and his followers remain convinced that they know how to maintain prosperity by managing the nation's aggregate demand, loosening reins on the money supply and the public purse and tightening them judiciously when required, always by just the right amounts and at the right time. Conservative economists are with little wonder skeptical. They point to repeated stabilization measures taken at just the wrong times or by the wrong amounts, evidenced in the dismal up-and-down record of business activity in an era dominated by the Keynesian doctrine. They also refer emphatically to the well-known inflationary bias in the liberals' fiscal and monetary policies, which carried prices to progressively higher and devastatingly fatal levels as Reagan prepared to take office—fatal, that is, to the program of the liberal economists and to Carter's reelection hopes.

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To the last charge Tobin has recently shown some sensitivity. If his first rejoinder was that the nation must tolerate inflation with a Spartan's iron will, his second thought is that if inflation persists without abatement, perhaps causing international dislocations, resort must be had to direct government control of prices and wages. To the latter suggestion his liberal colleagues have responded enthusiastically—about which more later.

ECONOMIC growth constitutes the second front of the liberal economists' campaign against middle-class values and convictions. Faith in the ability of the American people to make things materially and progressively better in the future took root at the birth of the nation. If anything, the notion grew steadily stronger as events from decade to decade justified expectations, again and again. In the light of this experience it has been difficult for ordinary, observant people to disagree with Adam Smith or modern supply-siders that the wealth of a nation depends ultimately on its people—particularly their energy and intelligence so long as they are free to use them. And few reminders have been needed to teach that science and technology stand always on the ever higher shoulders of the past, creating new resources, in effect, and new uses for those already known.

It is this belief in a better future that liberal economists like Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester Brown have challenged. Heilbroner in particular perceives in the future a debilitated capitalism and a world mortally engulfed in noxious fumes of pollution, desperately engaged in an international struggle for larger shares of dwindling resources. Technological progress, these economists warn, is itself subject to the Ricardian specter of diminishing returns, and salvation lies only in finding a new way of economic life—frugal, abstemious, passively resigned to a "stationary state." Naturally, far-reaching government controls would be required to administer the necessary domestic and international discipline.

One purpose of such pessimism is to propagate the spirit of egalitarianism. A stationary, or no-growth, state is a "zero-sum" state, in which the poorer can be helped only at the expense of the richer, strengthening the case—or so the liberal economists suppose—for a new and more vigorous redistribution of income.

Once again—and here we come to the third front of the campaign—we note a crunch between middle-class values and the thrust of the liberal economists. Most Americans clearly favor the merit system in economic affairs, mindful though they are of imperfections in practice. In conventional judgment (and assuming that reasonably equal opportunities are respected for all), the merit system is efficient and equitable, rewarding accomplishment and effort and penalizing their absence. The liberal economists cherish the contrasting idea that all people are "basically" the same. Hence as James Tobin, Lester Thurow, Christopher Jencks, and others have explained, observed differences in monetary rewards (apparently excluding their own) must be due to mere luck or one or another form of discrimination.

Thurow, for example, on the quaint assumption that "There is no such thing as a good teacher," scolds President Reagan for proposing merit pay for teachers. What is needed, he goes on, is more generous pay for *all* teachers to promote effective cooperative effort and "team work." To many students of the subject, such practices as social promotions and the omission of qualifying exams for diplomas appear as formidable barriers to educational achievement. Not, however, when viewed through the egalitarian lens of Thurow and his colleagues. Apparently they would enforce an unqualified right to advance through the educational system as steadfastly as the right to vote.

But this outlook on education is simply a specific application of a more general attachment to a "more equitable distribution of income." Thus, no act of President Reagan enraged liberal economists more than his 23-percent across-the-board tax cut of 1981, which for the first time since the New Deal openly defied their mandate. Their ideal policy, as the President derisively described it, is "to tax and tax and spend and spend," with the revenue coming from the upper-income groups and the outlays going to those below. Extended diligently enough, that practice would ultimately lead to a perfectly equal distribution of income, without regard to effort or age, not to mention market-determined merit.

Of course, no liberal economist explicitly cites perfect equality as a practical goal, since it would also lead to a per-capita income level that might well vie with that of the mainland Chinese and the Bengalis. But at the same time the literature discloses no empirical information on how far toward the goal the liberal economists do wish to go.

THE fourth and last front of the campaign is in a sense the culmination of the preceding three. It is theatrically encapsulated in the new buzzwords of the liberal economists, "A National Industrial Policy." Here the leading figure is Robert Reich, whose book, *The Next American Frontier*,* at the moment occupies a position with liberals not dissimilar to that of *Das Kapital* with Marxists. There are internal similarities as well. As Marx said almost nothing about how a socialist state would or should be organized, only about why and how it would be achieved, so *The Next American Frontier* says much about how and why the times will induce a National Industrial Policy, but very little about its specific content. And as Marx contended that capitalism contained the seeds of its own destruction, so

* Times Books, 324 pp., $16.60.

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Reich argues that the dominance of private enterprise as economic decision-maker will be undone by its own outmoded managerial proclivities.

Reich looks upon the conventional view of free markets and hotly competing business units with a showy disdain. The familiar account of the market's system of prices, signaling the conditions of demand and supply, he regards as a "myth." He sees the actuality in the United States as a calcifying market in which the dominant actors are a relatively few intellectually obsolete businessmen running a relatively few giant corporations in control of most of the nation's assets. These "paper entrepreneurs," he says, are preoccupied with mergers and acquisitions, buyouts and leasebacks, stock and bond exchanges, all in the process of constructing sprawling conglomerates. Such technologically stagnant business units move assets around in a zero-sum game that makes no positive contribution to the nation's production.

What is needed, Reich concludes, is an industrial policy like that successfully deployed in Japan, France, and Germany. The policy's objective would be to shift material and human resources from stodgy basic industries like "autos, steel, chemicals, and textiles" into—anyone can guess it —"high-tech." Such a transformation would herald a new "Era of Human Capital," placing a premium on technological innovation, individual initiative in the workforce, research, education, job training, and social services.

While Reich provides only scanty hints of the novel institutions and additional government functions that his proposal would imply, in the roughly two years since his book's publication such writers as Lester Thurow, Felix Rohatyn, Amitai Etzioni, Robert Nathan, George Perry, Richard Musgrave, Sar Levitan, Robert Lekachman, Samuel Bowles, and Ronald Muller have virtually crushed one another in a mad rush to supply the meat for the skeleton of his vision and organs for its operation.

All together these writers have created a grander purview encompassing in the scope of centralized planning virtually every facet of the economic system. First there would be a "National Planning Board," an "Economic Cooperation Council," or a "National Economic Policy Board," depending upon the writer, which would coordinate all of the government's economic activities and fix "priorities," in addition to certain of its own specific planning functions. A second key institution would be an "Industrial Development Bank," an amplified and more aggressive replica of the old Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Together, these two agencies would direct capital into the "more promising" industrial channels, utilizing tax incentives, subsidies, interest rates, and loan availability to encourage some enterprises and inhibit others. In most versions, the planning board would also negotiate some type of "income policy" to stabilize prices and wages, if necessary through mandatory controls. In this new environment, the conventional Keynesian policies for full employment and income redistribution would, it is supposed, work the magic that was originally claimed for them.

Virtually all variations of the plan include such disclaimers as "The concept of industrial policy does not imply 'picking the winners' or 'picking the losers' " in America's vast industrial society. Yet all, by one means or another, call for "targeting" federal funds, tax benefits, loans, and subsidies "toward areas of commercial promise." The quotations are from a proposal for an industrial policy by former Carter Labor Secretary Ray Marshall but appear in substance in Reich and other versions.

In other words, planning advocates attribute to bureaucrats and elected officials a degree of wisdom—as well as political purity and courageous objectivity—that has never been discovered in impressive quantity anywhere on this planet. How can bureaucrats tell, more accurately than private investors, which are the "most promising" firms or industries? Even if, in some especially happy event, they can tell, will they have the fortitude to resist political pressures and financial temptations in deciding where to bestow their gifts of loans, tax benefits, and other subsidies, and where to withhold them? Not if experience is any guide. Many fateful decisions today—like the farm program, tariffs, the "quotas" of affirmative action, and any number of pork-barrel projects—are clearly made in response to special-interest pressure rather than austere calculations of the public welfare. The old Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with a much more modest agenda than the planners' Industrial Development Bank, was abandoned many years ago in scandal. In France and Germany, constantly cited as models, much of the public largesse destined for high-tech went instead as subsidies for their deeply depressed but politically influential steel industries.

Nor is there evidence, either theoretical or empirical, in favor of wage-and-price controls. No scheme has yet been devised for direct control of individual prices and wages while still allowing them freedom to adjust to the intricate forces of demand and supply. In the absence of that freedom, with abnormal scarcities and surpluses arising, an economy would grind to a crippled halt; or the unworkable regulations would be widely and skillfully avoided; or—more likely—the government effort would, for the time being, be abandoned to avert disaster. In France, the most firmly addicted of all countries to mandatory wage-and-price controls, the consumer price index considerably more than tripled in the last twenty-five years, far overshadowing inflation in the United States.

France and Germany are worthy of further mention, especially because they appear so regularly as exemplars for American emulation, in Reich

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and all other writers in this school. According to their assertions, these countries have outperformed the United States in every important economic category, and all because of astute national economic planning. Yet as with so many other pronouncements in this literature, the facts are otherwise. Growth of the real gross national product in the United States was greater throughout the 1970's and to date than in Germany or France. The expansion of our most technologically advanced industrial sectors—including microelectronics, robotics, and biotechnology—has also been greater, as symbolized by the spectacular leap of retail outlets for computers from a few hundred to 37,000 in just the last two years. Our average living standards, judged by after-tax purchasing power, are higher—and this despite an influx of an estimated twelve million legal and illegal immigrants plus our own baby boom, neither with a counterpart in either France or Germany. As for unemployment, in Europe foreign "guest workers" are asked or forced to go home in every recession, a fact which lends an attractive but strictly artificial downward bias to their officially published unemployment rates.

Japan, on the other hand, has enjoyed a remarkable economic expansion over the last quarter-century, carefully attributed by liberal economists to the planning acuity of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). And it is true that in the first fifteen years after World War II MITI was extremely active, erecting impenetrable barriers to imports and disbursing abundant subsidies to its "infant industries," especially autos and steel for export. But careful scholars like Theodore J. Eismeier of Japan's Institute for Policy Science find barely any evidence that MITI's activities contributed significantly to the country's prosperity beyond this early period. Instead they locate the source of Japan's industrial success in a unique tax code, which aggressively propels incentives for competition, work effort, savings, and investment.*

Eismeier concludes: "The best evidence suggests that . . . the Japanese miracle has been more a matter of private than public initiative, and that the attempted outguessing of the market that has received so much laudatory publicity has in fact had relatively little to do with Japan's singular record of postwar growth." And indeed, as George Gilder points out: "For the twenty-four-year period of its most rapid growth Japan maintained the lowest tax rates, lowest welfare benefits, and lowest level of government spending in the industrialized world. . . . Japan's economy has accommodated more intense domestic competition than ours: for example, 12 auto firms, 12 mainline steel manufacturers, 48 calculator firms, and 147 robotic companies." All this is in direct conflict with the traditional image of cartel-ridden "Japan, Inc."

Such evidence evaporates into thin air even for the most brilliant economists who are determined not to see it. But it is almost certainly sensed by the great mass of the American public which, despite its support of the general social paraphernalia of the times—old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, welfare, food stamps, etc.—is well aware of how even the best laws are abused and misused. The general public has also learned, more and more as the years have gone by, how much reliable foresight and steadfast devotion to the public weal to expect, and not to expect, from elected officials and public employees, especially as their heady powers proliferate.

Moreover, while thankful for the recent respite, the American public is still worried about inflation, and has tied its faith as firmly as ever to progress and growth through private energy and initiative. Since the liberal economists' campaign is waged point-blank against just such middle-class convictions and values, its prospect for success, in anything approaching its present form, would seem to be dim at most.

* For a fuller discussion of Japan's industrial development, see Norman Gall's article, beginning on p. 27—Ed.

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From Coalinga to the Negev

Haim Chertok

THE first news report of the day in English spills forth from *Kol Yisrael* at 7 A.M. with a brassy fanfare of *Artza Alinu*. Too often that musical measure sounds the brightest riff of the ensuing quarter-hour. Still, like everyone here—fourth-generation Jerusalemite and born-again newcomer alike—we are addicted to our twice daily news fix. It was different when we lived in California's San Joaquin Valley, fortified within a ranch-style world. The most appalling news would float benignly and touch down elsewhere.

The hour is a poor one for concentration. The latest dispatches surface amid the ceaseless chatter of our two kindergartners: inflationary percentages, political in-fighting, another war casualty. A wry look or exclamation generally suffices for commentary—but not on the morning of May 3, 1983. Far more than for any other Israeli residents, the news for Marcia and me exploded with great force, and our perfunctory shushing of the kids grew suddenly urgent. Even an outbreak of hostilities could not have mobilized us more. A major earthquake had struck central California. We abandoned breakfast and hovered over the radio like late moths of the morning. The place hardest hit was Coalinga, a town of 6,000 some sixty miles southwest of Marcia's home town of Fresno. Hundreds of houses were damaged; the downtown was a shambles; dozens of fires were raging; scores of people were injured. Our eyes sought each other unbelievingly. Coalinga!

Remote, bucolic Coalinga, the America our two teenagers best recall when so moved, for nearly seven years our last stand in America, Coalinga was the epicenter of the day's headline fury. Had we heard that Begin and Arafat had been discovered secretly convening in Nepal or that the messiah had revealed himself in New Zealand, our amazement could not have been greater. We couldn't fathom it, but there it was that evening on television, a lengthy clip from one of the American networks: buildings razed, neighbors in tents, a sea of distraught faces. How we peered into that little screen for a flick of the familiar and how raveled the skein of thought.

WE FIRST arrived in Coalinga in 1969 at the end of a three-year tunnel of counter-educational, antiwar activism in New York City where I helped direct an experimental college at Fordham University. The constant state of embattlement had left us exhausted, and a slot teaching English in a small college pocketed in the foothills not far from Fresno seemed a remedy. A year earlier we had vaguely considered *aliyah* to Israel; now we desired a peaceful refuge. Our focus would shift to raising our two preschoolers, a garden, and our spent spirits. Emerson several times offers an apt tidal metaphor for the larger phases of our lives: we were ebbing out. But after a 3,000-mile journey into the sun, we felt refreshed and ready to wade into our new lives in classic American fashion.

Coalinga is Gothic American-Western. It saddles a small plateau above the first range of hills of the Great Valley. Undulating hills on three sides are leased by Shell, Standard, and Getty—an oil field producing diminishing returns of oil and revenue to support local services. The situation has been chronic for some decades now, but still hundreds of grasshopper oil rigs—some gaudily done up as kangaroos and rabbits—dance back and forth in an endless marathon. And the "oil people" constitute one of the important groups who comprise the town.

Twelve miles to the east, where the highway rises to cross the interstate, an enormous feedlot is host to some 50,000 head of cattle, surely more than in all Israel. With their thousands of acres and cattle, the ranches of the American West both overstimulate and overwhelm the popular Israeli imagination for which *Dallas* reigns as a supreme metaphor. Whereas most "hands" live on the ranch, many of the owners have family homes in Coalinga; several were our immediate, Yale Avenue neighbors. They are a small but highly influential segment of "Old Coalinga" people.

In addition there are business and real-estate people, Anglo working folks, college people, other teachers, retirees, and Chicanos. Most outlying Valley towns are predominantly Chicano, but Coalinga is mainline Anglo, its origins fueled by energy rather than grapes or tomatoes. The various groups interact largely among themselves, save for intermingling at the Catholic and outreach churches (especially the Mormon), civic extravaganzas like Horned Toad Derby Day, and the regular gatherings of men and lady Moose, Elks, Rotarians, and Lions. With one exception, none of Coalinga's four Jewish families was active in any of these organizations, though we gradually discovered more former Jews and Jewish descendants in the town's churches than we had any notion of initially.

Depending on the sophistication of the observer, we "real" Jews were viewed somewhere along a scale between heathen intellectuals and a variant sort of Seventh Day Adventist. In fact, we four families, together with our erstwhile breth-

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ren, struck not merely a vertical slice of middle-class possibilities for Coalinga but, it seems to me in retrospect, a just representation of the generality of Jewish possibilities in America at large. It makes, I think, for a melancholy but instructive panorama.

THE Gersteins,* two decades our senior, had come to Coalinga a few years before us from Chicago. A talented violinist, he taught music at the college, but felt himself greatly undervalued by small-town, tone-deaf yahoos. Their son, married to a non-Jew, was an expatriate who lived in London and rarely communicated. During our second year, their artist daughter died suddenly at thirty, leaving a cloud of sadness in her wake. Their attitude toward Jewishness was a compound of pride and bitterness. They didn't attend any synagogue service in Fresno; nor did Gerstein absent himself from classes on the High Holidays (which I did as a matter of course from the start). When some years later he requested these days and experienced some administrative flak, he complained of anti-Semitism. We were their closest friends, along with a sprinkling of other college "intellectuals" and some musical Fresno families.

The Zenders were "oil people" with two children slightly older than ours. An engineer, he came from Germany and spoke with an accent which must have sounded queer to many of the Upper South transplants among whom he worked. A diminutive but forceful woman, she came from Connecticut. The Zenders were heavily committed to psycho-emotional self-improvement; they meditated transcendentally and family-retreated, making major claims for both disciplines. For a number of years our four children attended Sunday School in Fresno together. For most of our seven Coalinga years, the Chertoks, Gersteins, and Zenders gathered together annually for a Passover seder, Hanukkah, and occasionally Sukkoth. However, since the Gersteins and Zenders tended to quarrel with each other, our joint celebrations were terminated toward the end. We remain friendly with both families.

The fourth Jewish family, the Berliners, was old-time Coalinga. They were the same age as the Gersteins. He was born and raised in Coalinga, and until he retired, owned and ran the town's largest clothing store which had been established by his family two generations before. (Once, when touring, we were astonished by the number of Cohens and Levys on a sketch of the business district of Tombstone, Arizona in the 1880's hanging in a local museum. But the same is true of San Francisco. In the West, Jews stand among the first families.) Berliner's wife was an Eastern import. Always amiable in their store, they neither extended nor accepted any invitations from us or any other Jewish families. We heard that they celebrated Passover with out-of-town relatives; they didn't attend any Fresno synagogue. Berliner was a Rotarian.

SUCH WAS the visible Jewish community of Coalinga in the 1970's. During our seven years at its hub, we felt the continual tug of contrary forces which ultimately imperiled each other. While all too conscious of them both, it was not clear to us at the time that the kick of one was related to the suck of the other. One motion drew us centripetally; variously viewed, we were digging in, selling out, or settling down. The counter-spiral was powered by an intensifying assertion of Jewishness. I suspect we would never have moved so rapidly in this direction had not the temptations posed by Coalingahood been so profound. (The tension had been quiescent during our three-year stay in New York, but then New York was never for us a viable environment.) These counter-movements, like the subterranean plates that undergird our earth's surface, ground inexorably past each other for a long period. When our lives were jolted—and we jilted Coalinga—we proved as startled as anyone.

Our natural element in Coalinga was reformist. After attaining tenure, I headed, in turn, the Faculty Senate, the English Department, and the Teachers' Union. On the outside, I chaired (to my present chagrin) the area's McGovern Election Committee. Marcia and I spark-plugged an independent Citizens' Action Group and organized the Valley's first chapter of Amnesty International. Marcia led a girl-scout troop, an environmental committee, and, more significant than any of the preceding, successfully ran for the local school board. In short, we found a mildly eccentric niche in the town's civic life, in the process buoying our social lives.

We bought a vacation house on the coast. We spent hundreds of pleasant hours in gardening and house repairs, transforming the house truly into our own. A room was added. In summers we went to British Columbia or New Mexico for extensive camping trips. All in all, we were anything but discontent with the range of Coalinga possibilities. Where they didn't exist, we created them. Our children were in good schools. Indeed, Coalinga provided precisely the safe, stable haven we had sought when our VW had nosed west out of New York in 1969, and we were settling snugly into the golden American landscape. Almost. . . .

IT WAS only as Jews that we felt increasingly restive, particularly as our children moved along in their schooling. We joined and abandoned each of Fresno's two congregations, even trying a synagogue at San Luis Obispo for a year. When the Conservative congregation hired an older, more learned rabbi, we rejoined it for our final two years, though by then we had become Sabbath observers, so synagogue attendance, which would have required travel, became an academic matter. (The children continued at the Reform Temple's Sunday School in order to meet some Jewish playmates.)

Looking back, our gradual accretion of the *mitzvot* in the fastness of the coastal foothills seems a small miracle of perversity. We stocked our freezer with chickens and roasts acquired on our seasonal jaunts to the Bay Area, the mainstays of which were the Berkeley bookshops and the Oakland kosher butcher. The receiver of the phone

* All names have been changed throughout this article.

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was disengaged on Friday afternoon, something Ma Bell never accepted, and we fashioned a separate world of the Sabbath. After a day of total involvement with the family (friends knew we were out-of-touch), the children and I would search the dusky sky for three stars signaling *havdalah*, TV, phone, and Coalinga-time. Marcia and I made mysterious, monthly, evening excursions to a secluded place in the hills ten miles west of town where a mountain brook served as a *mikveh*, with its dark, cold waters. The final step, as I well recall, was the "beanie" I began sporting when teaching my college literature classes. As it happened, many black athletes also wore garish headgear, so I was almost fashionable.

What an odd family were the Chertoks on the local scene! We were bothered by Christmas carols in the schools, and obviously our Jewish lives were increasingly separating us from the usual round of our neighbors' activities. But we so thoroughly enjoyed so much about our heart-of-the-country lives that I suspect we could have sustained the evident tensions past the point of psychic retreat had we not been joltingly confronted by living evidence of its deep-seated insupportability.

COALINGA then had three lawyers. We had some early dealings with two, but only encountered the third after some years. Jeff Franklin, I discovered, was a Jew married to an Episcopalian. His wife, children, and he were communicants at the local church. Friendly, he also seemed interested in our meeting socially; we invited them over for a Friday evening meal. It was a blunder. His children blurted a few questions; our response made them giggle. Their mother was stony. Franklin had negotiated a separate peace years before. We embarrassed him.

Somehow the dismay this stirred in me seemed all out of proportion to the banality of such a familiar occurrence on the American scene. What had I anticipated, after all? But still, here we were daily performing the high-wire act of sustaining ourselves as Jews in America (and we had long since realized that only the observance of *mitzvot* actively enhanced *our* Jewish well-being) and suddenly it was all too clear: no matter the degree of our dexterity, knowledge, or even daring—the odds on one or another of us slipping were inordinate. If not this generation, then the next. And the Jewish current spiraling in us would flow into larger channels, finally merging in the receptive American ocean without leaving a trace. The Franklins departed with relief, and the cheers from the nearby football field where "our" team must have scored a goal crashed louder than usual.

A few months later an item in the Fresno *Bee* took us aback. Fresno's Rabbi Greenberg had officiated at a funeral in Coalinga. How could we have known nothing of it? Dead at ninety-one was Frieda Zwenger, widow of a major ranch owner in the area. I recalled I had taught what must have been her great-grandson in one of my classes. He was a quiet young man who wore cowboy boots and a prominent jeweled earring. Frieda Zwenger, we learned, was the last Jew in her family. Children and grandchildren had long since assimilated into a variety of local options. I thought of the Einlands, the prominent Fresno family of converts whose grandfather, then Einstein, had founded Fresno's largest bank. The wayward thought that, had we known of her stubborn existence, we could have asked the old woman to a seder flitted through my mind. Now her Jewish bones were laid to rest in the California foothills, and with startling clarity, the deepest meaning of America for us, its Jews, declared itself. By 1976, two years later, we were living in Israel.

The Gersteins now live in Santa Maria where he conducts the community orchestra. The Zenders moved to Bakersfield. For reasons very different from our own, both were very happy to leave Coalinga. A few years ago we were surprised by an unannounced brief visit from the Berliners. On their first trip to Israel, enthralled with the country, they had persuaded their guide to track us down for a buoyant half-hour break in their touring. As far as I'm aware, they are the only Jewish family still residing in Coalinga.

AFTERSHOCKS of the great quake in the form of newspaper clippings sent by friends and family hit us for months afterward. I haven't seen mention of Berliner's name or spotted his face among the pile of clippings. Perhaps they too finally abandoned Coalinga to the Franklins, Zwengers, and the rest. Indeed, perhaps it is Skokie and Teaneck which reflect aberrant, vestigial reflexes of false vitality, like Jewish Hans Castorps skiing down a Magic American Mountain, whereas parochial Coalinga—the Gersteins, the Zenders, the Franklins, the Berliners, and, yes, the Chertoks—define with greater accuracy the true range of response for the vast majority of America's Jewish families.

Coalinga, its downtown a ruin, its college in serious disrepair, will surely pull itself together and rebuild. Letters from old friends make this clear. It really doesn't need any Jews at all.

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Yellow Rain: The Conspiracy of Closed Mouths

Lucio Lami

When one investigates the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia (and, for that matter, in Afghanistan as well), the difficulty lies not in gathering evidence, which by now is within the grasp of anyone who searches for it, but rather in understanding by what sophisticated mechanisms this evidence has been obscured, discredited, and minimized by the very persons who should bring it forward. And since the great falsifiers are all Westerners, one encounters a second difficulty: how to explain to the victims the absurd game of political complicity by which the "chorus of closed mouths" has come to be organized.

A few months ago, during my most recent visit along the Cambodian and Laotian borders where the guerrillas operate, I gathered so many and such detailed accounts of chemical warfare that anyone in my position would have had enough evidence for a grave and definitive verdict. At Ban Sangae I heard the testimony of Prith Song, the survivor of a gas attack on January 6 in the area of Non Chan, and the testimony of Chun Sarom, survivor of the attack of January 14. These two young men still had symptoms of poisoning, about which I heard the testimony of Miss Garcia, the attending doctor. The nature of the symptoms was confirmed by Dr. Jibbhong Jayarasu, a specialist in these things, who in recent days had treated twenty-eight gassed persons.

Along the Laotian border I heard the detailed testimony of Khommi Vang, the village chief of Ban Nam Jao, who, on December 22, 1982, between 8 and 9 in the morning, witnessed a "yellow-rain" attack launched from a Vietnamese airplane. Eyewitnesses described the effects of the attack, which wounded ten persons in the village, and roughly eight in the surrounding area.

The same description of "yellow rain," launched at the beginning of February on Nam Ngao and on Pa Mon, were heard from the refugees fleeing those villages. From the inhabitants of Ban Hue Sai, a Laotian village under Soviet and Vietnamese control, I heard of deposits of chemical weapons in the former religious house of the Oblates, a building visible from the Mekong.

In the region of Non Chan, in the first days of my arrival, a Vietnamese from the chemical units was killed, and his gas mask was taken by the Khmer Blancs. They insisted that I photograph and examine the mask before it was given to the West German embassy in Bangkok, which had secretly asked for it. The mask was of a new variety and confirmed that Vietnam was obtaining gas masks from various sources.

It is obvious that all countries, through their embassies in Thailand, have been collecting evidence. They have, by now, obtained a bit of everything: samples of infected soil and vegetation, blood samples from victims, samples of yellow powder, "top-secret" autopsy results, photographs of scarred and burned victims of chemical attacks (the photographs remind one of Hiroshima).

The documentation is immense (indeed, the Thai government has a special section of its intelligence service to deal with this material), and for some time the embassies collecting it have considered the evidence irrefutable. But the West is silent. Arrogantly challenging the obvious, the American national press continues to raise subtle questions, as if instead of a tragic reality one were talking about the Loch Ness monster; the press continues to say, "If it is true that 1,500 Hmong tribesmen have been killed by nerve gas," when it is sufficient to go there to discover that the number of dead is closer to 15,000, if not more. The Washington *Post* wrote last February that the "credibility of the charge" (of the use of gas) has been placed in further doubt by the fact that the gathering of evidence has been entrusted to the American secret services. Such evidence—said the *Post*—is used by Reagan to convince Congress to finance American chemical-weapons programs.

Europe is no better. A few months ago a noted French newspaper spoke about Vietnamese gas attacks in these terms: "No definitive proof, but strong suspicions," and thus the dead come to be the objects of black humor like the character in the famous joke. (Alas! If he weren't dead, he would still be alive.)

In the United States, in the meantime, at regular intervals one reads reports from skeptical professors who, with great echoes in the press, deny the evidence of the sampling carried out at the request of the State Department. These statements are not presented for what they are (technical disputations of marginal questions: Was the sample contaminated? Did it contain traces of one or another substance?), but as a general challenge to a reality that they do not wish to accept. Instead of the thousands of deaths (many of them among the Hmong tribesmen, precisely those who remained loyal to the last to the Americans), one hears about learned scientific analyses.

Meanwhile, Western journalists, respecting the Thai veto that obliges them to stay far away from the zones where the gas is used, live their pleasant days in Bangkok. Of the hundreds of "information kamikazes"—the great investigative reporters who crisscrossed Vietnam during the "patriotic war" against the United States—there is not a trace. A mysterious syndrome of disinterest in the phenomenon seems to have spread like an epidemic across four continents.

This silence permits the most shameful and the most aberrant complicities between the Vietnamese and

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the West. An impressive example: the doctors of the International Red Cross—in violation of all medical standards—refuse to help victims of gas attacks, "because to accept them in the hospitals would create a political problem." Protests are lively, but useless. The International Red Cross in Thailand is under United Nations control, and UN organizations favor with their silence the slaughter of Laotian and Cambodian anti-Communists, guilty of having refused to accept their "liberation" by the Vietnamese.

Amos Townsend of the International Rescue Committee appealed to the UN Border Relief Organization which supervises the International Red Cross in Thailand. At a meeting on November 4, 1982, Townsend officially asked why the Red Cross denied assistance to gassed victims. He was given no answer and—even worse—his question was removed from the transcript of the meeting. The same treatment was given to his second question: "Why were the results of the autopsy of a twenty-two-year-old Cambodian woman, killed by Vietnamese gas and carried to the hospital of Kao I Dang, suppressed, even though the autopsy was performed by Red Cross doctors?" No reply. Question deleted from the transcript.

The assistance agencies that work alongside the UN carry out their own campaign of obfuscation, while the newspapers say that "evidence is insufficient."

Almost all the medical agencies, even the private ones, are under UN control, and they have adapted to these methods and deny help to gas victims. On December 2, 1982, the question was raised by a scientist, Dr. Jibbhong of the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief to Refugees (COER), who pleaded that the doctors "respect professional ethics and put their personal or political interests aside." The appeal was not in the transcript. All the UN humanitarian agencies make efforts to prevent the truth from appearing in the press: there is no worse enemy of the journalist who tries to work in the area than the United Nations.

Indeed, we owe some of the most brilliant operations of suppressing the truth to UN officials. The most tragic, perhaps, took place some time ago. Two years back rumors were heard in Bangkok to the effect that the Vietnamese were producing new gas mixtures that were capable of deceiving investigators as to their toxic content and their origin. These new substances—it was said—were the result of experiments in a laboratory conducted by a "new Doctor Mengele" who operated on human subjects. No one accepted these rumors, which were so clearly "defamatory" to Vietnam. But in April 1982, Adelia Bernard, of COER, was secretly taken to Phnom Penh where, thanks to a person who worked at the *Hôpital Sovietique*, she was informed of the incredible truth. The experiments were taking place, in that very same hospital as well as elsewhere, and were being conducted on healthy children ranging from two to ten years of age. The children were kept in special homes and during the experiments were placed in transparent plastic spheres equipped with two valves, one for oxygen, the other for the gas that was being tested. There were approximately one hundred child guinea pigs in the area of the hospital alone, while many others lived in laboratory camps built on the tiny islands of the Mekong. The latter were injected with toxic substances.

Incredulous, Mrs. Bernard asked for proof, and after negotiating the payment of $300, her interlocutor entered the hospital and returned with a plastic sphere, with valves and tubes, inside of which lay the dead body of a three-year-old baby. Adelia Bernard put the sphere in a sack and carried it back to Bangkok, where she deposited it on the desk of Mark Brown, a representative of the UN High Commission for Refugees. Brown did nothing, and no "case" was opened.

Brown has gone, perhaps prudently transferred or removed. But not a word is to be heard of that terrible episode, which takes us back to the days of Treblinka, and which makes us all guilty of a shameful silence.

Music

Musical New York in Decline

Samuel Lipman

New York is the musical capital of the United States. New York is at the same time one of the most important centers of music in the world. As the events of the past summer have made abundantly clear, New York is now musically in a state of crisis.

This crisis has been many years in coming. During the time when the storm was gathering, crisis wore the face of prosperity, of expansion, of fame and fortune. The number of events seemed to be increasing, audiences were growing, press coverage was ever more enthusiastic, patronage was on the rise, and goverment and politicians displayed a

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touching eagerness to jump on the bandwagon of art.

The evidence for this apparently happy state of affairs has not been hard to find. Today's leading New York performers—Pavarotti, Domingo, Horne, Perlman, Zukerman, Levine, Mehta, Yo-Yo Ma, De Larrocha—have all become big stars since the mid-1960's. Noted careers have recently been made in musical composition too. The two Georges—Rochberg and Crumb—are often programmed, and are enthusiastically received in the New York *Times*. The once lusty avant-garde has had its heroes as well: Philip Glass and Steve Reich have both enjoyed the distinction of being *enfants demi-terribles* for the best part of the past decade. The city's music schools—Juilliard, Manhattan, and Mannes—have continued to attract much of the best talent in the country and even, in the case of Juilliard, in the world; not a few of their students have even become internationally prominent shortly after graduation.

New facilities in which to hear music and see opera have also been built. Gone is the past dependence upon the aging Carnegie Hall, the musty and cramped old Metropolitan Opera House, the poorly located Town Hall, and the barn-like Hunter College Auditorium. In place of these relics, Lincoln Center has arisen from the ashes of an urban slum, housing the New York Philharmonic in Avery Fisher Hall, the Metropolitan Opera in its own palatial building, the New York City Opera (and the New York City Ballet) in the New York State Theater, the Juilliard School in a building designed not only for music but also for dance, theater, and opera, and even the New York City Library of the Performing Arts. The place of Town Hall as a prestigious venue for recitals has been taken by Lincoln Center's Alice Tully Hall, where a successful chamber-music series is now regularly presented. The small Merkin Hall, newly built and adjoining Lincoln Center, provides an inexpensive, good-sounding place to put on smaller events. And the 92nd Street YM-YWHA, reviving its concert activity, has to some extent filled the gap left by Hunter's demise.

Yet despite all this activity and apparent prosperity, something—the most important thing—has been missing. What one calls this central quality is hardly important; it goes variously by the names of vitality, excitement, interest, creativity, or discovery. In the last year or two, not even celebrity musical events have been selling out very often. What new reputations there are increasingly seem pale copies of what has come before. Old recordings more and more sound better than contemporary performances. Old artists like Horowitz, Rubinstein, and Heifetz appear less replaceable as each day passes. And in musical composition, as the recent New York Philharmonic New Romanticism festival showed, new works are praised more for merely being new than as important artistic achievements. In short, every major musical institution in New York is in serious trouble.

PRECISELY because Lincoln Center is both at the foundation and the pinnacle of local musical life, it seems only fitting that the biggest troubles should be here. And in fact they involve every large musical constituent of the Center.

The most visible of Lincoln Center's recent problems was the strike of orchestra musicians at the New York City Opera. Lasting from the opening of the summer-fall season in July until the end of August, the strike destroyed the Puccini Festival which general director Beverly Sills had counted on to reverse the plummeting artistic and box-office fortunes of her company. The main issue of this bitter strike was not increased wages and improved working conditions, though these were demanded, or even the loss of the musicians' outside summer employment. What agitated the players was the consolidation of the company's traditionally separate fall and spring seasons into one combined summer-fall season of much shorter duration, leaving them with much less work to do.

Some of the acrimony that characterized this strike was doubtless due to the election of a new slate of militant officers in Local 802 of the Musicians Union, which has jurisdiction over the City Opera contract. Some of the difficulty in getting on with orderly negotiations was doubtless caused also by the unsettled state of the City Opera board, a state of open backbiting and bitchery revealed in a lengthy *Times* article by John Rockwell at the beginning of August.

But while board members complained about each other, union officials attacked the company for financial mismanagement, and orchestra lawyers argued that the expansion of music performances mainly comes about through union pressure, the real cause of the present parlous condition of the City Opera was not, and is not now, ever discussed in public. That cause is nothing less than the total artistic failure of Beverly Sills to put together a company musicians can respect and operagoers wish to support. The sad fact is that the City Opera now employs no one of major musical stature. At best its artists are talents in search of a leadership which could provide vital repertory, effective casting, energetic musical direction, and an overall sense of aesthetic purpose. Instead, Beverly Sills has given the company and the audience only personal publicity, public fund-raising, and show-business gimmickry.

It is no surprise, then, that the orchestral musicians have less and less work to do. As the late Sol Hurok is supposed to have said, "If people don't want to come, you can't stop them." When there is a good artistic reason for the public to come and for musicians to take the City Opera seriously, it will be time to talk about length of seasons, contracts, and financial management. As things now stand, the settlement of the strike only papers over a moribund situation.

MATTERS just a few hundred yards away at the New York Philharmonic are hardly more attractive. There music director Zubin Mehta, about to enter the sixth year of his association with the Philharmonic, is suffering from disaffection on the part of orchestra members, concert audiences, the critical press, and the record-buying public. All this had been much discussed privately by musicians and music lovers, but

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it had remained *sub rosa* until the publication of a lengthy article by the *Times* at the end of June. Under a headline reading "Philharmonic Board Hears Musicians' Complaints," Edward Rothstein described the results of a questionnaire distributed to the orchestra. Of the 103 members, nearly half responded; of these, all but six were negative about Mehta.

Rothstein went on to write in some detail about the loss of the Philharmonic's CBS recording contract and the poor sales of Mehta records. Significantly, even the records made by Pierre Boulez with the Philharmonic sell better than those of Mehta—and Boulez's sales figures were a major disappointment to both management and orchestra during the French conductor's tenure.

More interesting, however, than the recounting of this generally known information was Rothstein's presentation of what the Philharmonic board thinks of Mehta and the orchestra. Though the board members quoted by Rothstein were quick to blame the orchestra and not Mehta for the poor morale and the complaints, they also seemed curiously unwilling to praise the conductor either as a musician or as a leader.

In the case of the Philharmonic as in that of the New York City Opera, there seems no clear insight into the actual state of artistic affairs. Orchestra morale is not a cause but rather a symptom of trouble. An orchestra does not need to like its conductor; it needs to respect him. When that respect is not present, discipline inevitably becomes lax, and minor conflicts of personality begin to grate. Similarly, poor record sales of a well-known orchestra led by a well-known conductor, recorded in up-to-date sound, must be laid to artistic failings, not to mere vagaries of the market. There can be little doubt that the Philharmonic board and management have some hard thinking to do in coming months, not so much about the future of the orchestra as about the future of Zubin Mehta.

THE Metropolitan Opera, just entering its centennial year, finds itself faced with the upcoming retirement of Anthony Bliss, general manager since 1981. Although Bliss had originally taken over at the Met in the mid-1970's as part of a troika with James Levine as music director and John Dexter as director of productions, Dexter is now gone from management, and Levine's authority has remained confined to musical matters. Bliss has thus been having the last word at the Met. But now Levine—as revealed in a mid-June *Times* story by Harold C. Schonberg—wishes to be assured that Bliss's replacement will defer to him on all artistic issues.

This insistence by the Met's music director on artistic control, even though art has an impact on the budget, is proper. But it comes at a time when the company is rather more successful at fund-raising—its current campaign has now passed $70 million on the road to its goal of $100 million—than at finding a way to present musically and intellectually exciting operatic fare to an increasingly tradition-bound though unsophisticated audience.

The Metropolitan Opera is rarely less than professional; what it does it does on a large and often—as in the case of the Zeffirelli production of *La Bohème* two seasons ago—lavish scale. Both its chorus and its orchestra are composed of highly skilled individuals, and the level of solo singing is as high, it seems, as may be found in the world. Levine is a successful conductor in both concerts and opera here and abroad (though his enthusiasm and vitality are rarely matched by the other conductors who are chosen to fill in at the Met when he does not wish to be on the podium). Production and stage direction seem carefully crafted to appear neither innovative nor old-fashioned, and thus are able to please a wide range of ticket buyers.

All these virtues, considerable as they are, have conspicuously failed to make the Met a significant force in American musical life. The reason is that the Met's repertory is totally devoid of new operas, and of American works regardless of when they were written. It is lacking, too, in major works written since World War I. The Met has never done Schoenberg's *Moses and Aaron*, it has done nothing of Hindemith, and even *The Rake's Progress* of Stravinsky, which it performed in the 1950's, has fallen victim to programming caution and even fear. Strangely, this restriction on problematical works has extended even to the later works of Richard Strauss; the Met has put on nothing of this master after *Arabella* (1930-32).

When the Met has looked for new repertory, it has tended to find it in such safe modern composers as Britten, Poulenc, and Weill; when it has tried something slightly more venturesome, as in the Stravinsky triple bill of two years ago, it took care to preface the relatively difficult *Oedipus Rex* and *Le Rossignol* with the crowd-pleasing, non-operatic *Le Sacre du printemps*, performed as a ballet. Otherwise, the Met's novelty in repertory is now confined to rediscovering such older works as Francesco Cilea's *Adriana Lecouvreur* (1902) and Mozart's *Idomeneo*, never before done by the Met, even though the opera was first performed (in Munich) in 1781.

Just how Levine feels about the current state of the Met repertory is not a matter of public knowledge; the extent to which the exact make-up of the repertory is an issue in the current administrative battle over the powers of Anthony Bliss's successor is not known either. But if these issues are not now being fought out behind the façade of the famous Met Chagall murals facing Lincoln Center Plaza, it would be just one more sign of the obliviousness to artistic considerations now endemic in New York musical life. If, however, they are on the negotiating table, and even if Levine should win, one cannot be sure, given his propensity to please his supporters, that he would make the tough decisions necessary to bring the Metropolitan Opera into the 20th century.

ONE OF THE requirements of a musical capital is that it have a famous music school, and in the Juilliard School, New York boasts perhaps the most famous such institution in the world. Though its faculty is re-

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nowned, the school's distinction perhaps really lies not in its teachers but in its students. Juillard's students are very often already remarkable performers upon admission, and it seems likely that for the best of these young people Juilliard's contribution can be better described as performance coaching and career placement than as basic musical formation and intellectual development.

For twenty years the distinguished (but remarkably little played) American composer Peter Mennin served as president of Juilliard. In June, just after his sixtieth birthday, Mennin died. With his death, every question, not just about the future of the Juilliard School, but about the proper nature of music education for the most gifted, has become open. Should the Juilliard board merely wish to continue along the course of least resistance Mennin so brilliantly followed, finding his successor will not be easy; his idiosyncratic blend of musical distinction, pedagogic *laissez-faire*, and personal charm in the service of fund-raising has always been rare. But should the board wish to break genuinely new ground in musical training, neither suitable persons nor inspiring programs come readily to mind.

Certainly one's confidence is hardly raised by several of the prominent names rumored to have been under board consideration for the job. These names include Isaac Stern, Leonard Bernstein, Ezra Laderman, and Vincent Persichetti. Stern, of course, is a famous violinist and is both active and visible in musical politics; Bernstein, both as composer and as conductor, is one of the most gifted figures in the history of American music; Laderman is a well-known composer and for some years was head of the music program of the National Endowment for the Arts; Persichetti is a widely respected and prolific composer who has taught on the Juilliard faculty for many years. It is no denigration of the achievement of these men to remark that their age alone—ranging from fifty-nine in the case of Laderman to sixty-eight in the case of Persichetti—suggests that they are not suited for the immense daily output of energy and strength necessary to change the course of a settled and successful institution. Nor has any of them been known for any new and solid approach to music education. Even Bernstein, famous for explaining music to the millions on television, has functioned more as a music-appreciation lecturer than as a teacher.

One hopes that before it commits itself to a candidate the Juilliard board will take the trouble to think through for itself some of the fundamental questions at stake in music education. They include, but are not limited to, the role of serious music in a society riven by various commercially successful popular cultures; the proper relation (within serious music itself) between unpopular new music and the masterpieces of the past that are still successful with audiences; the currently regnant idea of the best music teaching as a laying-on of hands; and the role of an American music school at a time when many of the best students are neither American nor even Occidental.

There are undoubtedly answers to all these questions, but they all involve choosing between the easy course of institutional prosperity and media approval on the one hand, and the hard road of self-limitation and artistic concentration on the other. The future president of Juilliard willing and able to follow an active policy of rejecting the pressure of commercial culture and fame, of finding and making new music, of conceiving teaching as something other than a repetition of the time-worn formulas of European music schools, and of preserving a distinctively American rather than an international artistic style, will be difficult indeed to find.

AWAY from Lincoln Center, the problems, while hardly so massive and central, are still troubling enough. Of the two halls in which New York musical life was concentrated before Lincoln Center was built, Carnegie Hall seems much more likely to survive than Town Hall. Carnegie is superior acoustically to Lincoln Center's Fisher Hall. It is centrally located on West 57th Street, the business capital of the American music world. It has a busy schedule of rentals, most of them of highly respectable artistic caliber (and so does its small adjunct, Carnegie Recital Hall). It has a rich, well-connected board, with Isaac Stern as president and investment banker James Wolfensohn as chairman.

Furthermore, Carnegie Hall has prided itself upon becoming a businesslike operation, utilizing modern techniques of management and fund-raising to replace the personal approach described in a May *Times* story as a " 'mom-and-pop store' run by the Sterns [the violinist and his wife] and a coterie of friends." One token of this progress into the computer and business-school age has been the increase in management staff from ten in 1963 to forty-six today. A related indication has been the splitting of upper-level direction into the two positions of managing director and artistic director. Edward Michaelson, the recently chosen managing director, is a former top business executive; Seymour Rosen, the new artistic director, formerly managed the Philadelphia Orchestra. Though they have each been on the job only a short time, the New York musical rumormongers are now buzzing with apparently well-founded stories of Michaelson's decline in board favor and of his possible supersession by Rosen.

All this might seem merely another example of modern management techniques not always guaranteeing perfect organization and harmony all around, were it not for the interesting pronouncements Rosen has been making about the proper future of Carnegie Hall. According to the *Times*:

> Mr. Rosen has also been forthright about his intention to steer Carnegie Hall in new directions, democratizing both its programming and its potential audience. . . . "There are areas we have not paid sufficient attention to," he said, citing jazz, ethnic music, experimental and new American music among those whose role he wishes to augment. "We are also going to be doing more outreach," Mr. Rosen added, "moving Carnegie Hall into the community and into the schools."

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Perhaps Rosen's statement means no more than an increased emphasis on concerts for the young and "the community." His remarks, however, seem to suggest rather more: a quixotic attempt to go beyond Carnegie Hall's acoustics—the principal reason, after all, for its existence—to implement some grandiose—though no doubt fundable—dream of becoming a city-wide presenting institution. Here precisely is the kind of massive overreach, born at the same time of megalomania and an obsession with financing, which is one of the main causes of the crisis in New York musical life.

As for Town Hall, its problem is its unfortunate location in the Times Square area and its run-down condition. Remaining as it does a beautifully clear and sonically faithful ambience for solo recitals and small ensembles, it refuses to die, but at the same time it does not live. In August, another of its periodic attempts to save itself was reported in the *Times* under the headline, "Town Hall Is Scouting for Donors." Though much of the necessary money seems to have been raised, the list of groups to which Town Hall wishes to offer permanent support—among them the New Amsterdam Theater Group and the American Guitar Institute—does not necessarily augur well for its musical future.

To round out this gloomy account, finally, other significant problems in New York musical life could be mentioned as well. The Manhattan School of Music, for example, has been going through a well-organized faculty revolt against its president, and the musician-run American Symphony Orchestra has utterly failed to realize the hopes entertained by its well-wishers that it would become a true second orchestra in New York.

BUT whatever the particular details may be in each individual case, it is the lack of a significant artistic product which lies in common at the heart of the problems of the New York City Opera, the New York Philharmonic, the Metropolitan Opera, the Juilliard School, Carnegie Hall, and Town Hall. For some of these institutions, such as the City Opera and Town Hall, the crisis is immediate and acute; without some quick discoveries, they simply will not survive. For others, among them the Philharmonic and the Metropolitan, the problem is longer-term. For the time being, their financial health and the loyalty of their subscribers and their boards insure their stability. But unless a serious effort to resolve their artistic problems is made, these institutions too will soon find their survival threatened by the same loss of artistic purpose and creative vitality that has already all but doomed the City Opera under Beverly Sills.

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Verdicts of History

THE ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH. By RONALD RADOSH AND JOYCE MILTON. *Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 608 pp. $22.50.*

Reviewed by NATHAN GLAZER

RONALD RADOSH and Joyce Milton, in this superlative book, describe how their conviction that the Rosenbergs were innocent changed on the basis of a lengthy study of the case, and in particular of the enormous mass of documents that were released through the efforts of the Rosenbergs' sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol, under the Freedom of Information Act.

There were many phases in this change of view. Radosh recounts how he stood in Union Square, a young high-school student, with the despairing Rosenberg supporters, as they awaited news in those last confused hours between the Supreme Court's dismissal of the Rosenbergs' last appeals and the execution that had been moved up so as not to take place on the Jewish Sabbath. Even when, Radosh tells us, he gave up his early sympathy for the Soviet Union, he still believed in the Rosenbergs' innocence, and joined the executive committee of the National Committee to Reopen the Rosenberg Case that was organized in 1974.

These were certainly honestly held beliefs on his part, and on the part of many (not of all, as we learn from this book, for those who were close to the top echelons of the Communist party took it for granted that Julius Rosenberg had engaged in espionage). The earnestness of the belief in the innocence of the Rosenbergs is demonstrated by the successful campaign to gain access to FBI and Department of Justice files on the case. This campaign, after all, was not initiated by those who were satisfied that the truth had come out at the initial trial, and who had been unshaken by massive volumes attempting to demonstrate lying by the chief witnesses—David and Ruth Greenglass and Harry Gold—and fraud and manufacture of evidence by the FBI. The release of the official documents, sought to rehabilitate the Rosenbergs, has resulted in the addition of so much *more* evidence consistent with guilt that no honest person can now believe the Rosenbergs were framed by American agencies of investigation and justice. We learn from this mass of documents, more than 250,000 pages, analyzed meticulously by Radosh and Milton, that the FBI and the Department of Justice may have been guilty of many things—prejudice, insensitivity, and most seriously the indictment of Ethel Rosenberg as a means to get her husband to talk—but they were not engaged in the manufacture of evidence.

As one follows the trail of evidence, from Klaus Fuchs, to Harry Gold, to David Greenglass, to Julius Rosenberg, and then to those with whom he was in contact but who had fled or refused to talk—Alfred Sarant, Joel Barr, William Mutterperl, Vivian Glassman, and others—through the investigation reports, it is clear that the FBI was surprised by what it discovered. Things moved very rapidly after the Fuchs confession, and there was no reason to believe that the astonishing string of further confessions that led the FBI to the other participants in espionage would end with Julius Rosenberg. It did. After that, there was flight and silence and refuge in the Fifth Amendment.

All this is consistent with honest investigation, and cannot possibly, Radosh and Milton believe, support any suspicion of fraud or frame-up. Moreover, much of the evidence finds independent confirmation in ways totally inconsistent with manufacture.

There was even far more evidence than was presented to the jury. A number of reasons led to this strategy, including the fear of the Atomic Energy Commission that classified information would emerge, the desire to keep the extent of the FBI's knowledge of their espionage activities from the Soviet authorities, and decisions as to what would be clearest to a jury and a judge. This resulted in a transcript in which the evidence was thinner than it might have been, or than one would have wished in order to still all doubts in a capital case. But while this additional evidence was not available to the jury, much of it was available to observers quite early—as, for example, in the subsequent trial for perjury of William Mutterperl.

So Radosh and his collaborator, Joyce Milton, have gone through an odyssey that moves from belief in innocence to conviction of guilt. Part of this odyssey can be traced in the writing of Radosh as he began to explore the FBI documents. In 1979, an article he did jointly with Sol Stern in the *New Republic* announced the first findings from his study of the FBI documents and from interviews, some with people (the Greenglasses, for example) who had never been interviewed on the case before. Stern and Radosh asserted that Julius Rosenberg *was* guilty, but that Ethel Rosenberg was not. The reason Stern and Radosh could not believe in Ethel Rosenberg's guilt was thin; in this book, on the basis of further study, Radosh accepts the verdict of guilt and concludes: "Ethel Rosenberg probably knew of and supported her husband's endeavors, and it seems almost certain that she acted as an accessory, at least in the activities of her own brother, David Greenglass."

TO MOST people who have studied the case, there will be little news in the conclusion that Julius Rosenberg was guilty. A jury believed so in 1952, and when I read the trial transcript that same year, to settle my own doubts about the verdict, I could see no basis on which that verdict could be disputed. In later books trying to demonstrate the innocence of the Rosenbergs, I found only the tendentiousness of

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Read these statements and you'll understand why Israel is so important to the Jews.

1945

"The Jews are lower than animals."—*General George S. Patton referring to the survivors of the Holocaust*

1945

"We appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them."—*Report to President Truman*

1946

"If only Hitler had finished the Final Solution."—*Polish reaction to returning Holocaust survivors*

1946

"The Americans are so enthusiastic about opening Palestine to the refugees because they do not want to have many of them in New York."—*British Foreign Minister Bevin*

1948

"We will punish the Jews in a way the race dislikes by striking at their pockets."—*Sir Evelyn Barker, British Commander in Palestine on the eve of Israel's Independence*

These shocking statements give you some idea of the attitudes faced by the 400,000 survivors of the Holocaust. Sadly, liberation did not mean freedom. Instead, as Abram Sachar, one of this country's most distinguished historians shows, many of the survivors found themselves engaged in a new struggle—a struggle for dignity, an end to persecution, a homeland of their own. They had few resources, fewer friends, no place to go. They faced intense opposition from the British, who controlled Palestine, and from the Arabs, who bitterly fought the idea of a Jewish homeland.

Drawn from hitherto secret documents placed in the custody of the author by David K. Niles, a close aide to both Roosevelt and Truman, and scores of interviews here and in Europe and Israel, this book is about those survivors and their dreams. It is about organizations like *B'Richa* that rescued the homeless of Eastern and Central Europe through an underground network headquartered in Palestine; it is about a phantom army created to spirit thousands of Jews past a British Navy determined to block immigration to the promised land. It reveals fully the role of Niles in President Truman's support of Israel. And it shows the indifference of those who stood by while "Displaced Persons" from Hitler's death camps were held under guard against their will.

The Redemption of the Unwanted re-creates the heroic story of those who survived the Holocaust with a rare combination of sensitivity, historical accuracy, and a master historian's gift for fine writing.


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the already convinced, weaving fantastic tales of conspiracy that could not possibly influence an objective observer. Yet this was no great credit to my prescience. My political views were different from Radosh's and Milton's, and it was easier for me to see what they now accept as the truth—and more than accept, demonstrate beyond any shadow of a doubt through herculean efforts of research. Yet their different political views led them to a testing of the evidence that not only may convince the as-yet unconvinced, but opened them to understandings and aspects of the case to which I was not, I will confess, fully alive.

I have already referred to one of these issues: the degree of Ethel Rosenberg's guilt. The only overt acts of which she was accused were cooperation with Julius in urging her brother, David Greenglass, who was a machinist at Los Alamos, to provide information, and then typing up this information. The reference to typing comes late in the pre-trial questioning of the Greenglasses. Perhaps it was owing to David's desire to keep his sister out of the case. But regardless of the details, it is clear that almost all the espionage activity—the contacts with the Russians, the contacts with scientists working on classified projects, the trips to pick up information—was by Julius, not Ethel, a mother with two young children and in ill health. The notion that Ethel was the dominant figure of the couple has no basis at all in any of the official documents. It apparently comes from the imagination of Morris Ernst, the well-known civil-liberties lawyer, who was approached by Julius Rosenberg's relatives about coming into the case and who went to the FBI—a number of contacts are reported in the documents—to propose that he cooperate with them while serving as the Rosenbergs' lawyer.

The FBI came off rather better than Ernst from this shabby episode: "Nichols's [Ernst's FBI contact] memo paints a shocking picture of a lawyer offering to represent prospective clients only with the FBI's permission, and then, in effect, only to act as the Bureau's servant. The Bureau, however, was not very warm to the plan. Nichols told Ernst that the case was now 'out of our hands' though he did relay the message to Hoover, who agreed with Nichols's assessment that the FBI 'simply could not under any circumstances get involved.' "

While Ernst believed that "Julius is the slave, Ethel, the master," the evidence shows that it was not on this basis that Ethel was arrested and indicted; it was, rather, to serve as a way of putting pressure on Julius to confess. Once set in motion, the strategy moved to its grim conclusion in execution. This despite the fact that Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford, acting for the Department of Justice, opposed her execution, and that J. Edgar Hoover (who in contrast to Ernst presumed her "to be acting under the influence of her husband") also opposed it.

WHY then was Ethel executed? This brings us to the most disturbing part of the case—the role of Judge Irving Kaufman. Kaufman sought the views of the FBI and the Department of Justice on the sentencing. When he learned that both were against Ethel Rosenberg's being sentenced to death, he asked the prosecutor to refrain from making any recommendation, and then sentenced them both to death.

There was more to Kaufman's role. While he could not be faulted in his public capacity as judge, his commitment to his sentence of death, and his concern that it would not be carried out rapidly, led him into contacts with the FBI which seem to me incompatible with the judicial office. We may allow a senior colleague, Justice Felix Frankfurter, to pass judgment on him: "The individual that Frankfurter held most responsible for the courts' less than dispassionate handling of the Rosenberg case was Judge Irving Kaufman. Writing to Judge Learned Hand in 1958, Frankfurter said of Kaufman, 'I despise a judge who feels God told him to impose a death sentence,' and he vowed, 'I am mean enough to try to stay here [on the Supreme Court] long enough so that K will be too old to succeed me.' "

Kaufman thus emerges from the secret FBI reports looking as bad as Morris Ernst. Some explanation of his distinctly non-judicial behavior still seems called for. Even if it is from the point of view of law beyond challenge, from the point of view of the kind of judgment we are called upon to make on the character of public persons, he must be condemned.*

RADOSH and Milton's book, and the Rosenberg case, call on us to make larger judgments than those affecting individuals. Can we say that the Rosenberg case was a miscarriage of justice? Can we ascribe the case to an atmosphere of hysteria, of excessive fear of espionage? Were those found guilty given punishment that was disproportionate to the degree of guilt and the damage to national security demonstrated?

Certainly there was no miscarriage of justice where the question of guilt or innocence was concerned. The FBI did its work carefully. Its evidence was sound. The case was properly presented on the whole (though Prosecutor Saypol was severely condemned by higher judges for announcing the indictment of William Mutterperl for perjury during the trial, an action that might have influenced the jury). There can be no argument with the jury's verdict.

But one must argue with the judge's sentences. Apart from the issue of Ethel, the sentences meted out to the cooperating witnesses were also excessive—fifteen years for Greenglass, thirty for Gold, all far, far greater than were given for more serious crimes in Canadian and British courts. Were these discrepancies a sign of British and Canadian laxity, or American severity? It turned out that in related cases flowing from Gold's confession American judges gave longer sentences than even the prosecutors asked for. Perhaps the judges were closer to a public opinion that reacted with horror and outrage and vengeance at the revelation of

* I am mystified as to why Professor Alan Dershowitz has not a word to say about Judge Irving Kaufman in his lengthy review of this book in the Sunday New York *Times Book Review*, August 14, 1983.

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these crimes, while prosecutors, living with the cases, took a more balanced view.

There were many—I was among them—who accepted the verdict of guilt but felt uneasy at the death sentence. Why did we not try to prevent it? I believe the explanation lies in the role of the Communist party in the campaign to save the Rosenbergs, and the difficulties involved in an effort to stake out an independent position. (I leave aside the question of whether it would have done any good.)

The problem, as I wrote in an article in 1956 in the *New Leader*, was that there were two Rosenberg cases. One case was the case in the courts, in which guilt was clearly demonstrated. The other case was the case in the streets, where the legal evidence could be obscured and the most outrageous claims made that the Rosenbergs were being persecuted for their political opinions (opinions, by the way, they had not expressed in years, since they had entered secret work, and did not express at the trial, or after the trial). The trial in the courts was conducted by judges, prosecutors, lawyers. The trial in the streets was conducted by political activists, many under the guidance of the Communist party. The death sentence was imposed legally and properly, at the conclusion of the trial in the courts, but it became the basis for an international movement dominated by Communists, which in demanding the exoneration of the Rosenbergs was also demanding the condemnation of the United States, and it was difficult to divorce one from the other.

J. Edgar Hoover argued against the death sentence for Ethel not only because of extenuating circumstances but because he saw that it could become, as it did, the basis of international propaganda against the United States. Others argued against both death sentences, also on pragmatic grounds. Douglas Dillon, then Ambassador to France, sent an "eyes-only" dispatch to John Foster Dulles: "The fact . . . is that even those who accept the guilt of the Rosenbergs are overwhelmingly of the opinion that the death sentence is unjustifiable punishment for offenses as revealed at the trial, particularly when compared with prison terms meted out to British scientists Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs. . . . We should not (repeat not) deceive ourselves by thinking that this sentiment is due principally to Communist propaganda. . . ." This telegram was sent to the White House but was not allowed to reach President Eisenhower.

It was in large part because of the second case, the case in the streets, that the death sentences of the first case managed to stand. Many people refused to become associated with the demand that the Rosenbergs be spared because it was so closely tied, by the political activists who led the movement, to insistence on the innocence of the Rosenbergs and the corruption of the American system of justice. Thus Albert Einstein, who had called for clemency for the Rosenbergs, refused to sign an *amicus* brief because of the involvement of the Communists in the movement. The second case played a role in making firm and final the death sentences that emerged from the first.

Others besides Ernst and Kaufman come off badly in Radosh and Milton's account, and perhaps most strikingly Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who voted again and again against reviewing the case—and then, at the last moment, after the Supreme Court had adjourned for the year and scattered, issued a stay of execution. He could have voted with Frankfurter, Black, and other justices on a number of previous occasions to review the case, but refused to do so. Radosh and Milton are kinder to Douglas than Michael E. Parrish in his important article, "Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs" (*American Historical Review*, 1978). Parrish speculates that Douglas's political ambitions might have restrained him from voting for a review in which he would publicly have had to take a controversial position. Radosh and Milton, on the other hand, quote Douglas as saying that the Communists wanted the Rosenbergs

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executed, since they would be more valuable as martyrs than as potential informers (an opinion many others in the case also held). But it makes no sense to suggest, as Radosh and Milton do, that it was for this reason he refused to become involved. Douglas, as Frankfurter believed, had much to answer for.

We do not know what the Supreme Court might or might not have done in the end. In the special session Chief Justice Vinson immediately summoned to vacate Douglas's stay, the vote was 5 to 4 against the Rosenbergs. On the basis of this narrow judgment, two people were sent to their deaths only a few hours later. There was unseemly haste. Certainly many had cause to expect that the execution would be delayed over the summer to permit time for fuller arguments on the issues raised. One cannot but believe that there was some failure of justice at the end. How else to explain the rapidity, in American terms, with which the death sentence was carried out? We have already spoken of Judge Kaufman's role, but it was up to the Supreme Court to permit further deliberation, and this it failed to do.

IN THE end the temper of the times had much to do with the execution of the Rosenbergs. Tried a few years later, they would very likely have been found guilty, but a death sentence would have seemed less justifiable. Much was changing in 1953: we were, after the first shocks, beginning to live with the grim reality that the Russians possessed the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, and not simply because of espionage. Aside from any issue of national security, with the passing years more and more Americans were finding the death sentence repugnant.

Thirty-four years after their trial, there can be no doubt as to the guilt of the Rosenbergs. But there can be considerable doubt that they merited the death sentence. *The Rosenberg File* gives us good reason to conclude that the sentence was far too harsh, and that it was imposed and carried out at least in part because of the political temper of the times.

The Chosen

WHY THE JEWS? THE REASON FOR ANTI-SEMITISM. By DENNIS PRAGER and JOSEPH TELUSHKIN. *Simon & Schuster. 238 pp. $14.95.*

Reviewed by MONA CHAREN

MUCH that is important about this audaciously subtitled book (the one and only reason for anti-Semitism?) is foreshadowed in the dedication: "To Raoul Wallenberg," the Swedish diplomat who rescued Hungarian Jews during World War II and was subsequently bundled off to the Gulag by Soviet authorities, never to be seen again. A book about anti-Semitism inscribed for a "righteous Gentile" reassures the wary reader that the authors are not the sort of insular xenophobes often drawn to this subject. Moreover, in light of Wallenberg's fate, which achingly parallels the tragedies of Jewry in this century, the dedication signals the nonpartisanship of the inquiry to follow; anti-Semites of the Right and the Left get equal time.

The book is the second collaboration by these authors. The first, *The Nine Questions People Ask About Judaism*, was a feisty and full-throated ovation to a Judaism without tears. In this book, inevitably, there is some weeping—no treatment of the subject could avoid it—and also some crude formulations and awkward writing. But there is very little self-pity. The reason is that the authors find the root of anti-Semitism not in racism, xenophobia, the need for scapegoats, economic depressions, or any other universalizing factor. The occasion for the hatred of Jews they find in Judaism itself—hence the simplicity of the subtitle.

It is important to recognize from the outset, they argue, that Judaism is unique. Unlike other religions, it is also a nation. Unlike other nations, Jews maintained a sense of peoplehood even when they were without a state. The traditional Jewish formulation of this uniqueness is expressed as God (morality), Torah (law), and Israel (peoplehood). All anti-Semitism, announces this book, is a reaction to one or more of these three pillars of Judaism.

It is an alluring thesis, in part because of its air of sonorous profundity (". . . the Jew carries the burden of God in history and for this has never been forgiven"), but also, perhaps, because it is ego-gratifying. Seen through the Prager/Telushkin prism, anti-Semitism becomes a sinister form of flattery.

The idea that anti-Semitism is a manifestation of a primitive revolt against morality, civilization, and God Himself must be particularly appealing to the modern Jewish mind grown weary of the scapegoat theory and other de-Judaizing explanations for the persecution of Jews. How much more satisfying to find that Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the 19th-century English expatriate who became one of the philosophers of Nazism, believed that the Jew (and through the Jew the Christian) "came into our gay world and spoiled everything with his ominous concept of sin, his law, and his cross." Hitler swore to destroy the "tyrannical God of the Jews" and His "life-denying Ten Commandments." Among the ditties of the Hitler Youth was:

> Pope and rabbi shall be no more.
> We want to be pagans again.

"A basic element of anti-Semitism," the authors thus conclude, "is a rebellion against the 'thou shalts' and the 'thou shalt nots' introduced by the Jews in the name of a supreme moral authority." (George Steiner has advanced a similiar argument.) Pre-modern Jews understood this, accepting as axiomatic that the persecution they suffered was chargeable to their challenging religion. A Jew who sacrificed his life rather than give up his faith was said to have died *al kiddush hashem*, in sanctification of the name of God.

Satisfying as such speculation may be, its usefulness as an explanation is limited. As the authors themselves stress more than once, Nazism was a unique form of anti-Semitism. The naked neo-paganism of a Hitler Youth slogan may be

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fascinating in its own terms, but is uninstructive on the causes of the more universal forms of anti-Semitism.

A second flaw with the theory of the Jews as God's standard-bearers is the Procrustean difficulty of fitting Christian anti-Semitism within its bounds. It is historically and theologically reductive, to say the least, to reason that the Jewish rejection of Jesus was perceived by Christians as fealty to monotheism in the face of an invitation to some other kind of faith. Christianity adopted monotheism: its quarrel with Judaism is a family one—with, to be sure, all of the bitterness and hatreds such quarrels engender.

IF THE authors' religious analysis is less than comprehensive, their account of the role of Jewish nationhood in the etiology of anti-Semitism is masterful. Whereas, they write, anti-Semites in pre-modern times were primarily aroused by the offensiveness of Jewish beliefs—pagans resenting the refusal of Jews to acknowledge the legitimacy of their gods, Christians chafing at the rejection of Jesus' divinity—the modern anti-Semite was enraged by another pillar of Judaism: the tenacious transnational identification among Jews. This feature became even more inflammatory with the rise of nationalism in Europe.

In Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique*, the lengthiest entry is the article entitled "Jew." "Our masters and our enemies whom we detest . . . the most abominable people in the world." Enlightenment thinkers may have been indiscriminate in their hostility to religion, but the Jews were their special target. In December 1789, Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre rose in the French National Assembly during a discussion of the Jewish question and articulated what was to become the universal price of "enlightened" emancipation:

> The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals. . . . There cannot be one nation within another nation.

This (as Jacob Katz has recently argued in these pages, "Misreadings of Anti-Semitism," July) was nothing less than the hoary demand, familiar from pagan and Christian times, that Jews abandon their Judaism. The focus had merely shifted from the God component of Judaism to the Israel component. But the two are not severable. How can Jews give up their nationhood and yet remain Jews? On Yom Kippur, they ask God's forgiveness not as individuals but as a people. This communal religion touches every aspect of life, and adherence to even a few of its dictates marks the Jew off from the larger society.

Perhaps anti-Semites never truly understood this. Prager and Telushkin have assembled quotation after quotation by Enlightenment, Socialist, and Communist theorists first confidently predicting the assimilation of the Jews and then, disappointed, renewing every anti-Semitic calumny they could unearth, the most vile being the current Soviet accusation that during World War II the Jews collaborated with the Nazis to murder Russian prisoners of war.

But while the nationalist component of Judaism sets it apart from other faiths, religion has itself molded the nationalism of the Jews, and nowhere more strikingly than in what is, perhaps, the most provocative doctrine in history: chosenness. A recent University of California study revealed that among eighteen "potentially negative" beliefs about Jews, the one which continues to be the most potent (60-percent agreement) is that "Jews continue to think of themselves as God's chosen people." Arguably, the doctrine of chosenness, and the sense of superiority it connotes, is what has made Jewish nationhood so odious to so many different cultures.

But the authors protest. Why, they ask, should one tiny group's claim to divine election arouse such hostility? Should it not rather have been an occasion of derision where it was known at all? Their explanation offers some interesting insights.

They speculate that the traditionally higher standard of living

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which Jews always enjoyed relative to their neighbors gave the claim to chosenness a certain discomfiting plausibility. Jewish poverty, for example, was less visible than that of others because the law of Moses made charity justice (*tzedakah*)—and justice a religious obligation. Poor Jews, though ever with us, were less conspicuous than poor Gentiles, contributing to the belief that the Jews suffered *no* poverty. Adherence to the religious laws regarding family life meant that abandonment and wife-beating were exceedingly rare. Alcoholism was almost unknown. (The authors' attribution of this datum to the ritualization and sanctification of wine-drinking in Judaism is somewhat lame; Christianity, after all, made wine-drinking a central element of its most sacred ceremony, the Eucharist.)

The doctrine of chosenness, Prager and Telushkin conclude, was resented as much for its circumstantial persuasiveness as for its intrinsic effrontery. As evidence that the claim was taken seriously, they point to the fact that Judaism's two daughter religions, while discarding most of the beliefs and practices of their parent, were quick to arrogate the claim to themselves. Christianity called the Church the "New Israel," and Islam made Muslims the inheritors of Abraham's covenant.

The emphasis on chosenness is surely correct, and evidence for it crops up again and again throughout the broad historical sweep of the book. The precept was anathema to pagans, Christians, Muslims, Enlightenment liberals, Socialists, and no doubt to Zoroastrians (though the book is silent on this). But in their apology for the doctrine, the authors slide into defensive parochialism. Noting that Jews have always been aware of its offensiveness, and that two groups, 19th-century Reform Jews and 20th-century Reconstructionists, have moved to excise the idea from Judaism, they complain that it has been consistently misunderstood. Jews, they argue, saw themselves singled out not for privileges but rather for onerous responsibilities. (Recall Tevye's plaint to God: "Next time, choose somebody else.")

But this insistence that Jews were chosen only for obligation and suffering is disingenuous. If Jews found their status onerous, it was almost certainly because of the envy it excited among fellow mortals, not because they would have preferred some other relationship to God. A beautiful woman might feel her beauty a burden when surrounded by her lesser endowed sisters, but she would be unlikely to surrender her gifts if the opportunity were offered. A better response would be to point out that the claim to chosenness, while undeniably obnoxious, was never cruel—as it was when Christians transmogrified it. The "New Israel" proclaimed salvation only through the Church, and relegated the rest of humanity to eternal damnation.

ONE of the strengths of this book is the intellectual housecleaning it undertakes. The authors briskly dispose of several lingering myths about the causes of anti-Semitism. For example, the argument that wealth causes hatred of Jews is refuted by a simple comparison. In Eastern Europe, where Jews were poorest, they suffered the most. In North America, where they have been the most affluent, they have suffered the least. Again, although the authors devote considerable attention to Christian anti-Semitism, they take due notice of the important fact that today, moderate and conservative Christians are crucial allies and friends. The blood libel was ghastly and obscene, but its modern inheritors can be found in the souks and the soviets, not in the churches.

The book's strongest chapter is entitled "Non-Jewish Jews and Anti-Semitism." Here, the authors unblinkingly acknowledge that "The association of Jews with revolutionary doctrines and ideological social upheaval has not, unfortunately, been the product of anti-Semites' imaginations." The Jewish revolutionary is usually a rootless creature, unassimilated into the larger society, and alienated from traditional Judaism in every respect save one: he has inherited a three-thousand-year practice of challenging the most sacred values of those around him:

> Feeling no kinship, hence no responsibility, to any nation (only to "mankind") they have not felt concerned with the consequences of such destructiveness. Neither the demoralization of the non-Jewish nation nor the resultant . . . antipathy to Jews concerns these people.

The authors reproduce an exchange between Leon Trotsky (né Lev Bronstein) and Moscow's chief rabbi which speaks volumes about the whole phenomenon of the "non-Jewish Jew." Trotsky, who had denied being a Russian or a Jew, calling himself simply a "social democrat," was entreated by the chief rabbi in 1920 to intervene on behalf of the Russian Jews who were being slaughtered by both sides in pogroms during the civil war. Trotsky refused. The rabbi is said to have remarked, "The Trotskys make the revolutions, and the Bronsteins pay the price."

In the end, the book's subtitle crumbles under the weight of the authors' superb research. There is no single explanation for anti-Semitism; their title identifies only the victim. But their insights into the various outbreaks of anti-Semitism take us very far. The book is as valuable for the theories it explodes as for those it propounds.

Triumph of the State

MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE EIGHTIES. By PAUL JOHNSON. *Harper & Row. 818 pp. $27.95.*

Reviewed by DAVID GRESS

IT MUST surely be one of the great paradoxes of our times that as "the power of the state to do evil expanded with awesome speed" (in Paul Johnson's words), its ability to fulfill its traditional obligations —namely, maintaining an adequate defense and a solid currency, and guaranteeing the physical safety of its citizens and their property—declined precipitously. Social and institutional forces undreamed of by

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the state-builders of early modernity have in our time come to the fore, gradually replacing the old forms of paternal absolutism with a conception of state power as a means of organizing society and of supplanting the family as the basic physical and psychological provider.

Modern Times, the latest and most far-reaching of Paul Johnson's several excellent interpretative accounts of the political, cultural, and psychological challenges facing the peoples of the West, is specifically devoted to illustrating the effects of this change, which he defines as the triumph of relativism and its consequent political vice, the faith in social engineering, in "the notion that human beings can be shoveled around like concrete."

The link was made clear already by Kierkegaard and, more famously, by Nietzsche, decades before the fall of the old order, when they indicated that the philosophical destruction of traditional morality must necessarily lead to nihilism. God having been killed by the philosophers, and belief in objective morality being gradually erased by the discovery of the "real" mainsprings of behavior in the work of Marx, Darwin, and Freud, the resultant psychological vacuum was filled, as Nietzsche foresaw, by the Will to Power. "A new kind of messiah" appeared, Johnson writes, "uninhibited by any religious sanctions whatever, and with an unappeasable appetite for controlling mankind. The end of the old order, with an unguided world adrift in a relativistic universe, was a summons to such gangster-statesmen to emerge. They were not slow in making their appearance."

HAVING identified the negative pole of modern history in the connection between moral relativism and the abuse of vastly increased state power in new and monstrous ways, Johnson then proceeds to recount that history from World War I until 1982 in broad and fascinating detail, always relating the facts and his incisive analyses to his basic theme. Thus, "the effect of the Great War was enormously to increase the size, and therefore the destructive capacity and propensity to oppress, of the state." Germany, which had gone farthest, provided an impressive model ("war socialism") for Lenin and his Bolsheviks, who began systematically creating "the first despotic utopia."

Johnson's chapter on the Weimar republic is one of the gems of the book, argued in terms of what he calls "the East-West division" in German minds. The "Easterners," who had ruled Germany and who now sought to blame their hitherto powerless rivals, the "Westerners," for their own defeat in war, saw liberalism and democracy as a betrayal of the national culture, which they sought to preserve by calling for a "national awakening" and a revival of the "true" sovereignty of the state.

In the next chapter a subsidiary theme emerges, namely, the idea of Western imperialism as developed by J.A. Hobson and refined by Lenin. Colonial powers, instead of being judged on their merits, were now seen as always and everywhere evil. "The process whereby this crude and implausible theory became the conventional wisdom of most of the world, over the half-century which followed the Versailles Treaty, is one of the central developments of modern times, second only in importance to the spread of political violence."

In Britain, the rise of this belief in the interwar years was simply a part of a general loss of faith in the values of the culture. Sophisticated British public opinion became dominated by cynicism, lethargy, and a lack of passion well described by Johnson as a "torpid dampness." Of particular contemporary interest are the many features of the interwar British scene which anticipated the current peace and freeze movements in the West, such as the belief that armaments in themselves cause war or the way in which "the clergy, seizing on the peace issue as a remedy for declining congregations and their own flagging faith, . . . saturated the discussion in a soggy pool of lachrymose spirituality."

THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT
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This book of original essays provides an objective and enlightening analysis of the emergence and changing forms of the New Christian Right. The subject is in itself important in contemporary American life, but in addition, *The New Christian Right* reexamines standard theories of social movements and the relationship between religion and politics in America today.

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Herbert L. Costner
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Not until chapters 6 and 7, on America in the 20's and the Great Depression, are we given to understand clearly what might be the positive pole of modern history to set against the negative pole of anarchic state power, political violence, totalitarian collectivism, and Western self-hatred. It is, not surprisingly, the beneficial power of economic freedom, when set in a framework of limited institutions, to produce material goods and psychological satisfaction more abundantly than any utopian model of social engineering, and thereby also to counteract the very tendencies which destroyed old Europe.

Against prevailing prejudice, Johnson judges Harding and Coolidge highly as Presidents, though faulting the former for his choice of aides. But it is in his account of the onset of the Depression that Johnson really makes his point. Hoover was a failure not because he did nothing, but because he tried to do too much. As Secretary of Commerce under Harding and Coolidge, he "showed himself a corporatist, an activist, and an interventionist," and as President, in the fateful fall of 1929, he "agreed to take on the business cycle and stamp on it with all the resources of government." Protectionism, in the shape of the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, was only a logical corollary of Hoover's exercises in vulgar Keynesianism *avant la lettre*.

According to Johnson, the Depression would have been over by 1932 if the counter-cyclical efforts had not been pursued with such ruinous energy. This suggests, in turn, how false it is to credit the advent of Roosevelt as a great turning from callousness to compassion and from craven fear of business to energetic stimulation of the economy by government. From the start this was a myth, though one of fateful proportions, establishing for fifty years the notion that the Democrats were the party of progress, of compassion, of intellectual respectability, and of that new thing, "social justice."

The man-made disaster of the Depression had repercussions which have lasted to this day, as Johnson shows. Perhaps the most pervasive was the powerful reinforcement of cynicism, skepticism, and the "30's spirit, which had repudiated the virtues of capitalist enterprise and embraced those of collectivism." The march of "The Devils," as Johnson, echoing Dostoevsky, calls Stalin and Hitler and their henchmen, continued, bringing about, in due course, "The End of Old Europe" in 1939-41. With Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, which sealed Germany's fate and admitted Soviet power and rule to the very heart of the old continent, a new era began.

It is only proper that Johnson should devote as much space to the first twenty-odd years of our modern times as to the last forty, for it was in those fateful years of the Great War, the 20's, and the 30's that the shift to relativism, violence, and ideological justification of power was accomplished. What has happened since has generally been either a result of experience or an expansion of the fateful legacy of those years.

Johnson's account of the end of World War II and the early postwar period is fair and straightforward: the sorry tale of Allied folly and Soviet purposiveness, and its human cost in Europe and elsewhere, in 1944-45, can never be told often enough. Nor does it hurt to have another stake rammed through the corpse of the revisionism which has sought to "blame" the U.S. for the cold war, initiated entirely by Stalin in his efforts to expand Soviet power beyond the front lines of 1945.

After treating the cold war, Korea, and the 50's—"the most prosperous decade of modern times"—from the American perspective, Johnson next turns to the "failure of vision" and "collapse of will" that ended the British empire and turned much of South Asia and Africa over to superficially Westernized elites of professional politicians, "men who had never engaged in any other occupation except politics." Often they were lawyers, like Nehru, or agitating journalists, like Sukarno; sometimes junior officers, like Nasser; occasionally even clerics, like Nyerere. Triumphantly they went to Bandung, in Indonesia, in 1955, to celebrate the rise of the "nonaligned nations" of the world, and Bandung "completed [their] corruption. . . ." Political posturing and rhetoric, a belief that all problems could be solved by the simple act of propounding dramatic solutions, was combined by them with a contempt for actual economic progress and a resentment of the West which grew commensurately with the evidence of failure of their own regimes.

The final sections of the book pass from Africa through another look at India and China in the 60's and 70's to "The European Lazarus" and "America's Suicide Attempt." Johnson's account of the West European revival is succinct and accurate, although I must register a rare dissent from his view of de Gaulle as the "outstanding statesman of modern times." Certainly, de Gaulle's sense of history and his exercise of paternal authority were enormously beneficial to France and to Europe. But these advantages were probably outweighed by his utter failure to understand the nature of totalitarian rule in the Soviet Union, which he tended, naturally, to see as an old-fashioned empire with which one could negotiate on a basis of common interests, and even more by the incredible folly of his foreign-policy elite, who lacked his compensating greatness. The damage done by Gaullism to Atlantic solidarity has yet to be overcome.

In "America's Suicide Attempt" Johnson correctly notes that the Cuban missile crisis was essentially a defeat for the U.S., in that the price paid for withdrawing the missiles was a guarantee of inviolability for Castro's regime, with all that this has entailed in the Caribbean, in Africa, and in Central America. Kennedy is represented by Johnson as a weak President who not only surrendered American interests and principles in the Caribbean, and refused as well to honor solemn agreements (by not reacting to Soviet and East German violations in Berlin in 1961), but also, in the way he entered Vietnam, initiated a drama which

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became the very core and symbol of the end of American will to sustain a coherent global policy in behalf of the free world.

As the reader of *Modern Times* proceeds through "The Collectivist Seventies," he may well feel that there is not much to be said for the chances of freedom and of positive human forces in an age of ideology, political violence, professional revolutionaries, and state control of society. In a final chapter, "Palimpsests of Freedom," Johnson does see the forces of natural liberty at work and the fruits of economic good sense in "the Pacific free enterprise state, which by the early 1980's was perhaps the most encouraging aspect of human society." But these are merely islands in a rising sea. In general, "the state was the great gainer of the 20th century; and the central failure." Even if it is no longer seen as the engine of human happiness except by "a small, diminishing, and dispirited band of zealots," nevertheless, it is the states that have the power; and power, even when it does not corrupt, coopts.

A WORK of this size, and of such forthright and explicit judgment, must be read to be appreciated. Even those skeptical of the basic premise—that the modern predicament is the result of moral relativism—can share the excitement and tragedy of the political history of the 20th century as it unfolds in Paul Johnson's marvelously incisive and synthesizing account.

Back to Nature

PROMETHEAN FIRE: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF MIND. By CHARLES J. LUMSDEN and EDWARD O. WILSON. *Harvard. 216 pp. $17.50.*

Reviewed by HOWARD KAYE

A NEW generation of physical and biological scientists has been looking to nature rather than culture for authoritative answers to the troubling questions of who we are, what we can become, and how we are to live. Within this new wave, the entomologist and founding theorist of sociobiology, Edward O. Wilson, has emerged as a leading intellectual. His most recent book, *Promethean Fire*, coauthored with Charles J. Lumsden, a young theoretical physicist, boldly announces the discovery of the positivist grail: a true scientific account of the human essence.

Thanks to the theory of "gene-culture coevolution," the authors believe they can now explain human behavior and history by the interaction of genes, mind, and culture. This theory, they assert, "grounded in the facts, principles, and mathematics" of science, will enable us to construct a "more potent human science" with enormous "potential significance for a broad range of problems involving human behavior and social structure."

In thus attempting to analyze the underlying bio-logic of the mind and culture, and by proposing a mechanism through which the genes are said to guide and constrain the various ways we think, feel, and live, Wilson and Lumsden have again raised the stakes in the sociobiology debate. Wilson's monumental *Sociobiology* (1975) initiated this debate by synthesizing a wealth of scientific knowledge about the evolution of social behavior across the spectrum of species, from corals to man. Wilson's aim was to extend Darwinian analysis beyond the physical traits of organisms to their behavioral and social characteristics.

Sociobiology proved controversial because it presented a radical and disturbing view of organic life. According to Wilson, all traits of all organisms, including man, could be analyzed as genetically prescribed "devices" which increased the ability of an individual organism to survive and reproduce its genes in its particular environment. In effect, any organism could be viewed as nothing other than the means by which genes copied themselves. Everything from the aggregation of slime molds to the intellect and spirituality of homo sapiens, his social institutions and history, could

HOWARD KAYE, *a new contributor, teaches sociology at Franklin & Marshall College and is completing a book on the social and theoretical writings of modern biologists.*

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
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be accounted for through this simple calculus of genetic costs and benefits.

Wilson's work thus appeared to raise anew a number of troublesome questions: To what extent has our evolutionary history shaped the way we are and what we can become? To what extent, given the revelations of science, are human beliefs and moralities still valid? And to what extent can science tell us objectively how to live?

Prematurely proclaimed by the New York *Times* as a breakthrough in the scientific understanding of human behavior, *Sociobiology* was soon attacked for its alleged ideological implications, both by the political Left and by some of Wilson's own colleagues. In arguing for a greater role for biological processes and purposes in human affairs, and thus restricting the range of human choices, Wilson was accused of lending support to all kinds of racist, class-bound, and sexist defenses of the social status quo. Wilson responded sharply by attacking his critics as Marxist vigilantes and by largely ignoring their more substantive criticisms.

Wilson's next major work, the Pulitzer Prize-winning *On Human Nature*, was a popularized but even more speculative effort. The theme of *On Human Nature* was simple. The ancient question of "human nature," about which "literary" scholars had free-associated for thousands of years, could now be answered scientifically. The social sciences and humanities could now be, and indeed must be, absorbed into the natural sciences. In this way a biologically correct society and code of ethics—one built around species survival—could be achieved (at the price, to be sure, of the destruction of all those religious myths from which we have traditionally derived our moral consensus and sense of meaning).

Once again accused of a politically dangerous biological determinism, Wilson was now criticized as well for his assertion that "genes hold culture on a leash." According to Wilson, specific cultural patterns are either biological adaptations somehow under the control of genes (like the avoidance of incest) or exaggerated forms of previously adaptive behaviors (like nationalism). Some anthropologists, philosophers, and biologists were willing to concede the possibility that certain cultural universals—incest taboos, tool use, language—could indeed have a biological basis. They argued, however, that sociobiology could not account for human inventiveness, cultural diversity, and cultural change. For instance, the capacity and even the tendency to create religious myths, marriage ceremonies, and kinship systems might be in the genes, but how could their diverse *contents* be genetically prescribed? How could genetic evolution help us understand the origins and effects of the Industrial Revolution?

Wilson began working with Lumsden to develop a theory that could meet such objections. The result, *Genes, Mind, and Culture* (1981), was a highly theoretical attempt to integrate cognitive psychology, behavioral genetics, and cultural anthropology into a more sophisticated human sociobiology. The authors claimed to have discovered the mechanism by which the genes, by determining the structure and functioning of the human brain, could direct the creation of such cultural patterns as styles of dress and sex roles. Drawing on sophisticated mathematical reasoning borrowed from statistical mechanics, they attempted to demonstrate how the extreme cultural diversity described by anthropologists was compatible with elaborate genetic programming. In addition, their calculations suggested that genetic evolution could take place quite rapidly, in as little as 50 generations (what Lumsden and Wilson rather tastelessly referred to as the "thousand-year rule"). Thus biological changes could conceivably underlie broad historical changes.

Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the work and its intimidating mathematical arguments, *Genes, Mind, and Culture* caused more irritation than excitement. *Promethean Fire* is designed to popularize the analysis and to spell out its profound implications. Curiously, the book also presents the authors' personal account of the difficult road they followed to their currrent theoretical breakthrough. The purpose of this account is not simply to increase reader interest. Given the mathematical complexities of their original analysis, far beyond the tolerance and capacity of the average reader, and given the present lack of compelling evidence to support their theory, the authors' account becomes an essential means of authenticating their work by demonstrating their scientific sincerity. In contrast to their critics, whom they refer to as radical leftists and "thinkers" but never as scientists, the authors stress that they have proceeded in a strictly scientific fashion, developing their ideas not from personal hopes, political ideologies, or a-priori beliefs, but from "the discovery and synthesis of new facts" which then led "to the creation of new ideas," to be further refined and criticized by the community of their peers. The resulting theory, they tell us, is a triumph of the scientific method.

The theory of "gene-culture coevolution" which Lumsden and Wilson have developed is essentially a theory of how the mind works and generates culture. By "prescribing" the structure and biochemistry of the brain, genes also guide the development and workings of the mind in ways that either have been, or still are, biologically useful. Genes create what the authors call "epigenetic rules," innate mental tendencies and preferences (fear of snakes, love of sweets) which direct the way we perceive, think, feel, choose, and act. By doing so, these rules influence the formation of culture, which Lumsden and Wilson view as the simple sum of the genetically guided choices made by each individual from the array presented to him. The cultural patterns that prove biologically adaptive will enable the individuals possessing the correct epigenetic rules to survive and reproduce at higher rates. The naturally selected cultural elements, epigenetic rules, and the genes "prescribing" them will thus spread through the population. It is in this way that "genes hold culture on a leash."

According to the authors, the remarkable evolution of the human mind was essentially an evolution

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of epigenetic rules. These rules, however, do not rigidly determine our cultural choices; they only *bias* those choices and the frequency with which we shift between competing cultural options (such as incest and outbreeding). What is genetically determined, say the authors, "is not a particular social response but rather the statistical *pattern* of response across many societies." A certain amount of chance variation between societies—cultural diversity—is thus entirely compatible with genetic control. As for historical changes, Lumsden and Wilson simply observe that "at present there is no scientific proof that the essential qualities of a Charlemagne or the Quattrocento cannot emerge from a sophisticated theory of gene-culture coevolution applied to history."

Armed with the theory of gene-culture coevolution, the authors believe they can now solve "the great sphinx's riddle of the meaning of man," which has baffled all previous non-scientific philosophers. The answer, they warn, is not pretty; in fact it threatens our "most valued myths." The essence of man, his brain, is simply "a machine created by genetic evolution" to help us survive and reproduce. This "plain but awesome fact" means that in our politics, ethics, and self-understanding, we are not free to ignore our biological make-up and purposes. Moreover, since many of the epigenetic rules, such as those governing aggression and xenophobia, are now obsolete, inefficient, and downright harmful, they must be retooled by scientist/social engineers.

Is it time, then, to turn in our Plato, Augustine, and Freud? Or, to put the question differently, just what is the scientific status of *this* work? Although Lumsden and Wilson view their theory as orthodox science, certain questionable assumptions about mind and culture and an extreme reductionism mar their thought and inflate their claims.

Observers of men in society have always known that no human culture, not even our own, is a supermarket of discrete and competing cultural products—row upon row of hymns, gods, cuisines, clothing styles, styles of life—to which each individual is uniformly exposed, and from which he selects according to genetically prescribed preferences and abhorrences. Nor have existing cultural practices been selected solely for their survival value. Rather, each culture has done the shopping for us, circumscribing the chaos of possibility and ordering our choices to make our lives possible and meaningful. The mind is indeed no blank slate, and it certainly possesses a material basis. Yet as with books, which also have a material basis, the ideas expressed by the mind are virtually limitless.

Only an a-priori reductionism could lead one to conclude that *all* human choices and tendencies—even the "selection of social and economic roles" and the "goals and *principles that organize our daily* lives"—are governed by epigenetic rules. Not even the few such "rules" which Lumsden and Wilson do identify are so constraining. We may tend to fear and hate strangers, but we also find them attractive, even seductive. Children like sweets; we consider a cultivated palate one that has overcome this preference. Nor is the example of brother-sister incest avoidance so univocal. We may find the idea abhorrent, but even the authors refer to an undercurrent of "quiet titillation" at the prospect. The invention of birth control and amniocentesis makes the practice of incest harmless if not useful biologically.

A question which needs to be raised is why such distinguished scientists, claiming extreme scientific rigor, have allowed such flawed assumptions to guide their work. The authors themselves suggest an answer. Viewing the present as "the most dangerous of times," they hope that a true human science can provide us with "universal goals" and "absolute ethical truths," the highest of which is species survival, upon which we can all agree and by which we can conduct our lives. A moral and social passion is at work in this valuable attempt to integrate the disparate findings of various scientific specialities into a new natural philosophy with which to

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create a more harmonious and integrated society. But is it the right one? This is not for the authors, but rather for all of us, to say.

War & the USSR

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION. By EDWARD N. LUTTWAK. Appendices by HERBERT BLOCK and W. SETH CARUS. *St. Martin's. 242 pp. $14.95.*

Reviewed by ADAM B. ULAM

SOME years ago, before the events giving birth to Solidarity in 1980, I had occasion to chat with a Pole visiting this country. Though himself a member of Poland's ruling party, he not atypically launched into a violent denunciation of the Communists, the Soviet Union, and all associated phenomena. He concluded his diatribe with the exclamation, "Thank God the USSR is a Communist country!" When I expressed my astonishment at this seemingly paradoxical remark, he stated his conviction that if the Russians lived under a sensible system rather than Communism, they would long since have conquered the world.

Whatever one makes of my visitor's opinion, the episode is quite pertinent to the message of Edward Luttwak's book: that it is the sins of omission and commission (mostly the former) on the part of the Western world, rather than the inherent viability of the Soviet system, that is responsible for the shadow cast over the world by the USSR. Moscow's ideological attractiveness has long since waned; Marxism-Leninism has become fossilized; the Soviet economy is on the brink of stagnation; the standard of living is lower even than that of any of the European satellites. Nevertheless the Soviet empire, already the biggest in history, is still on the march, still trying, often successfully, to expand its areas of domination. In Luttwak's view, this has been made possible largely through the military preponderance which the USSR has achieved over the Western democracies—and achieved with their permission, as it were:

> Over the last thirty years, we have witnessed great political and economic changes that should have resulted in the consolidation of a decisive Western military superiority over the Soviet Union: the dissolution of the Russo-Chinese alliance, the postwar recovery of Western Europe and Japan. . . . But all these favorable changes have been offset by the spectacular growth of Soviet military power, the product of an armament effort of entirely unprecedented dimensions.

Luttwak rejects the notion that when it comes to power, economic, moral, or other factors can outweigh military ones. By military standards, "the Soviet system is roughly five times as efficient as the alliance that embraces the United States, NATO, Europe, and Japan, since the combined GNP's of those countries are roughly five times as great as the Soviet, while their conjoint power is at best equal." The rulers of the USSR, in Luttwak's formulation, have finally given up the hope, still alive in Khrushchev's period, of outstripping the U.S. in economic development and ideological appeal, and have placed all their bets on their vastly expanded military establishment. (An appendix by W. Seth Carus on the evolution of Soviet military power since 1967 presents startling statistics on the growth and modernization of practically every branch of Soviet military forces.) What is more, following the logic of its military superiority, the USSR in Luttwak's view has now passed the stage of prudent expansion and has entered upon a course of unabashed, warmaking imperialism.

The "conjunction of a long-term regime pessimism with current military optimism is the classic condition that makes deliberate war more likely," Luttwak writes. But against whom would this war be directed? Luttwak is almost as reassuring as the advocates of a nuclear freeze (if the comparison may be forgiven) in discounting the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike against the U.S. or an all-out invasion of Western Europe. We must remove "from consideration all war schemes that would require the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons and those which would entail any significant probability of a nuclear response by the victim." He then goes through a series of involved political, military, and psychological calculations from which he concludes that "the People's Republic of China has now become the Soviet Union's 'main enemy' and therefore the most likely target of war schemes aimed at enhancing its strategic security."

His premise is undeniable. For their own, and quite different, reasons, Moscow and Beijing may cool off their dispute and even effect a temporary rapprochement. But the prospect of the Chinese colossus achieving a solid industrial base and a correspondingly powerful military establishment remains a constant and gnawing worry to the Kremlin, dwarfing any concern it may loudly profess over "Pentagon warmongers." It is not for nothing that the Soviets have 46 divisions lined up along the Chinese border, and a number of SS-20's targeted on the People's Republic.

The actual war scenario sketched by Luttwak envisages Soviet forces carrying out a blitzkrieg against the poorly equipped and organized People's Army, and then occupying China's sparsely populated northwest. In view of the Soviets' enormous superiority in nuclear weapons, the Chinese presumably would not dare to use theirs, either against the invader or on targets within the USSR.

Luttwak is aware of the vast imponderables in his scheme, but refuses to be daunted by them. What of the huge territory and one billion people that would still remain under Beijing's rule? Well, "a petty warfare of raids and skirmishes may continue" after Soviet occupation of the outlying region, "but it is unlikely to detain more than a dozen Soviet divisions." One might well imagine Soviet marshals reading this scenario and sighing: if only things were that simple. What would the West do all the while? Answer: ". . . The relative growth

ADAM B. ULAM *is Gurney Professor of History and Political Science and director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. His most recent book is* Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics *(Oxford).*

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of Soviet military power has greatly reduced the indirect constraint imposed by American military strength upon Soviet conduct toward the Chinese." But has that constraint entirely disappeared? Would it not be an act of desperation on the part of the Kremlin to embark upon a gamble with such potentially catastrophic consequences? All one can say with confidence is that in this irrational world, Luttwak's vision cannot be summarily dismissed.

Luttwak's *general* point, certainly is well taken: the military preponderance which the Soviets now enjoy has considerably enlarged their scope of opportunities. Any further appearance of weakness on the part of the democracies, combined with exaggerated trust in Soviet prudence, can gravely endanger the security not only of the West, but of many other parts of the world as well. Hence his plea for a much more vigorous armaments build-up by the West. Although some may cry that this is a prescription for a suicidal arms race, in fact Luttwak's admonition is a useful and much needed corrective to the prevailing view, especially of those who have held that the U.S. does not need to keep up with the USSR in the number and power of its ICBM's.

The trouble with Luttwak's formulation of the problem lies in its tendency to put the cart before the horse. It is not so much the arms picture itself as a long-term West-

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

The Facsimile Edition of the Worms Mahzor is an entirely faithful, full colour replica, in original size (224 folio, 448 pages, 40 x 31cm), of one of the most important illuminated manuscripts of the Ashkenazi sphere of influence, written 1272, and now at the JNUL, Jerusalem (Ms.4°781/1). The edition, scheduled to appear in the fall 1984, is limited to 720 numbered copies, plus 30 publishers' copies. **Only as many copies as subscribed until 31st December 1983 will be printed.**

The publishers* selected ADEVA, Graz – the world's leading facsimile producers – as printers, binders, and general technicians. The Mahzor will be hand-bound in leather on wood boards, all pages to be hand-cut to conform to the original, and will be accompanied by a Commentaries' Book in Hebrew and English edited by Prof. Malachi Beit-Arie, containing important comments and articles by internationally known experts in the fields of Codicology, Jewish Art, Liturgy, Hebrew Language, Yidisch and Restoration.

For documentation folder, and sample page** please write to:

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ern misunderstanding of its psychological and political consequences that is responsible for today's situation. As Luttwak himself has repeatedly pointed out in his writings, military superiority in its own right avails but little in the game of international politics; to be meaningful, it must be backed up by political will and intelligence. After all, Stalin grabbed Eastern Europe when America had the monopoly of the bomb and its industrial power dwarfed that of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev made the Soviets a powerful factor in Middle East politics, trod heavily on Hungary, and authorized the Berlin Wall when the United States still had a crushing nuclear superiority over the USSR. Had the U.S. in 1945-48 been more aware of its strength, and of Russia's weakness, it could have, through forceful diplomacy, made Stalin moderate his policies.

CRUCIAL to the book's argument is the concept of "regime pessimism," which impels the Kremlin to compensate for its economic and ideological failures by amassing arms and achieving fresh conquests. The effectiveness of that compensatory mechanism depends in turn on Russian nationalism, which in fact if not in theory has become the main rationale of the Soviet system.

But is there any direct connection between Russian nationalism and the imperialist strivings of the Kremlin? Luttwak defines the structure of power in the USSR as follows: "The rule of the supreme rulers over the party which in turn rules over the Russians who *collectively* rule the non-Russians" (emphasis added). One does not have to be a Solzhenitsyn to question this formulation. The word "ruler," when referring to the USSR, is used properly only when describing some twenty to twenty-five people at the top of the party pyramid, and, secondarily, those few hundred bureaucats and military figures who *sometimes* influence the leaders' decisions. The Ukrainian Shcherbitsky and the Azerbaijani Aliyev, by virtue of their membership in the Politburo, are among the rulers. The mass of Russians, like their fellow citizens of other nationalities, are subjects.

To be sure, most Russians (including not a few dissidents) would be perplexed and pained by the prospect of the break-up of the USSR into ethnic states, while many Ukrainians must secretly wish for real autonomy or even independence for their land. But we have no grounds for believing that the average Russian, any more than the average Georgian or Ukrainian, derives special satisfaction from his rulers' imperialist ventures *abroad.* Nor, if they were given the true facts and were not anesthetized by official propaganda, would the mass of Soviet citizens of all nationalities agree that the present level of military expenditures (with all that it implies for their standard of living) is justified by considerations of national security.

In brief, while the regime manipulates Russian nationalism, and very skillfully, for its own purposes, in essence it is no more nationalist than it is "socialist" or "progressive." The Kremlin does try to flatter the national pride of the Great Russians, but foreign expansion and the piling up of arms are designed to serve as an object lesson to the whole Soviet people: it is under the present system that the USSR has been steadily advancing in power and worldwide influence and has preserved social cohesion, while the democracies, for all their alleged freedoms and riches, have been in disorderly retreat on the international scene and gripped by turmoil at home.

ONE may disagree with Luttwak on individual points, but it is impossible to deny the originality and boldness of this *tour de force.* Its general thrust goes far to liberate the reader's mind from the stale stereotypes that have characterized so much of the recent debate over America's foreign and defense policies. As with all good books, the lesson it carries goes beyond the writer's explicit conclusions and recommendations. Luttwak stresses the military side of the issue. An attentive reader will not fail to perceive that only by recouping the drive toward effective unity—political and economic as well as military—which seemed so promising in the 1950's and early 1960's, will the Western democracies be able to arrest the drift toward international anarchy and frustrate the designs of those who propagate and exploit it.

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